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Resumen:
La teoría dual de sistemas visuales, tal como es defendida por Andy Clark, David Milner y Alvin 
Goodale cuenta con grandes ventajas en la explicación de los procesos computacionales requeridos 
para la experiencia perceptual y el control visual de la actividad motora. Sin embargo, el 
planteamiento de la teoría por parte de éstos autores conduce a una noción de la acción intencional 
según la cual ésta se encuentra disociada en dos elementos: un proceso de nivel personal, que 
involucra la toma de decisiones en términos de tipos de acciones y objetos sobre los cuales ejercer 
la acción; y  un proceso de nivel subpersonal, que involucra la ejecución de rutinas motoras. Esta 
caracterización de la acción intencional es problemática en tanto que, al situar la realización física 
de la acción en el nivel subpersonal, no puede dar cuenta del compromiso epistémico involucrado 
en la interacción corporal del sujeto con su entorno. Tampoco puede dar cuenta de las relaciones 
normativas que hay entre la estructura del entorno, la estructura de la actividad y la intención que 
guía dicha actividad. Defenderé la tesis de que la evidencia que motiva la teoría dual de sistemas 
visuales puede sustentar una interpretación diferente, que admita una visión de la acción como un 
fenómeno unitario y plenamente normativo. Dicha interpretación debe darse en términos de los 
tipos de normatividades que caracterizan los contenidos mentales proporcionados por cada una de 
las corrientes, y no ya en términos de procesos personales y subpersonales. 
Palabras Clave: Percepción, actividad motora, normatividad, contenido, nivel personal de 
explicación, nivel subpersonal de explicación, compromiso epistémico, responsabilidad.
Abstract:
The dual visual streams hypothesis, as it is defended by Andy Clark, David Milner and Alvin 
Goodale constitutes a very  good explanation of the computational processes required for perceptual 
experience and the visual control of motor activity. However, the theory leads to a view according 
to which intentional action is dissociated in two separate elements: a personal level process, which 
involves the formation of intentions in terms of  action-types and target-objects; and a subpersonal 
process that involves the execution of sensorimotor routines. This view is problematic insofar as  it 
situates the execution of actions at a subpersonal level and therefore it cannot account for the 
epistemic commitment that is involved in the bodily interaction between a subject and her 
environment, or the normative relations between the structure of the environment, the structure of 
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motor activity and the intentions that guide it.  I will defend the thesis that the empirical evidence 
that supports the hypothesis can also support a different interpretation that admits a view of action 
as a unitary phenomenon that is entirely  normative. Such interpretation should be given in terms of 
the different kinds of normativities that characterize the perceptual contents processed by each of 
the visual streams.
Key words: Perception, motor activity, normativity, content, personal level of explanation, 
subpersonal level of explanation, epistemic commitment, normativity.
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Introduction
This thesis is an exercise in the conceptual analysis of one of the most controversial, and yet most 
explanatory, hypotheses in contemporary sciences of vision: Alvin Goodale and David Milner's 
Dual Visual Stream Hypothesis. This hypothesis is developed as an attempt to explain the 
functional significance of the separation of visual brain processing in two independent streams. 
Several hypotheses about a dual function in vision were advanced in the past century. Milner and 
Goodale's reinterprets the functional division in terms of a specialization oriented to two kinds of 
motor outputs. One of the streams processes information in the format required to form a visual 
representation of the world, which makes possible the intelligent selection of actions. The other is in 
charge of the processing of visual information oriented to visuomotor control. The proposal, in 
other words, claims that one stream is in charge of vision for perception and the other is in charge 
of vision for action. This view of the functional division constitutes a philosophical thesis of great 
import.
Milner and Goodale's hypothesis plays a central role in the contemporary philosophical debate 
concerning the content  of perceptual experience and its relation to motor activity. The debate 
between conceptualist theories of perception and those defending the existence of a non-conceptual 
content is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy. On one extreme there are theories 
such as McDowell’s (1994a) that argue for a conceptualist view of the contents of experience, 
appealing to the role they play  in the justification of empirical knowledge. On the other extreme, 
there are theories that defend that the content of experience must be non-conceptual, such as 
Evans’ (1982), Cussins’ (2003) and Peacocke’s (1998; 2001). Amongst these theories, some claim 
that the content of experience is (at least partly) determined by its role in the control and guidance 
of motor action. The debate between these theories is framed by  two fundamental questions that I 
will address throughout the thesis: (1) Are the contents of experience conceptual or non-
conceptual?; (2) What is the relation between the content of experience and motor action?
Milner and Goodale’s empirical hypothesis, and all the evidence presented in its favor, have a direct 
relevance to this debate. The theory comprises a view of the contents of experience that goes hand 
in hand with a view of intentional action, both of which are germane to the questions involved in 
the debate. Andy Clark (2001) argues that this theory presents evidence against philosophical views 
that claim that there is a direct link between experience and motor control, and in favor of views 
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claiming that the content of experience has a conceptual (or concept-ready) nature. If Milner and 
Goodale’s theory  and the empirical evidence they  present were taken at face value, the debate 
would be resolved in favor of the views that deny  a direct link between experience and motor 
action.
The idea that I will develop  in this work is that, even though the hypothesis is an excellent 
physiological and functional explanation of the division of labor in the visual system, it is not a 
good philosophical theory about the relation between perception and action. Extending a functional 
division of brain processes to the personal level, as a division at the level of perceptual experience 
and intentional action, brings about grave conceptual problems that I will expose. Insofar as the 
theory  is supposed to play an important role in the resolution of a philosophical debate, as Clark 
pretends, these problems should be carefully considered as a factor in the assessment of the theory 
and, especially, the reach of its philosophical implications. 
Following the line traced by these initial objections, I will sketch a model for a theory of the 
relation between perception and action. The model sketches a view of action that has implications 
for theories of the content of perception. I will attempt to show that perception has a normative 
relation to motor action that  consists in serving as a guide for the execution of bodily movements 
that are attuned to the environment. I will claim that, in order to fulfill this role, perceptual 
experience must have non-conceptual contents that are directly involved in the guidance of motor 
activity. Furthermore, I will argue that this philosophical claim is not incompatible with the current 
empirical evidence.
This dissertation deals with an empirical hypothesis and attempts to undermine it  through 
conceptual considerations. One of the most important questions about this research concerns its 
relevance: why  is conceptual analysis important for an empirical theory? As I will attempt to show 
throughout this work, the theory I will be examining has a great deal of philosophical content, not 
only because of its implications, but also because some of its assumptions have a highly 
philosophical nature. The terms in which the debate is formulated and the general framework in 
which it is presented also involve philosophical concepts and theses. For this reason I will address a 
hybrid version of the hypothesis, situated in between the empirical and the philosophical. This runs 
the risk of over interpreting Milner and Goodale's view. However, this version can arguably be 
found in Andy Clark's philosophical interpretation, and in an analysis of the concepts and 
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assumptions behind the formulation of the theory. Strictly  speaking, the target of my objections will 
be the philosophical elements in the theory. I will question some presuppositions and object to some 
consequences of the theory. I will also analyze the way  in which these philosophical components 
interact with the empirical elements of the theory. 
The philosophical concepts and background assumptions of the theory allowed me to select a 
philosophical framework for its interpretation and assessment. The framework I take is that of 
theories of the content of experience with a neo-Fregean and normativistic tendency. Such choice is 
justified both by the kind of concepts employed by the authors in the formulation and defense of 
their hypothesis, and by the fact that its philosophical consequences are clearly  situated in such 
framework. 
The defense of this thesis has a limited scope and will be done within the framework of some, 
perhaps problematic, assumptions. One of them is that perceptual experience has contents. I will not 
engage in a debate with views that hold that experience is to be understood as a direct  relation with 
objects (i.e. without contents), like Campbell’s, Martin’s or Brewer’s; nor with views that reject that 
experience plays a justificatory role in judgments, like Davidson’s. The debate with these positions 
will be postponed for another occasion.
In general terms, this work attempts to show that the philosophical consequences that Andy Clark 
draws from Milner and Goodale's view, and its supposed impact on the debate about perceptual 
experience, are unsound. Within the framework in which the debate is situated, Milner and 
Goodale’s theory  leads to conceptual problems. It will be shown that, in this conceptual framework, 
the theory  cannot appropriately account for the relation between perception and action. This 
dissertation can be seen as a case study of a more general problem: the influence of philosophical 
concepts and assumptions in the formulation of empirical theories, and vice versa. It attempts to 
explore in depth the consequences of the interdisciplinary dialogue established by Milner and 
Goodale's theory.  
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Chapter 1
The Dual Visual Streams Hypothesis
The dual visual streams hypothesis is a model for the functional interpretation of the physiological 
division of visual processing in the human and primate brain. Visual information passes by the 
retina, through the geniculostriate stream, to the primary  visual cortex (V1). From this point two 
streams emerge: one that carries visual information to the inferior temporal cortex, and one that 
carries information to the posterior parietal cortex. The former is known as the ventral stream and 
the latter, as the dorsal stream. Researchers on vision agree that there is a physiological division 
and that its has important functional implications. Each stream has characteristic modes of 
information processing, and it  is known that each one is adapted to codify certain properties of the 
visual field. There is, however, some disagreement regarding the precise nature of the functional 
division. 
There have been diverse theories about a functional division in the brain systems that support visual 
coding. Trevarthen (1968) was the first to postulate two distinct functions for vision. He named one 
of them “ambient vision” and the other, “focal vision”. The former served the purpose of providing 
guidance for movements of the entire body, such as locomotion and posture adjustment. The latter 
served the purpose of guiding fine motor control.
Schneider (1969) proposed a distinction between a subcortical and a cortical stream. The former 
used the projections from the retina to the superior colliculus in order to localize objects in the 
visual field. The latter was the geniculostriate stream, which enabled the identification of objects. 
This hypothesis is known as the division between the “what” and “where” systems. Ungerleider and 
Mishkin (1982) adopted this approach to the functional division, but proposed a different 
neurological implementation. According to their view both streams are cortical. The function of 
identification was associated to what we currently know as the ventral stream and the function 
localization was associated to the dorsal stream. Livingston and Hubel (1988) adopted a similar 
view, adding an association between the dorsal and ventral streams and the mango and parvo-
cellular streams.
Trevarthen draws the functional division as responding to the different kinds of conduct to which 
vision contributes. Ungerleider and Mishkin draw the division in terms of the different visual 
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properties that are codified by each stream. The latter distinction is drawn in terms of visual inputs, 
whereas the former is drawn in terms of the distinct behavioral outputs that are served by  visual 
processing. This difference in the portrayal of the division involves suppositions about the function 
of vision and, more generally, about the reason for the modularization of cognitive functions. As 
will be clear in the following section, these suppositions have important consequences on the way 
in which hypothesis are formulated, and may even lead to important philosophical consequences.
1.1 Milner and Goodale’s bold proposal
Milner and Goodale (1995; 2004) advance a hypothesis that starts from the idea that the primary 
function of vision is the distal control of motor outputs (1995: 7, 18) Vision emerges in the 
evolution of vertebrates as a mechanism for the control of action. For this reason, if there are two 
streams for visual processing, their apparition must have responded to selective pressures on action 
itself. Consequently the explanation of the functional division should start from the motor outputs 
for which the different kinds of visual processing are destined.
Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis, which Andy Clark (2009) calls their “bold proposal”, is that the 
division between ventral and dorsal streams should be understood as a division between vision for 
perception and vision for action. One of the motivations for this proposal is the idea that the 
computational requirements for these functions are radically different. In order to obtain a visual 
representation of the world, visual information must be codified in a characteristic way, very 
different from the way in which it must be codified to appropriately guide motor control.
According to their model, the ventral stream codifies visual information in a manner appropriate for 
the construction of a visual representation of the world, whose contents are objects, events, 
properties and relations. The type of visual processing that  goes on in the ventral stream is what 
allows subjects to carry out  perceptual tasks, such as object discrimination, recognition and 
categorization. In order to accomplish these tasks, the ventral stream must create representations of 
particular objects, which in turn requires it to compute perceptual constancies, in an allocentric 
coordinate system, with relative metrics, and that it does so by working in close connection with 
short and long term memory  (Milner and Goodale 1995: 2, 20). Lets call this set of computational 
requirements for perception, Set P.
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On the other hand, the dorsal stream codifies visual information for the purpose of fine motor 
control; that is, for the fulfillment of motor tasks such as navigation, grasping objects, catching 
them in the air, etc. These tasks require that the brain has access to constantly  updated information 
about the position of objects relative to the subject’s body and their real size, in order to be able to 
act upon them. For these tasks, the dorsal stream codifies spatial properties in an egocentric 
coordinate system (moreover, in several effector-specific coordinate systems) and it computes an 
absolute metric for objects (Milner and Goodale 2004: 75-6). From now on I will refer to these 
requirements for motor control as Set M.
The functional division thus stated intends to be consistent with engineering principles. This view is 
consistent with, and possibly  motivated by, the idea that natural selection of brain systems for vision 
obeys to selection pressures on the motor outputs of such systems. Starting from the premise that 
there are two types of tasks (perceptual and visuomotor), and showing that each of them requires a 
particular type of codification, it seems to follow naturally  that those tasks are carried out by  two 
independent systems.
[W]e propose that the anatomical distinction between the ventral and dorsal streams 
corresponds to the distinction we made earlier between perceptual representation and 
visuomotor control. In other words, the reason there are two cortical pathways is that 
each must transform incoming visual information for different purposes (Milner and 
Goodale 1995: 24)
This division of labor must  have emerged in our primate ancestors because of the 
different processing demands imposed by these two functions of vision (Milner and 
Goodale 2004: 73)
It may seem paradoxical to assert that  vision is a mechanism for the control of action and then 
characterize one of the streams of visual processing as “vision for perception”. However, these 
ideas do not conflict in Milner and Goodale’s theory. Codification in the ventral stream is as 
oriented towards action as codification in the dorsal stream, though in a very different way. Ventral 
processing subserves the intelligent and flexible selection of action types and target objects1.
In Milner and Goodale’s 1995 and 2004 books, there is an implicit inference to the best explanation, 
which runs as follows:
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1 See: Chapter 2
(1) There are two kinds of tasks, perceptual and motor, for each of which there is a set of 
computational requirements: respectively, Set P and Set M
(2) Set P and Set M impose incompatible and interfering tasks for a system of visual coding.
(3) If incompatible and interfering tasks are carried out by a single system, it will not function 
properly and effectively.
(4) Evolution favors the division of labor in order that tasks are carried out effectively.
(5) The human visual system performs effectively and successfully for both perceptual and 
visuomotor tasks (i.e. typically there is no interference between tasks)
(6) ∴ The coding of visual information for perceptual tasks functions independently  of the 
coding for visuomotor tasks.
The argument is supposed to substantiate Milner and Goodale’s bold claim. However, the claim is 
stronger than the conclusion yielded by  the argument. Their hypothesis is that information used for 
motor control is not only  useless for the performance of perceptual tasks, but it is inaccessible to the 
subject’s visual experience.
The visual information used by  the dorsal stream for programming and on-line control, 
according to the model, is not perceptual in nature. According to our definitions, 
therefore, it cannot be accessed consciously, even in principle. In other words, although 
we may be conscious of the actions we perform, the visual information used to program 
and control those actions can never be experienced (Milner and Goodale 2008: 776).
According to the quote, the visual information used for motor control cannot, in principle, be part of 
experience. From this statement it  may be inferred that the information that constitutes the content 
of visual perception can never be used for the purpose of motor control. If information used in 
motor control is not perceptual in nature, it may  be said that perceptual information is not 
visuomotor in nature and thus cannot be accessed by the processes that guide motor control; i.e. the 
fact that  certain information is part of perceptual experience implies that it  does not play  a role in 
motor control.
Thus, Milner and Goodale’s argument is supposed to yield the stronger conclusion:
(7) ∴ The contents of visual perception are not accessible for processes of visuomotor 
control, and the information used for visuomotor control is not accessible to the subject’s 
perceptual experience
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The argumentative step from (6) to (7) doesn’t  seem to be entirely legitimate. It  involves an 
unjustified transition between two levels of description. (6) is a thesis about the independence of 
brain processes that are necessary for the fulfillment of certain tasks. (7) is a thesis about the 
separation between perception and motor action, which are personal level phenomena.2 
Furthermore, going from (6) to (7) implies a transition form a factual statement about the 
independence of two brain systems, to a statement about the inaccessibility in principle of certain 
information to personal-level perceptual experience. (7) is not a thesis about neural modularity, nor 
about informational encapsulation of brain processes. Milner and Goodale actually maintain that 
there are neural connections and information exchange between both streams (1995: 204). Rather, 
(7) states that the contents3 of visual experience are inaccessible in principle to the processes of 
visuomotor control, and vice versa. 
The transition from (6) to (7) can be seen as one of several interpretative steps that take place in 
Milner and Goodale’s formulation of their hypothesis. The first  step is one that goes from the 
anatomical to the functional level; that is, from the level of brain structures, to the level of 
computational requirements and tasks. All of the evidence that Milner and Goodale bring forth, as 
well as the argument above (1-6), give strong theoretical and empirical support to this inference. 
The transition from (6) to (7) involves a further step, from the computational to the personal level of 
explanation4. Milner and Goodale seem to suppose that the support for the first transition is, so to 
speak, inherited by the second transition. This supposition is warranted, only if the theory 
presupposes a certain conception of perceptual experience, which I will refer to as the narrow view 
of experience, and which I will explain in the following sections of this chapter. I will argue that 
this view of experience also permeates their interpretation of empirical evidence.
Because of the transition from (6) to (7) Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis about a 
neurophysiological division turns out  to be a highly counterintuitive philosophical thesis. The 
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2  In Milner and Goodale’s texts there seem to be several unjustified transitions between levels of explanation. They 
move from talking about information processing in the brain to talk about perception and action, and vice versa.
3 It may seem tendentious and illegitimate to talk about contents, when I’ve been talking about information. I use term 
to refer to the visual information that is part of the subject’s perceptual experience. Its use is not tendentious (at least for 
my part) insofar as Milner and Goodale define perception as a representation of the environment. I will assume that it is 
legitimate to talk about the contents of perception when perception is understood as a representation. In the following 
section (1.2) I will analyze the notion of perceptual experience that is used by Milner and Goodale.
4 For an explanation of the way in which the notion of “personal-level” will be used in this thesis, see Chapter 2.
stronger conclusion (7) plays a central role in the current philosophical debate about perceptual 
experience. The main exponent of the philosophical importance of Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis 
is Andy  Clark. In his 2001 article, “Visual Experience and Motor Action”, Clark argues that the 
hypothesis contradicts an intuitive view of perceptual experience that is central in the contemporary 
debate about the non-conceptual content of experience. Clark refers to this view as the assumption 
of experience based control (EBC)
Assumption of Experience-Based Control (EBC): Conscious visual experience presents 
the world to the subject in a richly textured way, a way  that presents fine detail (detail 
that may, perhaps, exceed our conceptual or propositional grasp) and that is, in virtue of 
this richness, especially  apt for, and typically  utilized in, the control and guidance of 
fine-tuned, real-world activity. (Clark 2001: 496)
EBC is the assumption according to which the contents of experience provide a basis for the control 
of motor activity. According to Clark’s formulation it is the richness and fineness of detail of 
experience that make it apt for the guidance of motor activity.5
Clark argues that the empirical evidence that supports the dual visual stream hypothesis goes 
against EBC, insofar as it  shows that  motor control is independent from, and inaccessible to, visual 
experience. The systems for visuomotor control do not  use visual information that is part of the 
subject’s experience, hence experience plays no role in the guidance of motor activity. 
Insofar as empirical evidence refutes EBC, it also refutes the theories of non-conceptual content that 
seek to establish a direct link between experience and motor activity. According to Clark, Milner 
and Goodale’s empirical proposal supports either the philosophical theories that hold that perceptual 
content is conceptual (Clark 2001: 514), or the theories that commit to non-conceptual content but 
establish an indirect link between such content and motor action (Clark 2001: 515).6 For this reason 
Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis is germane to the philosophical debate concerning perceptual 
experience and should be carefully examined.
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5  Throughout the thesis I will use this concept (motor activity) to refer to a subject’s bodily movements in an 
environment.  Motor activity is not the same as intentional action. It is the way in which the body moves in, and interacts 
with, its environment, either for the fulfillment of an intention or in a non-intentional way.  I will explain this point in 
length in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2)
6 For an exhaustive presentation and analysis of Clark’s argument, see Chapter 4.
The transition from (6) to (7) doesn’t seem to be entirely legitimate. If it is granted that there is a 
conceptual problem in this transition, and that a further argument is needed for its justification, then 
Clark’s philosophical interpretation also requires a thorough conceptual examination.
The argument described above is not the only  support for Milner and Goodale’s bold proposal. 
Their theory not only “makes excellent computational sense” (Clark 2001: 501), but it puts forward 
a wide variety of empirical evidence. This evidence is what justifies, for Milner and Goodale, the 
transition from (6) to (7). As I will argue, the justification for this transition depends on the implicit 
assumption of a particular conception of perceptual experience that is pervasive in Milner and 
Goodale’s work. On the light of this conception, the empirical evidence has only one possible 
explanation: Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis. I will argue that if this conception is cast  aside, or 
simply  bracketed, there are at least two possible interpretations for the evidence, one of which 
doesn’t lead to Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis, nor to the denial of EBC. 
In this chapter I will show that Milner and Goodale’s model is based on the implicit acceptance of a 
particular definition for the theoretical term: perceptual experience. I will exhibit the crucial role 
that this term plays in the formulation of the model. In the following chapters I will reject the 
meaning that is given to this term, based on the conceptual problems that it entails. I will also show 
that it is possible to propose a different model for the interpretation of empirical evidence.
1.2 The narrow view of experience
In the Introduction to The Visual Brain in Action (1995), Milner and Goodale characterize 
perception as “subserving recognition and identification of objects and events, and their spatial and 
temporal relations” (1995: 2). Perception, they  claim, excludes reflexive phenomena (as the control 
of pupillary diameter) and the processing of visual information used for the online control of skillful 
action, such as walking or grasping objects (1995: 2). According to their model, the function of 
visual perception is to construct a perceptual representation of the environment, which allows for 
flexibility and intelligence in the control of action. This is accomplished by means of object 
categorization, abstraction from particular points of view, the processing of perceptual invariances 
and the independence between particular visual inputs and motor outputs. They claim that ventral 
processing:
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subserves an intermediate goal in the guidance of behavior, specifically the formation of 
perceptual representations of objects and of their relationships. Such representations are 
necessary  if behavior is to be guided intelligently  by events that have occurred at an 
earlier time, allowing, for example, a mate or a prey object to be categorized correctly 
and, thus, acted upon appropriately. This use of vision in the categorization and 
recognition of objects must rely  on stored information that can be abstracted from 
particular viewpoints or contexts in which the object might be seen. Furthermore, to 
permit maximum flexibility this system must be free from rigid linkage to particular 
possible responses, though the system would be essential for the selection of goals and 
the selection of actions relating to those goals. This perceptual system would by its 
nature have to be independent of particular motor outputs. (Milner and Goodale 1995: 
20)
Thus, from the outset, a certain view about visual experience can be discerned. In the first place, 
visual experience is a representation of the world, hence it has some kind of content. This 
representation is used for the purposes of recognition, identification and categorization of objects. 
In order to fulfill this functions, visual experience requires the processing of perceptual constancies 
and invariant features. We can say, therefore, that the contents of visual experience are particular 
objects, and their relationships, with invariable properties, which are prone to categorization and 
recognition. 
This characterization is further developed with their definition of perceptual tasks: those tasks by 
means of which it can be determined whether a certain visual stimulus is part  of a subject’s 
conscious experience. Perceptual tasks are performed by  means of perceptual reports. The criterion 
for the fixation of a certain content in a subject’s conscious experience is the (potential) 
reportability of the content (Milner and Goodale 2008: 775).7 In other words, the accessibility of a 
certain stimulus to the subject’s experience is determined by the possibility to report the stimulus. 
Verbal reports are the most common case of a perceptual task: subjects make verbal assertions 
based on their experience. There are also non-verbal reports that can be conveyed by  manual 
gestures (such as pointing in the direction of a stimulus, indicating the orientation of a slot  with the 
orientation of the hand, or indicating the size of an object with the tips of the fingers). These tasks 
involve bodily movements, but  they are distinguished from visuomotor tasks in that they respond to 
verbally formulated questions, while visuomotor tasks consist of object  oriented actions. Manual 
reports are acts of communication:
19
7 This criterion is standard and uncontroversial in the field of psychophysics and experimental psychology. However, 
my argument intends to cast doubt on its use for the purpose of drawing philosophical conclusions regarding the nature 
of perceptual experience.
It is the purpose of the movement that matters. When we asked people to use their hand 
to show us what they saw in the matching test, they were reporting on their conscious 
perception of the slot in front of them. Turning the hand in this case was an act of 
communication. The fact that the communication happened to be manual was arbitrary
—the same information could have been conveyed by a variety of different means. They 
could have drawn a line on a piece of paper, for example; or picked the correct 
orientation from a number of alternatives in a multiple choice test; or of course they 
could simply have told us in words. (Milner and Goodale 2004: 28-9)
According to this definition of perceptual tasks, every report is an act of communication. In these 
reports, subjects assert something about their experience. Acts of assertion have been traditionally 
regarded as expressions of judgments. This view of assertion can be traced back to Frege’s “On 
sense and Reference” (1948) and “The Thought” (1956). Thus, a perceptual report  is the expression 
of a perceptual judgment. In order to report  a stimulus, the subject must perform a judgment based 
on the contents of her experience, which will be the content of her assertion.8
In accordance with this Fregean view, if the criterion for attributing contents to a subject’s 
perceptual experience is the reportability of the content, it follows that a necessary condition for 
such attribution is that the content is liable to form part of a perceptual judgment. That is, if the 
information that counts as an experience is just the information that  the subject  can report (at  least 
in principle), then for information to be considered a content of experience it must be apt for 
articulation in a judgment. Information that cannot enter a perceptual judgment is information that 
the subject  cannot report in principle, not even potentially; hence it will not be considered a content 
of the subject’s conscious experience.
These features of Milner and Goodale’s view of experience make it  very similar to philosophical 
theories that maintain that the content of experience is conceptual or concept-ready. In order to be 
liable to categorization and to become a part of a judgment, the contents of experience must be 
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8  There is a potential objection to this point of my argument, regarding the relevance of a Fregean analysis of an 
empirical criterion. In a purely empirical theory, the philosophical implications of experimental models may be entirely 
irrelevant. However, the theory I am analyzing involves both empirical and philosophical theses and has important 
philosophical consequences, that I have presented in the first section of this chapter. Moreover, the philosophical 
implications that Clark draws from Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis have a direct impact on theories of perception that 
are situated in a Fregean framework: Evans’, Cussins’, McDowell’s and Peacocke’s. In other words, the philosophical 
debate that this hypothesis raises is framed by the presuppositions and concepts of a neo-Fregean approach to 
philosophy of mind and language.  The impact of the hypothesis on these theories should be assessed in a manner that is 
consistent with the philosophical framework where they are situated. 
either conceptual or concept-ready.9 Categorization is the subsumption of something under a certain 
category. This can be a process of conceptualization. If a subject sees an object as a laptop, in virtue 
of its properties of shape, size, and color, the process of categorization consists in subsuming the 
object under the category “laptop”. She may be said to see the object  as falling within the extension 
of the concept “x is a laptop”.10 
On the other hand, judgments have been traditionally regarded as propositions that are endorsed as 
true (Frege 1948; 1956). Propositions, in turn, are composed of concepts. Therefore, if a specific 
content is apt to be part of a judgment, it must be either conceptual or concept-ready (that is, 
subsumable under concepts).11  Following this line of thought, if the only criterion available for 
attributing contents to a subject’s experience is that the content can be reported, then the contents of 
a subject’s perception are only  those that she can report, at least in principle. Since perceptual 
reports are expressions of judgments, it can be said that a necessary condition for a certain stimulus 
or information to count as part of the subject’s experience is that  such information is prone to be 
articulated in judgment and reported. In order to be available for an articulation in judgment, 
contents must be conceptual, or concept-ready.
This understanding of perceptual experience is what I will call the narrow view of experience. This 
view restricts the contents of experience to those that are prone to be articulated in judgments. 
According to this view, if a certain stimulus or information is not available to be articulated in a 
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9 The notion of concept-readiness (as I will use it throughout the thesis) is taken from McDowell (1994a). He claims 
that, even if the contents of our experience may not be already conceptualized --in the sense that subjects have at their 
disposal the relevant concepts under which the content can be subsumed-- they are all concept-ready, or 
conceptualizable, insofar as they can always be captured by means of demonstrative concepts (See: McDowell 1994a: 
Chapter 3). This point is fundamental to support the idea that every perceptual report involves a judgment. This idea 
could be refuted by saying that non-verbal perceptual reports do not involve judgments, since subjects don’t possess the 
necessary concepts to subsume the contents of experience. To this objection, it may be replied that the report of the 
orientation of a line by means of a hand gesture consists in the expression of a judgment involving a demonstrative 
concept. What makes the report the expression of a judgment is its purpose in the context of a perceptual task: to answer 
a propositionally formulated question.
10 Strictly speaking,  categorization cannot be equated with conceptualization. The reason is that there may be processes 
of categorization in non-conceptual animals. Animals may see some object as food or as a predator, thereby 
categorizing the object,  and yet they cannot be said to be in possession of the concepts “food” or “predator” (not in any 
of the senses in which it is said of a human being to possess a concept). I will not touch the issue of how animals may 
categorize without concepts, but rather I’ll restrict my argument to human perception.  I’ll say that,  in Milner and 
Goodale’s theory, the categorizability of contents does amount to concept-readiness. The reason is that, besides being 
prone to categorization, these contents must be available for reports.
11 There are passages where Clark uses the notion of “non-conceptual judgements”, or judgements that do not involve 
the use of concepts (2007: 586). In the Fregean framework where Clark places this debate, judgements are considered to 
be conceptual exercises par excellence, which is why the notion seems to be out of place. On the other hand, the notion 
of a judgement that doesn’t involve conceptual abilities is simply obscure. If this notion is to be taken seriously in the 
current debate, its soundness would be Clark’s burden of proof.
judgment, and reported, then such a stimulus is not considered part  of the subject’s perceptual 
experience.  As I will argue below, Milner and Goodale’s conception of experience plays a central 
role in the way in which they present and interpret empirical evidence.
1.3 Empirical evidence for the dual visual streams hypothesis
One of the virtues of Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis is the great variety  of empirical evidence that 
supports it. In this section I will present some of the most relevant cases and  experiments that they 
present. I will describe only the cases that most clearly support their conclusion. The rest  of the 
experiments are variations of these, which do not alter the results of my analysis in a relevant way. I 
leave it to the reader to verify whether this is so.
The evidence for the hypothesis can be divided in three groups. The first group contains evidence 
from neurophysiological studies carried out on primates and humans, by means of functional 
imagery of the brain. This group will be excluded from my exposition, since I have no interest in 
debating the thesis on this level of explanation. In what follows I will take for granted: (1) that there 
are two streams of processing for visual information; (2) that this separation has functional 
implications that can be discerned in neurophysiological studies, as well as in psychological studies. 
What I intend to discuss is Milner and Goodale’s philosophical interpretation of this functional 
division (7). For this purpose I will discuss the evidence from the second and third groups, in which 
the link to the philosophical thesis is manifest.
The evidence in groups two and three consists in a set of experiments that seek to display  a double 
dissociation between perceptual and visuomotor tasks. The second group  includes experiments 
carried out on people suffering from different brain pathologies. It includes three types of 
pathologies: optic ataxia, visual form agnosia and blindsight. The third contains experiments carried 
out on healthy  subjects, which, like the others, display a double dissociation between the two 
functions of the visual system.
1.3.1 Dissociation in pathological cases
This group contains the most prominent source of evidence for Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis. 
The pathological cases clearly exhibit a double dissociation between perceptual and visuomotor 
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tasks, which Milner and Goodale take as a dissociation between the contents of experience and the 
information that guides visuomotor control. I’ll present and analyze the cases to show that this 
interpretation is permeated by the narrow view of experience.
A. Optic Ataxia
Brain lesions in cortical areas that belong to the dorsal stream (particularly the parietal lobe) cause a 
more or less uniform set of symptoms that has been interpreted in diverse ways. The first authors 
who described the syndrome were G. Holmes (1918) and R. Bálint (1909). Whereas Holmes 
described the syndrome as a deficit in visuospatial  functions (or “disorientation”), Bálint described 
it as a deficit in visuomotor functions (or “optic ataxia”). One of Milner and Goodale’s central 
claims is that the correct interpretation of the syndrome is the latter: lesions in the parietal lobe 
cause deficits in visuomotor processing (1995: 119)12. In this section I will describe some of the 
symptoms caused by lesions in the parietal lobe that impair the ability to grasp objects.
Before describing the symptoms it is necessary to describe the dynamics of reaching-and-grasping 
hand movements in unimpaired subjects. Jeannerod (1988) refers to the two components of these 
movements as transport and grasp. The former consists in the transportation of the hand in the 
direction of the object, until it reaches the point where it is located. The latter includes the 
prehension movements of the hand and fingers. When healthy subjects reach their hand to grasp an 
object, their hand begins to open (i.e. the grasping movements start their course) almost  at the same 
time that the hand begins to move towards the object. Approximately  at 2/3 of the transport 
movement, the hand reaches its maximum grip aperture (MGA). The aperture of the hand is directly 
proportional to the size of the object, even though it is larger than the object. From the point in 
which the hand reaches its MGA it begins to close until it reaches the object. Success in this action 
requires, among other things, that the transport movements are accurately directed to the position of 
the object; that the hand aperture is adequate to the size of the object; that the contact with the 
object is made with the tips of the fingers and that these are positioned on certain points of the 
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12 The hypothesis that Milner and Goodale defend throughout their book is presented as an alternative to Mishkin and 
Ungerleider’s (1982) view of the two visual streams as the “what” and “where” systems. Part of their defense consists 
in showing that the processing of information in the dorsal stream is implicated in visuomotor functions, rather than 
visuospatial functions. This claim is substantiated by the fact that lesions in the structures of the dorsal stream cause 
visuomotor deficits. According to Milner and Goodale,  the processing of spatial information occurs in both streams. 
Each of them codifies space in a characteristic way that is appropriate for the kind of motor output that each stream 
subserves (1995: 119). In this text I will assume that the evidence favors Milner and Goodale’s view, and I won’t 
discuss the visuospatial nature of dorsal processing. For a detailed discussion, see: Milner and Goodale 1995: Chapter 
4; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: Chapter 3
object’s surface, so that  it won’t  slip. All these elements constitute what Milner and Goodale 
describe as “a beautifully orchestrated action” (2004: 22).
Observations of patients who suffer Bálint-Holmes syndrome show that lesions in the parietal 
cortex disrupt performance in the various grasping movements described above. In the first place, 
these patients cannot direct their hands accurately  to the position of the object (Tzavaras and 
Masure 1976). Secondly, the patients are incapable of rotating their hands in a manner appropriate 
for the action they  are performing (for example, to introduce it into a slot). Third, their hands move 
towards the object completely  open, with the palm facing down and the fingers close together. 
There is no anticipatory adjustment of the hand aperture that adjusts to the object’s size. In some 
cases the contact with the object is made by the palm instead of the tips of the fingers (Jeannerod 
1988). Other subjects are unable to position their fingers on the opposing points of the object that 
allow for a firm grip, so when they grasp objects with smooth surfaces they  slip and fall, unless the 
subject corrects the position of the fingers using tactile information. In a few words: “the well-
regulated patterns of movement that typify the normal person’s reaching and grasping behavior 
were severely disrupted in patients with optic ataxia” (Milner and Goodale 2004: 34).
Despite this inability  to convert visual information into bodily movements, that are adjusted to the 
properties of objects, these patients have no difficulty in the performance of perceptual tasks. They 
are able to categorize, identify, and distinguish objects, compare them on the base of their size and 
shape, etc. They  can correctly  describe and indicate with their hand the orientation of a slot, but 
they  are unable to introduce their hand inside it  (Perenin and Vighetto 1988). They  are able to 
accurately estimate the size of objects but cannot adjust their hands to grasp it. Apparently, these 
subjects’ visual experience remains intact, but it  is useless for the visual control of bodily 
movements.
To borrow some terminology from robotic engineering, optic ataxia can be seen as a 
disruption of the control systems connecting the sensors (dealing with the input) and 
the actuators (providing the output). These control systems would take all the 
relevant optical information from the sensors and re-code it  for the programming and 
control of the goal-directed movements of the robot. In the human brain, analogous 
systems have to transform visual information about the size, shape, orientation, 
motion, and spatial location of the goal object, into a code for programming and 
controlling the person’s skilled motor acts. (Milner and Goodale 2004: 37)
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The quote suggests that optic ataxia is not a deficit  in the patients’ visual representation of the 
world. Optic ataxia consists, rather, in a deficit in the connexion between visual inputs and motor 
outputs: in the use of visual information for the programming of bodily movements. This deficit  is 
caused by lesions in structures of the dorsal stream. On the other hand, their accurate perceptual 
reports indicate that patients with optic ataxia possess an accurate visual representation of their 
environment that allows them to issue true judgments about the different properties of the objects 
they  see. This is explained by the fact that they  have no brain damage on the structures of the 
ventral stream. Milner and Goodale infer that these patients’ visual experience remains intact.
I’ll briefly describe some experiments performed with two of the reported patients. AT (Anne 
Thiérry) suffered a bilateral occipito-parietal stroke (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 92). She had no 
difficulty in naming, describing and recognizing objects and visual forms. With a hidden hand, she 
was able to accurately estimate the sizes of objects, having the same performance than healthy 
subjects. However, when her ability to grasp these same objects was tested, the results were quite 
different. She could not calibrate her hand aperture to the size of the object, but made an 
exaggerated aperture, which she did not close as the hand moved towards the object. Hence, the 
contact with the object was made with the palm of her hand or the proximal phalanxes. This 
resulted in awkward grasps, or on her being unable to grasp the object, since she pushed it  with the 
palm of her hand (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; Milner and Goodale 1995; 2004) 
RV (Ruth Vickers) suffered a bilateral parietal lesion caused by two strokes --each in one of the 
hemispheres. Just like AT, RV’s lesion didn’t seem to affect  her visual representation of the world. 
She had a normal performance in perceptual tasks, and could even copy line drawings (though she 
did it clumsily because of her lack of motor abilities). Goodale et.al. (1994) tested her ability  to 
grasp objects, with an experiment known as the “Blake Forms”. This experiment was initially 
devised to test the effectiveness of grasping in robots. RV was presented with some flat pebbles, 
with a smooth texture and abstract shapes. The first task consisted in comparing the shapes of 
several pebbles to determine whether they were the same, or different. RV had a normal 
performance in this task. The second task consisted in grasping the pebbles with the tips of her 
fingers. The shape and texture of the objects were specifically designed so that it  was possible to 
have a stable grasp only when the tips of the fingers were positioned on the opposite points of the 
object. Otherwise, they would slip  and fall. RV showed an inability  to grasp the objects correctly. 
She would pose her fingers on random points of the objects thereby generating unstable grips. Due 
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to their smooth textures they  fell from her hand, unless she corrected the position using tactile 
information.
These experiments show that there is a high degree of independence between perceptual and 
visuomotor functions: despite the fact that perceptual experience remains intact, it  seems to be 
unavailable for use in visuomotor control. Otherwise there would be no dissociation between the 
ability  to tell the size of an object and the ability to make anticipatory movements of the hand to 
grasp it. Information about size that figures in the subject’s experience, Milner and Goodale claim, 
plays no role in the programming of grasping movements, for if it did movements would be 
accurately adapted to the size of objects. It also seems to follow that the dorsal stream doesn’t 
contribute to perceptual experience, since the lesions on its structures cause no (apparent) deficit  in 
perceptual tasks. If damage to the dorsal stream causes no loss in the subject’s perceptual 
experience, then it appears that perceptual experience is a product of ventral-processing alone. 
However, the antecedent of this conditional seems problematic.
The reason it is problematic has to do with a tendentious interpretation of the symptoms that  is 
influenced by the narrow view of experience. Milner and Goodale infer that “subjects’ perceptual 
experience remains intact” (2004: 36) from the fact that they are able to issue accurate reports. The 
use of the adjective “intact” to describe the experience of optic ataxics presupposes that the deficit 
on visuomotor functions implies no loss for the contents of experience. According to Milner and 
Goodale, these subjects not only retain a capacity to issue true judgments based on their experience, 
but rather, the experience itself is unchanged despite the fact that they are unable to skillfully act on 
the base of it. Of course this interpretation makes sense, and is also inevitable, if the narrow view of 
experience is assumed --according to which the contents of perception are only those that the 
subject can report. If the only criterion for the ascription of perceptual contents is that the subject is 
able to report them, then accurate reports would constitute a sufficient condition to infer that  there 
have been no losses in the contents of experience. However, if this view is cast aside (or at least 
bracketed) it  is not so clear that the evidence supports Milner and Goodale’s conclusion. In that 
case, all that the evidence shows is that there is a dissociation between the ability to make true 
perceptual judgments and visuomotor abilities. In other words, the evidence shows that optic 
ataxics’ perceptual judgments remain intact. The further step, to claim that their experience is intact, 
requires to include the narrow view of experience as a premise.
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For the moment I would merely like to cast doubt on this interpretation of the syndrome. The idea 
that it  is possible to have an “intact” visual experience despite being incapable of acting on the base 
of it  should be carefully considered. It goes against some current research on perception that claims 
that our experience is closely  linked to our abilities to act. Some theories go as far as to claim that 
the link is constitutive (Noë 2004; Cussins 2003; Hurley 1998): our sensorimotor knowledge and 
abilities determine the contents of our experience. Therefore, the idea that visual experience may 
remain intact despite having no link to skillful action deserves a defense of its own, which is not 
given by the proponents of the dual visual stream hypothesis. The support for this idea given by 
empirical evidence presupposes the narrow view of experience, and thus begs the case against 
theories that establish a link between experience and motor activity.
B. Visual Form Agnosia
Visual form agnosia is the mirror syndrome of optic ataxia. It  consists, roughly, in the inability to 
perform perceptual tasks that involve the use of information about form, in addition to the 
retainment of visuomotor abilities. This syndrome is the result  of by occipito-temporal lesions, 
typically caused by anoxia, due to carbon monoxide poisoning --although there are similar clinical 
conditions that are caused by mercury poisoning, head trauma, or meningo-encephalitis.
Visual form agnosia is classified as a kind of apperceptive agnosia, thus distinguished from 
associative agnosia. The latter consists in the incapacity to categorize perceived objects and it is a 
deficit that involves both visual perception and conceptual processing. Apperceptive agnosia, on the 
other hand, is a deficit of visual perception that consists in the incapacity of the brain to form 
meaningful visual percepts by  means of the binding of visual features such as shape, color, etc. That 
is, the incapacity to form a pictorial contextual representation of objects: a visual experience of an 
object. The two forms of agnosia are distinguished by their anatomical locations as well as their 
characteristic symptomatology.13
The central case discussed by Milner and Goodale (which also motivates a large part of their 
research) is that of DF (Dee Fletcher); a woman who suffered carbon monoxide poisoning, that 
caused a bilateral occipital lesion. The lesion consists of a selective necrosis on the lateral pre-
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13  For a detailed description of the symptoms of each kind of agnosia and a discussion regarding the taxonomy see: 
Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; Milner and Goodale 1995; 2004
striate cortex, on areas V2, V3 and V4. The lesion affects the transmission of shape information to 
the temporal lobe. The consequence of this lesion is a deafferentation of the ventral stream from its 
sources of information about form (the magno-cellular and parvo inter-blob channels). The 
temporal lobe receives information of color and texture from the parvo-blob channel through V1, 
V2 and V4. Form information reaches the parietal lobe through the dorsal stream and the tecto-
thalamic stream that receive information from the mago-cellular channel (Milner and Goodale 
1995: 134-7; Casagrande and Xu 2004: 501-2)
As a consequence of this lesion DF cannot perceive the shape of objects. This leads in turn to a 
difficulty in the recognition and discrimination of objects and simple geometrical shapes, drawings, 
and their orientations. DF preserves visual functions such as the ability  to discriminate shades of 
color and the detection of patterns, which allow her to recognize familiar objects based on the 
properties of their surface. She preserves visual acuity to recognize fine details and an 
understanding of spatial relations between objects. 
DF displays an incapacity to distinguish objects from their background in cases where there are no 
color or texture cues: “Dee said that objects seemed to ‘run into each other’, so that two adjacent 
objects of a similar color such as a knife and fork will often look to her like a single indefinable 
‘blob’”. (Milner and Goodale 2004: 9-10). Although she is able to recognize numbers and letters by 
touch, she cannot do it by  visual means. She is incapable of copying line drawings, despite being 
able to draw objects based on her memory. This is, perhaps, the main reason to classify her agnosia 
as apperceptive rather than associative. I will come back to this point below. 
Despite these incapacities, DF preserves her visuomotor abilities intact. Milner and Goodale narrate 
the occasion when they  became aware of this particularity  of DF’s syndrome, during an 
experimentation session:
When we held up  a pencil, we were not surprised that she couldn’t tell us what it was, 
even though she could tell us it was yellow. In fact, she had no idea whether we were 
holding it horizontally or vertically. But then something quite extraordinary happened. 
Before we knew it, Dee had reached out and taken the pencil, presumably to examine it 
more closely […] Dee’s movements had been quick and perfectly coordinated, showing 
none of the clumsiness or fumbling that one might have expected in someone whose 
vision was as poor as hers. (Milner and Goodale 2004: 17-18)
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DF’s behavior displays that her incapacity to make true reports on the contents of her experience 
does not affect her abilities to use visual information for object-oriented actions. DF behaves like a 
normal person and, from her behavior, it is hard to guess that she has a visual impairment (Milner 
and Goodale 2004: 19). She is capable of skillfully grasping objects and of catching them in the air 
when they  are thrown at her. She is also able to negotiate obstacles and navigate through intricate 
paths. Milner and Goodale relate an occasion when they  walked through a forest to a place where 
they had a picnic:
This walk provided a good example of a time when the other side of Dee’s visual life 
was strikingly revealed. To reach the meadow, we had to walk along a half-mile trail 
through a dense pine forest. The footpath was steep and uneven. Yet Dee had no trouble 
at all. She walked confidently  and unhesitatingly, without stumbling, tripping over a 
root, or colliding with the branches of the trees that hung over the path. Occasionally we 
had to point out to her the correct route to take, but other than that, her behavior was 
indistinguishable from that of any of the other hikers on the mountain that day. We 
eventually arrived at the meadow and began to unpack the picnic hamper. Here Dee 
displayed once more how apparently  normal her visual behavior was. She reached out to 
take things that were passed to her with the same confidence and skill as someone with 
completely normal sight. No-one would ever have guessed that she could not see the 
difference between a knife and a fork, or recognize the faces of her companions. (Milner 
and Goodale 2004: 19)
These abilities resemble those of another patient with visual form agnosia (SB), described by Jacob 
and Jeannerod (2003). Because of a meningo-encephalitis he had at the age of three, SB has a 
bilateral lesion at the occipito-parietal union, which impedes the discrimination and identification of 
shapes. However, SB preserves the visuomotor abilities necessary to drive a motorcycle and play 
ping-pong (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 88-9) DF and SB are capable of using for visuomotor 
control, the very information that  seems to be inaccessible for perceptual tasks. In other words, the 
information that guides their actions is the same information that they are unable to report.
Milner and Goodale report  to have carried out with DF the experiment designed by  Perenin and 
Vighetto14, in which the subject is presented with a slot, whose orientation the subject must report, 
verbally or manually, and then introduce her hand, or an envelope, through it. DF performed poorly 
on the perceptual task, and normally in the visuomotor task. Her ability to discriminate shapes was 
tested with a 3D version of the Efron test, which consists in presenting the subject with a series of 
rectangles with the same area but differing in length and width. The subject is asked to report which 
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14 See Section 1.3.1A
of the rectangles have the same shape and which are different. DF had a very low performance in 
this task, as well as in the task of estimating the size and orientation of objects and reporting it  by 
means of manual gestures or verbal reports. However, when asked to grasp the objects she showed 
an accurate adjustment of her hand movements to the size and shape of the objects. In the 
experiment of the “Blake Forms”15  DF had opposite results to RV’s: a normal performance in 
visuomotor tasks and a poor performance on the discrimination task.
Thus DF seems to be able to use visual information that is not part of her conscious perceptual 
experience (using Milner and Goodale’s terms).16 The interpretation of DF’s clinical condition and 
the characteristic symptomatology of visual form agnosia is crucial for the formulation of the dual 
visual stream hypothesis. There are several points that deserve attention. First, what explains the 
deficit in perceptual tasks and the retainment of visuomotor abilities is the fact  that there is damage 
to the structures of the ventral stream and not the dorsal stream. Perceptual tasks are dependent on 
ventral-processing, which is damaged in DF, while visuomotor tasks are dependent on dorsal-
processing, which is intact in DF. I will not question this point.
Secondly,what makes the difference between the tasks that DF is successful at, and those at which 
she isn’t, is the purpose that frames her movements: in visuomotor tasks movements are framed by 
a goal-oriented action, whereas perceptual tasks are framed by an act of communication17. 
According to the authors, the explanation of this difference in performance is that DF fails at 
perceptual tasks because she has no visual experience to communicate. They claim that DF’s 
impediment is not at  the level of the conceptualization and communication of the contents of her 
experience (since she has the ability to communicate other perceptual contents), but rather at the 
level of perceptual experience itself: “Dee could do none of these things [perceptual tasks]—not 
because she couldn’t communicate but because she had nothing visual to communicate. She had no 
conscious experience, no conscious visual experience at  least, of the orientation of the slot to share 
with us”. (Milner and Goodale 2004: 29).
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15 See Section 1.3.1A
16  There are, however, certain limitations to DF’s visuomotor abilities. For example, when a delay condition is 
introduced, or when she must insert complex objects in slots. For these tasks it seems that ventral-processing is crucial. 
The first case is particularly important to Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis, since they claim that there is a close link 
between ventral processing and memory (unlike dorsal processing that only consists in the online, immediate control of 
motor adjustments)
17 See Section 1.2
Milner and Goodale acknowledge that their primary source of evidence for denying that DF has 
visual experience of shapes is her incapacity to give accurate reports of the information in her visual 
field. The inference from DF’s inability  to give accurate reports to the claim that she lacks any 
experience of form is clearly influenced by  the narrow view of experience, according to which 
every content of experience is a reportable content.
More explicitly, there seems to be an inference that runs as follows: Given that DF cannot make 
true judgments about form on the base of her experience, it follows that there are no contents of 
form in her visual experience. This inference can only be justified if, as a second premise, they 
assume the narrow view of experience. In a wider conception of perceptual experience, the use of 
visual information for the purpose of visuomotor control might be taken as evidence for the claim 
that such information is part of DF’s experience. However, Milner and Goodale describe DF’s 
visuomotor abilities as residual, more primitive, abilities; which are part of a system that guides 
motor activity  in a quick and efficient way, without the involvement of the subject’s conscious 
experience.
It is possible to cast doubt on this interpretation, arguing that the errors on perceptual reports do not 
show a lack of contents of form in DF’s experience, but an inability to conceptualize such contents 
and emitting a report based on them. This objection can be found in Walhagen (2007):18
What the results demonstrate is that D.F. is severely  impaired at tasks that require her to 
indicate—to represent to someone else, be it verbally  or by  positioning her hand—
aspects of an object’s form (size, shape, orientation, etc.). Such tasks require D.F. to 
form a perceptual judgment about aspects of form [...] Forming a perceptual judgment, 
of course, requires one to perceptually identify certain aspects of perceptual stimuli, to 
bring those features under concepts. And this, I grant, is what  D.F. cannot do. D.F.’s 
problem is a conceptual one: she cannot identify shapes, sizes, and orientations, she 
cannot ‘bring them under concepts’. This is why  she cannot perform the 
representational task of indicating to someone else, verbally or by positioning the hand, 
aspects of an object’s form. However—and here is the crucial point—it does not follow 
that she is not aware, in a non-conceptual way, of the shapes, sizes and orientations of 
things (Walhagen 2007: 556)
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18 Walhagen’s objections to Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis,  and the alternative reading he proposes for the empirical 
evidence,  resemble my own on several points. However, there is a fundamental difference in the approaches we take. 
Whereas Walhagen bases his objection and his proposal on phenomenological notions (such as awareness, notice, 
attention, etc.), my objections are based on concepts that belong to neo-Fregean theories of content (concepts such as 
normativity, commitment, responsibility, judgment, etc.)
To question the interpretation of DF’s symptoms as a deficit in visual experience, as Walhagen does, 
amounts to question the classification of visual form agnosia as a kind of apperceptive agnosia, 
instead of associative agnosia. However, Milner and Goodale provide additional evidence for this 
classification: 
Dee’s difficulty in identifying objects or line drawings is not one of finding the right 
name for the object, nor is it one of knowing or remembering what common objects 
look like. Her problem is more fundamentally  ‘visual’ than that. Dee has enormous 
difficulties in copying drawings of common objects or geometric shapes. Some patients 
who are unable to identify pictures of objects can still slavishly copy what they see, line 
by line, and produce a recognizable product. But Dee cannot  even pick out the 
constituent elements of a picture in order to copy them. Presumably unlike those 
patients, then, Dee’s problem is not one of interpreting a clear visual experience—her 
problem is that  she doesn’t  have that clear visual experience to start with. (Milner and 
Goodale 2004: 10)
This point calls for the question of whether the ability to copy  line drawings requires conceptual 
abilities or not. My intuition is that conceptual abilities do play  a role in this task. In what follows 
I’ll rehearse an argument to show that, under one description of the task, the successful copying of a 
line drawing requires the exercise of conceptual abilities in the formation of true perceptual 
judgments. Under this description, even if the task doesn’t require the subsumption of contents 
under concepts, it does require that the subject exercises her ability to form judgments, which is a 
conceptual ability, par excellence --at least in the philosophical framework in which this debate is 
situated.
What are the necessary steps to copy a line drawing? One possible description of the task is the 
following: (1) to perceive the whole drawing; (2) to analyze its parts; (3) to recognize the spatial 
relations between the parts; (4) to reproduce each of the parts in a manner that respects the spatial 
relations between them in the original drawing; (5) to form comparative judgments of the 
resemblance between the original and the copy, as the task is performed (in order to go on, or 
correct any  mistake) and when the copy is finished (in order to assume the task is done, or to correct 
the drawing).19 Success in this task consists in the drawing of a faithful copy of the original. This 
requires that the subject draws the lines in a way  that reproduces the relations between the lines of 
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19 This description of the task may seem arbitrary, but it is an analysis of the description made by Van Gulick (1994) of 
visual agnosics while performing the task: “In copying drawings, visual agnosics employ a slow mechanical line by line 
technique that involves lots of careful back and forth comparison of small line segments in the original drawing with the 
details of their copy” (Van Gulick 1994: 45)
the original drawing. This requires, in turn, that the subject is able to discriminate the parts and to 
appreciate the relations between them.
It is plausible that steps (2), (3) and (5) require the subject to form true perceptual judgments. (2) 
requires the capacity  to discriminate the parts of the drawing; that is, to identify  the lines that 
compose it. The criterion for this discrimination is no other than the orientation of the lines (some 
vertical, some horizontal, some curve, etc.) and the continuity or discontinuity between them. This 
is exactly the kind of perceptual task that DF is unable to perform, and that requires the articulation 
of the contents of perception in judgments such as: “line a has orientation x”, “line b has orientation 
y”, “orientations x and y are the same/different”, “a is different/equal to b” etc. (3) requires the 
capacity to analyze the spatial relations between parts of the drawing. This requires, in turn, that the 
subject is able to appreciate the orientation of some lines relative to others. Once again, this requires 
the ability to form judgments such as: “lines a and b are perpendicular/parallel”, “lines a and b have 
the same/different orientation”, etc. I do not mean that the task requires the possession and use of 
concepts such as “parallel”, “perpendicular”, “horizontal”, etc., rather, that the performance of the 
task requires that the subject is able to understand the spatial relations denoted by  this concepts, and 
to judge whether these relations hold between the different parts of the drawing. Finally, (5) consists 
in a comparison of the copy  and the original that the subject must make in order to know whether 
the copy is sufficiently  similar to the original, and whether the task is going well, or is finished. 
This step involves the formation of comparative judgments, such as: “the copy is equal to the 
original”, “the copy differs from the original in such and such parts”, etc.
But why do I claim that  these steps require the ability to form judgments? As I explained in Section 
1.2, there are several tasks that require the mediation of a perceptual judgment:  those that consist in 
reports. Among these tasks I included the indication of the size of an object with the tips of the 
fingers, the indication of orientation with the orientation of the hand, etc. Success in these tasks 
requires that the subject forms a true judgment based on the contents of her experience. By the way, 
Milner and Goodale assert that  the drawing of a line to, say, show the orientation of a slot is a 
communicative act of this same kind (Milner and Goodale 2004: 29). 
If Milner and Goodale acknowledge that these reports involve perceptual judgments, it  is not so 
clear why  they would deny that the copying of a line drawing involves perceptual judgments as 
well. Their claim is that copying a drawing does not involve conceptual abilities, in the sense that it 
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doesn’t involve the subsumption of contents under general categories. However, if judgment is 
considered (as it has been by traditional analytic philosophy) the conceptual exercise par 
excellence, then it is not clear that the task does not require conceptual abilities. 
My argument intends to show that  there is at least one description of the task under which it may be 
said to involve perceptual judgments. If Milner and Goodale were to deny  that the task requires 
judgments, they would need a reason to support the distinction between this task and the task of 
drawing a line to indicate the orientation of a slot, which apparently does require a judgment. Of 
course, there may be other descriptions of the task in which it does not require the subject to form 
perceptual judgments. I do not want to commit to the idea that this is the only, or the best, 
description of the task. Ultimately, there may  be no way  of telling whether it does require 
judgments or not --al least with the available evidence. My claim is, rather, that the failure to copy 
line drawings does not necessarily justify the conclusion that DF has no experience of form, since 
this failure could be explained as a consequence of an incapacity to form perceptual judgments. 
Thus, even if DF’s visual deficit is not related to her ability to name objects (i.e. to subsume 
contents under concepts), it is still not clear that the only explanation for her inabilities is that she 
does not have visual experiences of form.
I do not mean to question whether DF’d pathology should be classified as a kind of apperceptive 
agnosia or a kind of associative agnosia. What I want to point out is that her symptoms could be 
explained as an inability  to articulate contents of form into perceptual judgments. This inability 
would explain the fact that she is unable to give accurate perceptual reports and her inability to copy 
line drawings. Milner and Goodale’s conclusion that the explanation for DF’s symptoms is that she 
has no contents of form in her experience, presupposes the narrow view of experience.
Milner and Goodale’s interpretation of DF’s symptoms has a further consequence, which I consider 
undesirable: if DF’s agnosia was not specific to certain features of objects, but was generalized to 
all visual features (including color and texture), it would follow that DF would have no visual 
experience whatsoever. If DF was unable to make true judgments about every visual feature of 
objects, she would not have visual experience at all. This would place her in the same condition as 
blindsight patients:
Our interpretation of apperceptive agnosia would predict, however, that some patients 
should suffer from generalized losses in the perception not only  of form, but also of 
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colour, texture, and allocentric space. Indeed, lesions causing an extensive 
occipitotemporal disconnection should result  in a global apperceptive agnosia that 
would, in the limit, be experientially indistinguishable from cortical blindness, which 
we consider to result from an isolation of the ventral stream from visual inputs (Milner 
and Goodale 1995: 128)
In the next section I will argue that there are important differences between blindsight and visual 
form agnosia that Milner and Goodale fail to recognize.
C. Cortical Blindness
The name of “cortical blindness” or “blindsight” has been given to a pathological condition caused 
by lesions in the primary visual cortex (V1). In some cases the damage to V1 is total and affects the 
whole visual field. In other cases, the lesion is restricted to one hemisphere and the “blindness” is 
restricted to the contralateral hemifield. In these cases, the pathology is known as “hemianopia”. In 
other cases, the lesion is local and only  affects a restricted area of the visual field, which is known 
as “scotoma”.
The name blindsight has been given to this pathology to suggest a sort of paradox in the clinical 
condition: despite the fact that the patients cannot report conscious experiences in the affected 
portion of the visual field, they seem to be able to use information for the guidance of certain 
movements. The condition is similar to visual form agnosia, but has several relevant differences. In 
the first place, it is not restricted to one visual feature, but it is generalized to all visual stimuli. I 
will mention and discuss other differences below. 
The symptoms of cortical blindness have a clear explanation in the dual visual stream theory: The 
ventral stream, which is responsible for perceptual experience, is entirely dependent on V1. 
Damages to this area leave the ventral stream deafferented. Since no information is transmitted to 
the temporal lobe, subjects have no visual experience. However, the dorsal stream has alternative 
sources of information, as the tecto-pulvinar stream. This starts from the retina and reaches the 
parietal lobe going through subcortical structures, such as the superior colliculus (where 10% of 
optic fibers culminate), and the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus. Thus, the dorsal stream continues 
receiving information through other channels that are not affected by the damage to V1. In the 
frame of Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis, the absence of perceptual reports is explained by the 
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deafferentation of the ventral stream, whereas the use of information for visuomotor control is 
explained by the residual functioning of the dorsal stream.
Descriptions of the behavior of blindsight patients is very much like that of patients with visual 
form agnosia. They  perform poorly in perceptual tasks and report no stimulus in the affected area of 
the visual field. However, they can successfully carry out visuomotor tasks: they  can make saccadic 
movements and point in the direction of the stimulus, which they report not to perceive. They are 
able to make the anticipatory  adjustments of the arm, hand, and wrist in order to grasp  objects of 
different shapes, sizes and locations, but cannot report the size of the objects. They have the same 
results as DF in Perenin and Vighetto’s experiment: they  cannot report the orientation of a slot, yet 
they are able to insert an envelope through it.20
As I have mentioned in previous sections, the criterion used to deny that blindsight patients have 
visual experiences is the subjects’ inability to give perceptual reports: "The definition of ‘cortical 
blindness’ is in fact based on only one particular index of visual capacity—namely that of 
perceptual report" (Milner and Goodale 1995: 69). In virtue of this fact, Milner and Goodale 
maintain that cortical blindness can be explained as an absence of visual experiences, in addition to 
residual visuomotor functions in the dorsal stream: "It is clear from our discussion in this chapter so 
far that we do not consider blindsight to be well characterized as ‘unconscious perception’, as many 
writers would have it. We believe that it  is more correctly  seen as a collection of residual 
visuomotor responses that may depend on a variety of relatively  independent circuits in the superior 
colliculus and dorsal stream" (Milner and Goodale 1995: 75). 
As I mentioned in the previous section, Milner and Goodale characterize cortical blindness as 
similar to visual form agnosia. There are, however, some dissimilarities that should not be ignored 
and that, I believe, have important consequences for the philosophical interpretation of the dual 
visual stream hypothesis. In the first place, unlike DF and SB21, blindsight patients behave as blind 
people: they  are unable to navigate or negotiate obstacles: "Cortically blind patients behave like 
completely blind people, except that  their pupillary reflex to light is preserved: they do not see 
objects, they  cannot orient in space, they  bump into obstacles, etc." (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 75). 
On the other hand, as Milner and Goodale report, visual form agnosics’ behavior doesn’t reveal 
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20 See: Sanders et.al. (1974);  Perenin y Jeannerod (1975); Weiskrantz (1986); Perenin y Rosetti (1996).
21 See Section 1.3.1B
their impairment. They  are able to catch objects in the air, walk through a forest  and even drive a 
motorcycle. 
These activities can hardly be explained without appealing to some type of perceptual access to 
form information. Especially if one considers that, in the absence of this information, it is hard to 
discern objects from their background, which seems to be a condition for negotiating obstacles. 
Although Milner and Goodale hold that  DF’s brain has access to visual information about form, this 
access is restricted to the subpersonal module of the dorsal stream. The explanation of her success 
in visuomotor tasks is the same as that of blindsight patients. 
Secondly, in the cases of cortical blindness, visuomotor abilities are only manifested in “forced 
choice” situations. These patients cannot spontaneously  self-prompt the use of the visual 
information that is available to their dorsal stream. They  can only do so in situations where an 
experimenter asks them to produce an automatic response: "This striking phenomenon, however, 
could not be observed unless patients were placed in a, so called, 'forced choice' situation in which 
no conscious report about the presence and the nature of the visual stimulus was required, and in 
which they were invited to produce an 'automatic' response to it" (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003: 75) 
This fact strongly  contrasts with Milner and Goodale’s descriptions of the picnic they had with DF, 
or the moment when she spontaneously grabbed a pencil to examine its shape (Milner and Goodale 
2004: 17-9)
These differences can be explained at the neurophysiological level by  the fact that, in blindsight, the 
dorsal stream is deafferented from its sources of information in the visual cortex, which leaves only 
a group of primitive and impoverished functions: what Jacob and Jeannerod describe as a “primitive 
system of quick and crude reactions to visual stimuli” (2003: 76). Blindsight  patients can only 
produce automatic responses to visual stimuli in forced choice situations, so their use of visual 
information is not integrated to the rest of their conduct. This can be explained by the fact that their 
dorsal stream only  gets information from subcortical structures. Visual agnosics, on the other hand, 
seem to be able to integrate their visuomotor abilities with the rest  of their behavior. This can be 
explained by the fact that their dorsal stream preserves its cortical sources of information. However, 
this merely  physiological explanation of the differences in the conditions seems to put aside an 
important element: an explanation of the difference at the personal level. In other words, the 
physiological explanation excludes an account of the role that visual information plays in the 
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subjects’ cognitive lives, which seems to be important for the explanation of both differences I have 
mentioned. 
One plausible explanation would be that these differences are explained by  the fact that visual form 
agnosics do have some type of perceptual access to form information but they are unable to 
articulate it in perceptual judgments and, hence, cannot report it or use it for the task of copying line 
drawings. This is suggested by the fact that this information seems to be integrated in patients’ 
behavior, and available for the spontaneous initiation of actions. On the other hand, the visual 
information available for motor control in blindsight patients seems to be encapsulated. This 
suggests, in fact, that they have no visual experiences.22 This interpretation is, however, beyond the 
reach of Milner and Goodale’s theory, since it requires a wider view of experience. This suggested 
interpretation widens the notion of perceptual experience beyond the contents that  subjects can 
report and beyond the products of ventral processing. Given the narrow view of experience, Milner 
and Goodale can only explain the difference between the two conditions in neurophysiological 
terms. To them, a case of global visual agnosia would be “experientially indistinguishable” from a 
case of cortical blindness (1995: 128).
Milner and Goodale characterize visual experience, a personal level, cognitive phenomenon, as a 
product of ventral processing. In the absence of ventral processing, there is no visual experience 
whatsoever: “Larry Weiskrantz once characterized dorsal-stream vision as, “in a sense, blindsight 
without blindness”. We maintain that the nature of both dorsal-stream vision and blindsight stand in 
sharp contrast with visual processing in the ventral stream, even when that processing fails to reach 
awareness. The processing of vision for perception – conscious or unconscious – is, according to 
our model, restricted to the ventral stream” (Milner and Goodale 2008: 776). The quote suggests 
that the authors group together all cases of dorsal processing (visual agnosia and cortical blindness), 
as cases of visual non-perceptual processing, because neither of them involves the ventral stream. 
Hence there is no difference between these two conditions in terms of the information to which 
subjects’ have access in their experience.
There are important differences between the two conditions, which should be considered. The base 
of the narrow view of experience serves is a justification to group them together, as Milner and 
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22 Once more, this view is supported by Walhagen: “[T]he more plausible view is that D.F. is (nonconceptually) aware 
of aspects of form. For one thing, D.F.’s ability to behave appropriately with respect to shape and orientation is very 
good, much better than is a blindsight patient’s” (Walhagen 2007: 556)
Goodale do, insofar as both conditions coincide in the fact that patients are unable to accurately 
report experiences. In the light of this view, both conditions involve visual non-perceptual content. 
If this view is bracketed, it is not  so clear whether both conditions should be grouped together in the 
way that Milner and Goodale do. In Chapter 4 I’ll examine in more detail the reasons to adhere to 
Milner and Goodale’s view and the reasons to accept a wider view of experience that allows to give 
different explanations, from the personal level of description, to cortical blindness and visual 
agnosia.
To sum up, so far I have analyzed Milner and Goodale’s proposal and their reading of empirical 
evidence. Their proposal partly consists in equating visual experience to the product of ventral 
processing. The authors seek to justify  this assimilation by presenting empirical cases that make the 
case for a double dissociation between perceptual tasks and visuomotor tasks. However, Milner and 
Goodale’s presentation of the evidence, and their conclusion, are influenced by the narrow view of 
experience. Moreover, the validity of their inferences from the evidence to their proposal heavily 
depends on it. This view is not justified within the theory. It works as an implicit assumption, that 
permeates the criterion for the attribution of perceptual experiences. There are some consequences 
that follow from Milner and Goodale’s reading of the evidence that turn out to be highly 
counterintuitive and potentially problematic.
1.3.2 Dissociations between perception and visuomotor control in healthy subjects
This group of experiments can be divided in two subsets. In the first place, there are experiments 
that show that despite subjects’ unawareness of certain stimuli, subjects’ are still able to adjust their 
bodily  movements to those same stimuli. In the second group there are experiments that show the 
adequate function of visuomotor processes despite the presence of perceptual illusions. I will 
describe and discuss one series of experiment from each group.
A. Visuomotor adjustments without awareness
In the past decades there has been a series of experiments that intend to show that even in healthy, 
unimpaired subjects there is a dissociation between perceptual and visuomotor tasks. The way 
Milner and Goodale state this dissociation is as follows: "[I]t  must  follow from our arguments that 
even in neurologically  intact  individuals, the visual information underlying the calibration and 
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control of a skilled motor action directed at an object will not  always mirror the perceptual 
judgements made about that object" (Milner and Goodale 1995: 157. My italics). It is worth to 
notice Milner and Goodale’s formulation of the dissociation, as it  is stated in the quote. Here they 
talk about perceptual judgments, though not necessarily  about the content of experience (although, 
as I’ve shown in this chapter both notions are interchangeable in their theory). My contention in this 
section will be that the results of experiments only support their claim as it is stated in the quote, 
and not the stronger claim that there is a dissociation between visuomotor control and perceptual 
experience.
Goodale et.al. (1986) designed an experiment to show that visuomotor adjustments in response to 
changes in the visual field does not necessarily go hand in hand with an awareness of these changes. 
The task subjects were required to perform consisted in reaching their hand towards a target (a 
light), while their hand was hidden from them. Initially they would foveate a light in the periphery 
that would turn off once the target appeared. During the time it takes for the subject to make a 
saccadic movement towards the target, it could move 10º to the right or left. In 50% of the trials the 
target would change its position, and in the rest it would remain in its initial location.
The results showed that despite saccadic suppression, in the trials when there was a change in the 
position of the target, the trajectory of the subject’s hand was corrected and adjusted to the new 
position of the target. Besides, the saccadic movement terminated with the target centered in the 
fovea, whether it had moved or not. So despite the lack of awareness of the shift in the target, due to 
saccadic suppression, hand movements were reliably adjusted to those shifts: “These and other 
experiments using the same paradigm have consistently  shown that subjects fail to perceive changes 
in target position even though they modify their visuomotor output to accommodate the new 
position of the target” (Milner and Goodale 1995: 162). A consequence of these results is that 
visuomotor adjustments are not guided by subjects’ visual experience, but rather by visual 
information that fails to reach awareness.
Catiello et.al. (1991) report a similar experiment, which involved the additional task of emitting 
vocal reports when a change in the target’s position was perceived. Subjects’ vocal response would 
take 300ms longer than the motor adjustment. This shows, claim Milner and Goodale, that 
perceptual awareness of a stimulus takes longer than visuomotor responses, which is why it is not 
possible that the latter are based on the contents of experience.
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Milner and Goodale (1995) use the engineering considerations exposed at the beginning of the 
chapter to explain these results. Their interpretation is based on the idea that perceptual and 
visuomotor tasks have different computational requirements. For visuomotor control there are 
critical factors, such as time, and a very precise location of the target-object. Hence it  must be 
sensitive to small changes in the visual field and give a quick response to compensate for the 
changes in the object’s position. For perceptual experience, on the other hand, time does not  play 
such a crucial role, and the suppression of small changes may even be advantageous in order to 
obtain stability and perceptual constancies, which are necessary for object identification. It  does not 
require a precise location of the object, but rather its position in relation to other objects.
These different requirements explain, according to Milner and Goodale, that there is a motor 
response to the shift in target position despite the fact that subjects are not aware of it.
[T]he apparent constancy of target position observed in the experiments described 
above (for example, Goodale et al. 1986) can be seen as part of a constellation of 
perceptual constancies by means of which the size, shape, color, lightness, and 
relative location of objects are preserved across a variety  of viewing conditions. […] 
As we have already suggested, it is [the] concern with the location and disposition of 
objects in egocentric space that helps to explain why, in the Goodale et al. (1986) 
study, the aiming movements of subjects are sensitive to shifts in the location of the 
target even though those shifts in location are not perceived. We would suggest that 
all of the various discrepancies that have been observed between the visuomotor 
performance and perceptual reports of normal subjects may reflect the differential 
processing characteristics of the dorsal and ventral streams (Milner and Goodale 
1995: 165)
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, it  is worth noting that the dissociation shown by 
these experiments is not necessarily one between subjects’ experience and motor control. What the 
experiments clearly  show is a dissociation between perceptual judgments and visuomotor 
adjustments. The conclusion that subjects have no experience of the shifts in target position 
presupposes that subjects can only experience what they are able to judge and report.23
Johnson and Hagaard (2005) report a similar experiment that shows that even though subjects may 
not report a change in target position, they do seem to have a type of experience of the change in the 
trajectory of their reaching movement. This version of the experiment has three phases. In the first 
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23 For a similar critique of Milner and Goodale’s interpretation, see: Walhagen 2007: 553-4
subjects were asked to reach to the target, reproducing the conditions of Goodale et.al.’s 
experiment. In the second phase subjects were asked to reproduce the trajectory made in the first, 
while their hand is still hidden from them. In the third stage they  were asked to report whether 
they’d seen a shift in the target.
The results of the first phase were similar to those described above. There were adjustments in the 
trajectory of the reaching movements, which were proportional to the displacement of the target. In 
the second phase, subjects accurately reproduced their hand trajectory made in phase 1. In the third 
phase, subjects reported a change in the target in 37% of the trials where there was a change. What 
is interesting about these results is that the adjustment  of the reaching movement and the 
reproduction of that movement were independent of subjects’ awareness of a change in the target. 
That is, even in trials where subjects didn’t report a shift, the adjustment of the trajectory  and its 
reproduction were accurate.
The authors interpret these results as follows: motor adjustments in the first phase show a 
visuomotor response to the changes in target position that is independent from subjects’ awareness 
of such a change. The accurate reproduction of the trajectory  in the second stage shows a sort of 
“motor awareness”, or “motor experience”. Given that the reproduction of the movements was 
accurate in most trials, independently of the report of a target shift, this can be seen as evidence that 
subjects have some kind of awareness of the adjustment in their reaching movement that is 
independent from their perception of change in the target.
Our measures of motor awareness did not differ significantly according to whether 
subjects were aware of the target shift or not. This demonstrates the novel finding that 
motor awareness can dissociate from perceptual awareness. […] This pattern of results 
seems quite paradoxical. The subjects clearly knew, in some sense, that their initial 
movements contained a lateral deviation. It is tempting to speculate on how subjects 
reconcile this awareness of their own motor adjustment deviations with manifest 
unawareness of any reason why the movement required adjusting. (Johnson y  Hagaard 
2005: 232-3)
These results show that Milner and Goodale’s interpretation, which postulates a polar opposition 
between unconscious visuomotor adjustments and perceptual experience, does not account for all 
that is going on in these cases. Johnson and Hagaard’s “motor awareness”  holds no place in Milner 
and Goodale’s dual hypothesis. 
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Milner and Goodale could reply to this challenge by  saying that subjects aren’t aware of their motor 
adjustments, and that the reproduction of the trajectory in the second phase is an automatic 
movement programmed by subpersonal processes. This reply, however, would once again 
presuppose the narrow view of experience. It  would presuppose that information that is not reported 
isn’t a part of subjects’ experience, but an input to an automatic, subpersonal and unconscious 
process. Of course this is a plausible interpretation of the results. I do not want to claim that Milner 
and Goodale’s interpretation is incorrect, but only  that it is not the only one that is consistent with 
the evidence.
They  could also reply that the accurate reproduction of the movement has nothing to do with the 
visual system, but rather with the somato-sensory system and some sort of short-term motor 
memory. In such a case, their claim regarding visual experience still holds.  A new experimental 
model would be needed to figure out whether visual experience plays any role in the guidance of 
the hand movement in the second phase.
B.  Perceptual illusions and visuomotor control.
One of Milner and Goodale’s predictions is that perceptual representations formed by ventral 
processing should be prone to optic illusions, whereas dorsal processing is not. According to their 
theory, the ventral stream codifies the metrics of objects in relation to the rest  of the perceptual 
scene. Size contents of perceptual experience are comparative. Visuomotor control, on the other 
hand, requires information about the real size of objects. Hence the dorsal stream codifies an 
absolute metric for objects.
If the theory is correct, it would follow that visual experience is prone to size-contrast illusions, 
while visuomotor control is not. Aglioti et.al. (1995) report an experiment in which this prediction 
was tested. Subjects were presented with an array of tridimensional discs, arranged like the circles 
of the Ebbinghaus Illusion (also know as the Tichener Circles). In this classic example of size 
contrast illusion, the central discs of the top  drawing are physically the same, but the one on the 
right appears smaller than the one on the left. In the bottom drawing, they  appear to have the same 
size, but the central circle on the left is actually larger than the one on the right. 
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Subjects were presented with either the upper or 
the lower drawing, and were asked to perform 
two tasks: (1) point to the left circle if they were 
the same size, or point to the right circle, if they 
were different. (2) Grasp  the disc at which they 
pointed. The first is a perceptual task. It responds 
to the question “are the sizes of the central discs 
equal or different?” and requires the subject to 
per form a compara t ive judgment , and 
communicate the judgment by  pointing to one of 
the discs. The second is a visuomotor task.
As the dual stream theory predicts, results showed 
that subjects were clearly under the influence of the visual illusion: when presented with the upper 
drawing, they  pointed to the right, and when presented with the lower drawing, they pointed to the 
left. However, their grasping movements, which were measured with opto-electrical devices, were 
accurately calibrated to the real size of the disc: “In short, grip  size was determined entirely  by the 
true size of the target disc. Thus, the very  act by means of which subjects indicated their 
susceptibility to the visual illusion (that is, picking up one of the two target circles) was itself 
uninfluenced by that  illusion” (Milner and Goodale 1995: 169). Processes of visuomotor control are 
not affected by  size-contrast, and maintain their precision despite the perceptual illusion: "In nearly 
all cases, the illusions have been found to have little or no effect on the scaling of grasp  or the 
trajectory of a reaching movement despite having strong effects on perception" (Milner and 
Goodale 2004: 89).
In Haffenden and Goodale (2000) a version if the experiment is reported in which a third task was 
included: subjects were asked to show an estimation of the size of the discs with the tips of their 
fingers. Once more, it was evidenced that performance in this (perceptual tasks) was under the 
influence of the illusion, while visuomotor control was not.
These results indicate that the visual mechanisms underlying perception and 
visuomotor control can operate independently, in normal subjects […] Although we 
often make subtle relative judgements of object size, we rarely make absolute 
judgements. In contrast, when we reach out to pick up  an object, particularly one we 
contrived scenario. No undergraduate course on visual perception
would be complete without a session devoted to these illusions.
We never fail to be impressed with the fact that our eyes can
deceive us so thoroughly—and even when the trick is explained
we continue to perceive apparent differences in size, orientation,
movement, and distance that we know are not really there. Many
visual scientists would agree with British psychologist Richard
Gregory, who has argued over many years that illusions are not
just curiosities, but can provide important insights into how the
brain constructs our percepts of the world.
One major class of illusions depends on so-called pictorial
cues—the kinds of cues that are commonly exploited by painters to
create a realistic three-dimensional world on a two-dimensional
canvas (see Box 6.1).The artist’s manipulation of cues like perspec-
tive and relative size can create powerful illusions of depth and
scale, taking advantage of the way in which our brains carry out an
obligatory analysis of the visual scene that confronts us. Such cues
are one of the most important sources of information used by the
perceptual system to construct our representations of the world.
One particular example illustrates this well.The central circles in the
top two arrays shown in Figure 6.5 are actually identical in size—
but it is very hard to resist the impression that the one on the left
(surrounded by small circles) is larger than the one on the right
(surrounded by larger circles). We can neutralize the illusion by
increasing the size of the central circle surrounded by larger circles,
as shown in the lower part of Figure 6.5. In this case, although the
two central circles look alike, they are actually quite different in size.
A number of explanations have been put forward to account for
this illusion, which was first described by the late nineteenth-
century German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus. The most
commonly accepted one goes something like this:The brain cannot
help but ‘assume’ that the array of smaller circles represents a clus-
ter of objects more distant than the array of larger circles. To use a
term we will enlarge on later in this chapter, the perceptual system
is attempting to maintain ‘size constancy’ across the entire visual
array.This remains true even though each cluster includes an object
(the central circle) that is different in size from the majority. So the
central circle within the array of smaller circles will be perceived as
more distant than the central circle within the array of larger circles.
Since the two central circles are actually identical in size as far as the
Sight unseen

Figure 6.5
In the Ebbinghaus illusion,
shown here, the two middle 
circles in the top two arrays
appear to be different in size 
even though they are actually
physically identical. The two 
middle circles in the bottom 
display appear to be identical but
their real size is actually different.
(To convince yourself of this,
view each display through a piece
of paper with two holes cut in it
that reveal only the two central
circles.)
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have not seen before, our visuomotor system has to compute its size accurately if we 
are to pick it up efficiently, that is, without fumbling or readjusting our grip. (Milner 
and Goodale 1995: 169-70)
Milner and Goodale interpret these results as showing that the illusory content of perception was 
not guiding the grasping movements. What guided these movements was the unconscious 
information in the dorsal stream, which was not part of the subjects’ visual perception. This 
inference seems to be supported by  the idea that, if perceptual contents were guiding the 
movements, then there would be inconsistent contents in perception (there would be an illusory 
content of the size of the discs and an accurate content as well). However, this interpretation is also 
influenced by the narrow view of experience. 
In order to assert that the contents would be inconsistent, it  must be supposed that they are 
propositional. Inconsistency is a property of a set of propositions, which cannot be simultaneously 
true. 24 For the subjects’ experience to be inconsistent, it would have to contain the following 
propositions:
•The disc on the left is size a
•The disc on the right is size a
•The right disc is smaller than the left.
These propositions would constitute an inconsistent set. What remains doubtful is whether the three 
of them can be attributed to the subject’s perceptual contents. As far as the evidence goes, only the 
third can be attributed to the subject’s experience. However, according to the narrow view of 
experience, if the real size of the disc is a content of the subject’s perception, then it must be the sort 
of propositional content that can be inconsistent with the comparative judgment. But if this 
conception is cast aside, there need not be any inconsistency. That is, if the subject perceives the 
real size of the disc but this content is not propositional (i.e. not truth-evaluable), and cannot be 
articulated in a judgment, then there is no inconsistency  between that content of experience and the 
propositional content that the size of the discs is different.
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24 Someone might reply that there are other types of inconsistencies, such as performative inconsistencies, that do not 
hold between propositional contents alone. However, insofar as the notion of consistency is defined in terms of the 
notion of truth (i.e. truth has explanatory priority over consistency), things of which consistency can be correctly 
predicated must be truth-evaluable and, therefore, they must be able of being propositionally articulated.
To sum up, experiments cited to support the claim of a dissociation between perceptual experience 
and visuomotor control do not necessarily justify Milner and Goodale’s bold proposal. These 
experiments show a dissociation between the contents of judgments and the information that guides 
grasping and reaching movements. The further inference that the information guiding the 
movements is not a part of the subject’s experience requires the presupposition of the narrow view 
of experience.
1.4 Conclusions of the chapter
Milner and Goodale’s bold proposal sharply distinguishes perceptual experience from visuomotor 
control. Beyond claiming that each of them is implemented by an independent brain system, it holds 
that there is an inaccessibility between the contents of experience and the information that guides 
motor control. This hypothesis is supported by a wide variety  of empirical evidence. However, I 
have shown in this chapter that the interpretation of this evidence is influenced by a particular view 
of perceptual content, which I have called: the narrow view of experience. According to this view a 
subject’s perceptual experience is restricted to those contents that are prone to be part of judgments 
and can be reported. If this view is bracketed, the evidence that Milner and Goodale put forward can 
only justify a weaker thesis: that there is a dissociation between information that guides motor 
control and the contents of experience that are judged and reported by subjects. Additionally I have 
explained some reasons that suggest the need for a wider view of experience, such as the need to 
account for motor awareness, an explanation of the behavioral differences between blindsight 
patients and visual agnosics, and the intuition that the contents of experience cannot remain intact if 
the subject is unable to act skillfully on the base of her experience.
In the following chapter I will put forward an argument that intends to show that Milner and 
Goodale’s hypothesis leads to an unsatisfactory view of intentional action. In the chapters that 
follow, I will argue that if a wider view of experience is adopted, then it would be possible to give a 
better explanation of intentional action, which is consistent with a moderate reading of empirical 
evidence. 
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Chapter 2
Intentional Action and the Dual Visual Streams hypothesis
In the previous chapter I argued against Milner and Goodale's "bold proposal". The chapter 
attempted to show that the hypothesis does not follow from the empirical evidence presented by the 
authors, unless a particular view of perceptual experience is already  assumed: a view according to 
which the contents of experience are only those that can be reported or, in other words, those that 
can be articulated within a perceptual judgment. If this view is bracketed, the evidence provided by 
Milner and Goodale only shows that: (1) there is division at  the neurophysiological level; and (2) 
there is a double disassociation between the abilities to make true judgments about the perceptual 
environment and visuomotor abilities. 
In this chapter I will argue that  Milner and Goodale's bold proposal is not only based on a 
tendentious reading of the evidence, but also leads to undesirable philosophical consequences 
regarding the understanding of intentional action. If one adopts this hypothesis, one must also adopt 
a view of intentional action where it is split in two separate components. I will argue that this 
understanding does not do justice to crucial features of intentional action.
2.1 The tele-assistance model 
Milner and Goodale's dual hypothesis postulates two processing streams of visual information. On 
the one hand, the ventral stream takes care of processing visual features in the way needed for the 
categorization and recognition of objects. For this, it must compute the object's spatial properties, 
using a relative metric and an allocentric coordinate system, and the object's invariant features, to 
obtain perceptual constancies. Ventral-dependent processing constructs a visual representation of 
the world that constitutes the experience of the subject.  On the other hand, the dorsal stream is in 
charge of processing visual features of objects in an appropriate way for visuomotor control. For 
this, it  must compute the absolute metric of objects and their location with respect to the subject’s 
body, with a constant update. Dorsal-dependent processing functions independently of the visual 
experience of the subject, in the sense that information processed for visuomotor control is not 
accessible to the subject’s experience, and the contents of the experience are not available for motor 
control.
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From this formulation of the dual hypothesis comes a model of intentional action described by 
Milner and Goodale by  comparison to tele-assistance mechanisms, which are typically  used for 
robot control in hostile environments. In such mechanisms action is executed through the 
interaction of two elements. On the one hand, there is a human operator perceiving the visual scene 
in a distanced manner: through a screen, say, in which there are images captured by a camera 
incorporated in the robot. The human operator can order the robot to execute an action upon a 
specific object in the robot’s “visual field” (for example "move the stone ahead"). On the other 
hand, the robot is situated in the scene, has access to updated information about the position of 
objects in relation to its effectors, their real size, and can engage in sensorimotor routines through 
which it executes the operator's orders. 
In tele-assistance the human operator doesn’t have to worry about the real metrics of the 
workspace or the timing of the movements made by the robot; instead, the human operator 
has the job of identifying a goal and specifying an action toward that goal in general terms. 
Once this information is communicated to the semi-autonomous robot, the robot can use its 
on-board range finders and other sensing devices to work out the required movements for 
achieving the specified goal. In short, tele-assistance combines the flexibility of tele-
operation with the precision of autonomous robotic control. (Milner and Goodale 2004: 99)
Milner and Goodale's hypothesis is that ventral-dependent processes resemble the work done by the 
human operator who has a representation of the scene, on the basis of which a target and a general 
action course are fixed. The dorsal system resembles the robot, lacking a perceptual representation 
but with constantly updated information of the scene and sensorimotor knowledge that allows it to 
engage in activity  routines and control them on the basis of the newly updated information. In this 
way, the subject's perceptual representation helps select a kind of action and a target-object to 
determine the course of action. In the meanwhile, dorsal non-perceptual information guides the 
execution of sensorimotor routines that are activated by the subject’s decision. 
Our current conception of how the two visual streams interact in the animal or human brain 
corresponds nicely  to this engineering principle. The perceptual systems in the ventral 
stream, along with their associated memory and other cognitive systems in the brain, are 
rather like the human operator in tele-assistance. They identify different objects in the 
scene, using a representational system that is rich and detailed but not metrically precise. 
When a particular goal object has been flagged, dedicated visuomotor networks in the 
dorsal stream, in conjunction with output systems elsewhere in the brain (located in other 
brain structures including the premotor cortex, basal ganglia, and brainstem) are activated 
to perform the desired motor act. In other words, dorsal stream networks, with their precise 
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egocentric coding of the location, size, orientation and shape of the goal object, are like the 
robotic component of tele-assistance. Both systems have to work together in the production 
of purposive behavior— one system to select the goal object from the visual array, the 
other to carry out the required metrical computations for the goal-directed action (Milner 
and Goodale 2004: 100)
This division of labor can be understood as a division between the planning and the programming 
of an action (Milner and Goodale 2008). The planning consists in the identification of a target-
object and the selection of an action type. The programming consists in the detailed specification 
and online control of bodily movements using visual information. 
It is important  to notice that, according to this model of intentional action, the subject never has 
conscious perceptual access to the information that guides the execution of her actions. She only 
has access to the perceptual representation produced by ventral processing. The action executing 
control happens at an unconscious level. It  can be said that the functional distinction between the 
roles of the ventral and dorsal streams is mapped into a distinction between the kind of information 
to which the subject has conscious perceptual access and that  is used to select action courses, and 
the unconscious information that guides motor activity through the execution of sensorimotor 
routines.   
For this reason, Andy Clark (2001) argues that Milner and Goodale's theory provides evidence 
against the assumption of Experience Based Control (EBC), according to which our visual 
experience presents us the world in a manner appropriate for the control of our motor activity.25 
Clark holds that the view that  is most consistent with Milner and Goodale's theory is a hypothesis 
he calls Experience Based Selection (EBS): “Conscious visual experience presents the world to a 
subject in a form appropriate for the reason-and-memory-based selection of actions.” (Clark 2001: 
512).  As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the visual representation of the world obtained by 
ventral processing provides flexibility and intelligence to action. According to the tele-assistance 
model and EBS, perceptual experience allows a selection of action courses that is sensitive to 
memory and reason. In other words, allows subject's actions to be rational and appropriate in the 
light of the contents of her visual experience. However, the contents of experience do not play  any 
role in the guidance of bodily movements through which the selected action is executed. 
Furthermore, they  could not in principle play  such role, for they  do not have the appropriate form 
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25 See Chapter  1, sections 1 and 2
for that function. In Clark's words, the role of visual perceptual experience in the guidance of action 
is the following:
[C]onscious seeing makes its contribution at a rather more executive level: a level that 
guides my behavior only  in the same sense as my love of pasta may be said to guide my 
selection of a menu item” (Clark 2001: 511)
The required distinction is that between providing the information used to compute the 
gross aspects of the reach and merely  providing a specification of the target and action 
type required. It is the difference between telling the waiter to get the apples from the 
pantry  and providing at least a rough sketch of the motion that would get  the waiter to 
the pantry (Clark 2007: 576).
We have, then, an extrapolation of a division in visual processing to a division in intentional action. 
Just as there are two clearly distinguishable components in vision, there are also two clearly 
distinguishable components in action: selection (or planning) and execution (or programming). 
Selection is a process that is based on reason and the visual experience of the subject. Execution is 
the process of sensorimotor routine activation. This distinction could be characterized as a 
distinction between a personal level and a subpersonal level phenomena. There are reasons that 
suggest this interpretation, which I will explain below.
2.1.1. The tele-assistance model and the personal/subpersonal distinction
To start, it is important  to make clear the way that the personal/subpersonal distinction is going to 
be understood. We could start with the criteria provided by Dennett  (1969) and Bermúdez (2000; 
2003) to distinguish the phenomena proper of the personal level. These criteria are: (1) states and 
processes can be legitimately attributed to the person, and not only to a module or subsystem of her 
brain, understanding person as a rational agent (Dennett 1969); (2) the operative principles are not 
the nomological principles of the physical world ---nor principles that could be reduced to 
nomological relations among events (Bermúdez 2003). The latter can be analyzed in two 
components: (a) at the personal level of explanation there is a distinctive set of regularities; and (b) 
the explanation of personal level phenomena is subject to normative constraints like the rationality 
principle (2000). This criteria can be understood in several, some problematic, ways.26
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26 See: Bermudez 2003: 201-205
To avoid the problems brought by certain formulations, I will assume the distinction as McDowell 
(1994a; 1994b) presents it. McDowell holds that the personal level is the only  one in which there 
can be  talk about genuine content (1994b), that is, where there is a direct relation between a subject 
and her environment. Genuine content  is what puts the subject in contact with her environment. 
This opposes to the "as-if" content of subpersonal level, in which there is only  contact with 
structural properties of the received inputs. 
A sub-personal informational system is a physical mechanism, connected to its 
surroundings by  transducers that convert  physical impacts from outside into events of the 
sort that the system can work on, and perhaps by transducers that convert the system’s end-
products into physical interventions in the exterior. The system knows nothing even about 
the character of the immediate physical impacts on the input transducers, or the immediate 
physical interventions in the exterior that result from its operations by way of output 
transducers, let alone about the nature and layout of the distal environment (McDowell 
1994b: 198)
Following this idea, the subpersonal level of explanation deals only  with syntactic processes, 
whereas the personal level is characterized for the place it gives to explanation in semantic terms. 
What establishes a direct relation between person and world is meaning and reference. But at the 
subpersonal level there are no semantics. 
The personal level of explanation is characterized for describing relations between a person and her 
environment: this relation, understood as a semantic relation, constitutes genuine content. But  what 
characterizes this relation? In a word: normativity. According to McDowell, normativity is needed 
to make sense of the contact that a subject can have with the world: “A normative context is 
necessary  for the idea of being in touch with the world at all” (1994a: iv). The personal level is 
characterized by the existence of normative relations (of justification, warrant, correctness) among 
its elements: “The relation between mind and world is normative [...] in this sense: thinking that 
aims at judgement, or at the fixation of belief, is answerable to the world --to how things are-- for 
wether or not it  is correctly executed” (McDowell 1994a: xii).This normative context is equivalent, 
for McDowell, to Sellars’ (1956) logical space of reasons.
For Sellars and McDowell, the space of reasons opposes to the space of laws, the logical space in 
which natural science's discourse takes place. The difference between both "realms" lies in the kind 
of relations established between their inhabitants. In the logical space of reasons there are: 
“relations such as one thing’s being warranted, or --for the general case-- correct in the light of 
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another” (1994a: xv). In this realm, explanation is governed by what Davidson calls "the 
constitutive ideal of rationality" (Davidson 1980: 183). In virtue of being constituted by elements 
sensible to reasons, talk within the space of reasons allows talk about freedom and responsibility: 
“Rational necessitation is not just compatible with freedom, but constitutive of it. In a slogan, the 
space of reasons is the space of freedom” (McDowell 1994a: 5). Thus, the normative context allows 
the use of concepts like action, belief, judgment, etc. These concepts involve responsibility and 
commitment on the part of the person. 
In the realm of laws, on the other hand, there is no space for such concepts, because the relations 
between its inhabitants are not normative.  The kind of intelligibility  of the phenomena in this space 
is different from the intelligibility  that reasons provide. Sellars holds only a negative 
characterization of the space of laws, as a space constituted by relations different from the 
normative relations of the space of reasons (McDowell 1994a: xv). However, the name given can 
provide a useful insight into the distinction. The nomological, what  is bound by  laws, does not 
allow description or explanation in terms of its, as it were, correctness in the light of anything. It 
only allows description in merely  factual terms and is, therefore, excluded from the space of reasons 
and hence from the personal level of explanation.
What is found in the subpersonal level, to sum up, are phenomena that  are not susceptible of an 
explanation that appeals to normative relations. They are processes that can only  be described in 
terms of syntactic and algorithmic operations. Such algorithmic processes clearly exemplify the 
kind of nomological phenomena that are outside the space of reasons. At the personal level, on the 
other hand, explanation is bound by normative constraints, obeys the ideal of rationality, and is 
characterized by  describing relations that are normative (like justification). At the personal level 
there are descriptions and explanations of the interactions between a rational agent and the world.
Let us return to the tele-assistance model. Ventral-dependent selection of actions can be understood 
as a personal level phenomenon, since it  is a "reason-based selection of actions” (Clark 2001: 512) 
Processing in the ventral stream:
subserves an intermediate goal in the guidance of behaviour, specifically the formation of 
perceptual representations of objects and of their relationships. Such representations are 
necessary  if behaviour is to be guided intelligently  by events that have occurred at  an 
earlier time, allowing, for example, a mate or a prey object to be categorized correctly and, 
thus, acted upon appropriately. (Milner and Goodale 1995: 20)
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Firstly, as shown in the passage above, ventral dependent process lead to the formation of visual 
representations of objects and their properties. Secondly, this representations are the base to act 
appropriately. In the case of human beings, Clark holds, this selection is based on reason. Such idea 
of a process based on reason is reminiscent of McDowell’s and Sellars’ portrayal of phenomena 
belonging to the space of reasons, as sensitive to normative constraints. If action selection is based 
on reason, then it calls for a type of explanation that  involves normative notions, such as 
appropriateness, correctness or rationality. Action-selection is rational/correct/justified, etc. by 
reasons. These reasons include the subject’s beliefs and desires but also the contents of her 
experience. It is in the light of these contents that the selection of an action is rendered rational or 
appropriate.
Action selection consists in choosing an action type and a target-object and communicating this 
choice to the brain systems that  are able to execute it. For example, based on her perception of her 
environment, and her desire to make a phone call (besides other intentional states), a subject may 
select the action: “pick the phone that’s placed in front of me”, and then go ahead and perform the 
action. Action selection can be understood as the formation of an intention to act, where “intention” 
is defined as a mental state whose content (and conditions of satisfaction) is an action to be 
performed by  the subject27, and that is motivated by  other intentional states, as beliefs and desires, 
that render it appropriate. Thus, when the subject selects the action “pick the phone that’s placed in 
front of me”, it may be said that she has the intention to pick up the phone in front of her, and that 
this intention is executed by means of bodily movements that are guided by visuomotor routines.
Following this line of thought, action-selection, which is a ventral-dependent process, would 
amount to the formation of an intention. Subjects’ intentions would be, in this model, based on the 
contents of experience (representations of objects) and would themselves have a content (an action 
to be executed upon a target-object). The idea of a reason-based process entails that the contents of 
intentions enter in justificatory relations with other contents, like those of beliefs, desires, and 
experience. Subjects’ intentions can be explained as "appropriate" or "rational" in the light of her 
experience and other mental states. The selection of actions (as well as their explanation) is bound 
by normative constraints, characteristic of the personal level of explanation. For this reason, it can 
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27 For a discussion of intentions, actions and their relation, see: Searle 1983: Chapter 3
be said that the planning of actions can be attributed to the person, and not only to a module of her 
brain.
On the other hand, the programing processes do not seem to satisfy the criteria of the personal level 
of explanation. Firstly, Milner and Goodale insist that dorsal processing does not conform a visual 
representation that is available to the subject. Thus, neither the visual information that enters as 
input to the sensorimotor routines, nor motor control are accessible to the subject. Both operate, as 
it were, behind perceptual experience's back.  Insofar as the subject does not have access to the 
information or to the control of the activity it is not easy to see how they could be legitimately 
attributed to her. 
Secondly, programming processes are characterized as executions of sensorimotor routines not 
unlike the ones carried out by a robot. Routines are automatic and nomological processes that do 
not call for, nor allow, normative explanations. Their explanation only requires an algorithm that 
determines the nomological covariation between the detection of visual properties in the 
environment and a determined range of motor responses. For this reason even if the programming 
of the actions is framed and triggered by a selection made on the base of reasons, it is not itself 
sensitive to, nor guided by, reasons. In an algorithmic process, given certain input, there is a 
guarantee of a particular answer. In this sense, there is no space for freedom or error; notions that 
are constitutive of the space of reasons. There are no normative constraints in the motor 
programming explanation, and the regularities it obeys are nomological and algorithmic.
For these reasons, the tele-assistance model entails a dissociation of action in a personal and a 
subpersonal component.28 Even though Milner and Goodale only  talk explicitly about a distinction 
between a conscious and an unconscious process, the way they frame this distinction leads to a 
deeper disassociation. One that involves phenomena of two distinct levels of explanation, each 
54
28  In a broad sense, every model of intentional action must make use of distinguishable personal and subpersonal 
elements.  An explanation of action that does not include these components would be incomplete. Without an 
explanation at the personal level, the concept of "intentional action" would lose its meaning. On the other hand, the 
implementation processes (like the transfer of nervous impulses, etc) require a nomological explanation. In this sense, 
my claim about the tele-assistance model may seem trivial. However,  what I intend to highlight is the point in which 
Milner and Goodale draw the division between the personal and subpersonal processes. This is the problematic aspect 
in their model, as I will show in this chapter.
corresponding to the processes involving one of the visual streams.29 At the personal level there is 
only the selection of actions and target-objects; that is, the formation of an intention, whose content 
is a kind of action and an object upon which to perform it (for example: "lift the pen to my right" or 
"move the chair that is in front of the table"). At the subpersonal level there is motor activity and all 
the programming and control processes for bodily movements. There is, thus, a conceptual 
opposition between a deliberate selection of action that is guided by reasons, and an automatic, 
algorithmic, and nomological process.    
I would like to venture a description of the process of performing an intentional action, under the 
tele-assistance model, in order to clarify  what is the role that each of the visual streams plays in this 
process.30 Let us take the action of picking up the phone to make a call. In the first  place, I must 
choose an action-type that looks appropriate according to my beliefs and desires. If I desire to make 
a call and I believe that for doing it I need to use a phone, it  is rational to pick up the phone. 
Secondly, the ventral system must identify an object in the visual field as the target-object. For this, 
an object must be categorized as "phone" and located within the visual field by  determining its 
position in a system of coordinates based on the scene (say, “on top of the table”). Now I have the 
intention of picking up the object that’s on the table. Once the object has been identified and 
located, the ventral system must, as it  were, flag it as the target object of the action. An order with 
the content "Pick up the object at  the coordinates x, y, z of the visual field "is then issued and 
communicated to the brain systems in charge of executing it. The ventral-dependent planning 
processes stop here.
From this point on, the dorsal system takes charge. It must compute the exact position of the phone 
in relation to my body  or, more specifically, to my hand. It  must determine the direction in which I 
must move my hand and the size, form, grasping points, etc. of the object. As my hand approaches 
the object, it must  determine the appropriate MGA, the correct  position of the hand, the appropriate 
closing of my fingers to make contact with the object, etc. These processes are carried out by 
algorithms that  correlate the detection of a certain property  of the object with a particular motor 
response (detection of a five centimeter wide object with a seven centimeter MGA, say). If the brain 
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29 Perhaps its important to clarify that I do not claim that processes in the ventral system are processes of the personal 
level of explanation. What is to be found at the personal level is their product: the visual representation of the 
environment and the selection of actions. The expression "ventral dependent process" is used to stress the dependence 
of these personal phenomena on ventral processing.
30 I will not mention the details of the neurophysiological process. For a complete description of the process at this 
level, see Milner y Goodale 1995, Chapter 7
is working correctly and the environment does not  present any obstacle, we can safely assume that 
the story  has a happy ending where I can pick up  the phone effortlessly and, why not, without 
knowing how I did it ---for the routines of visuomotor control are outside the bounds of my 
experience.    
If this story  is correct, the dorsal stream has the role of guiding the execution of actions. That is, the 
role of processing, in a very  precise manner, the features of the object that are relevant for the 
skillful performance of the action. We can thus say that the dorsal stream is responsible for guiding 
the execution process, in order to satisfy  the intention in a skillful way. Concerning the planning 
processes, two objectives can be identified. Firstly, the planning processes must form an intention 
that is rational in the light of the subject's beliefs, desires and experience; it has the task of 
specifying an action type and an object upon which it will be executed ("Picking up the phone"). 
Secondly, send the order to the systems in charge of execution: trigger the causal chain that leads to 
the execution of the action.  According to the tele-assistance model, an intentional action consists in 
the execution of a series of nomologically determined routines, which are triggered by  an intention 
of the subject that specifies the state of affairs that is sought with the action. 
 
2.1. Objections to the tele-assistance model
On this section I shall argue that the tele-assistance model is not a good model of intentional action. 
First, I shall present McDowell's critique of theories that disassociate intentional action. Then, I 
shall present my own argument, developing McDowell's, to determine specifically what are the 
conceptual problems in disassociating intentional action in the way that the tele-assistance model 
does. 
2.2.1. McDowell and bald naturalism
In the fifth lecture of Mind and World (1994a), McDowell criticizes the view of intentional action 
that stems from the philosophical posture he calls bald naturalism. He considers that bald 
naturalism disassociates action in two components: the intention, an act of spontaneity  belonging to 
the space of reasons and situated within a web of normative relations; and bodily movements, 
belonging to the space of laws. For this reason, agency (a concept belonging to the space of 
reasons) is reduced to the formation of an intention and tends to shrink into an inner realm, where it 
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only has the function of framing actions. Bodily movements, then, seem to be mere effects in the 
subject’s body as a result of an intention ---effects that are alien to the subject. (McDowell 1994a: 
92-3) 
The problem with this explanation of intentional action is that it blurs the tight relation between the 
intention of a subject and the bodily  movements through which it is executed. In this view, the 
intentions frames a chain of bodily  movements and they  happen within that same frame. To take the 
analogy used by McDowell, bodily movements and intentions have a similar relation to that 
between the falling of a tree and the action of cutting it: an external relation (McDowell 1994a 90). 
In this case, the person's action (the exercise of agency, so to speak) is limited to cutting the tree, 
but the way in which it falls does not  count as, as it  were, something done by the subject; it is only 
an effect of her actions. There are two distinct though related events.
Bald naturalism's characterization of action is similar: On the one hand, there is a subject's intention 
that stands within the space of reasons and is the only exercise of spontaneity and activity  on the 
part of the subject (the only  exercise of his condition as an agent). On the other hand, there is an 
event within the realm of law, that is externally related to the subject's intention. Furthermore: the 
event is alien to the subject for she does not play  any role in the development of the causal chain, 
aside from triggering it and providing the frame in which such events happen. As McDowell says: 
“It comes to seem that what we do, even in those of our actions that we think of as bodily, is at best 
to direct our wills, as it were from a distance, at changes of state in those alien objects [our 
bodies]” ( McDowell 1994: 91).
There are two aspects of this view of action, to which McDowell’s objection may be directed. In the 
first place, the idea that bodily movements are merely effects of intentions. This view holds that the 
only thing that distinguishes bodily  movements executing an action from other events of the world 
is the fact that  the former are caused by an intentional state of the subject, whereas the latter are not. 
There is nothing constitutive or intrinsic in bodily  movements in virtue of which they make part of 
an action of the subject; only  something external can do that job: having an intention as a cause. In 
the second place, the idea that intentions have the role of giving a specification that frames bodily 
movements: a state of affairs that is sought through those movements. This specification creates a 
frame within which different series of movements can take place, and with which the subject has no 
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direct relation. This view, McDowell claims, eliminates any authentic understanding of bodily 
agency. (1994a: 91).31
2.2.2. Responsibility and experience
Within the frame of McDowell's theory, we can say that the problematic disassociation comes from 
placing bodily action in two different logical spaces: the logical space of laws and the logical space 
of reasons. Being situated in the space of law, bodily  movements split from agency, --a 
phenomenon that belongs to the logical space of reasons. Two central notions to understand the 
constitution of this logical space are freedom and responsibility.32 Insofar as a subject's agency in 
her bodily actions is restricted to the formation of an intention, it can only be said that she is free in 
and responsible for the formation of the intention; not for the execution of the bodily action, for it is 
in the space of laws and nomological compulsion, in which there cannot be talk about freedom or 
responsibility. 
The following argument seeks to do justice to the intuition that we perform the bodily  movements 
that execute an action. In the disassociated view of action sketched above, bodily  movements seem 
to be events alien to the agent; they only have a relation to her in virtue of being caused by  an 
intention. However, we have the intuition that  bodily movements are ours, insofar as we are agents 
and we perform those movements. In fact, we say that  some of our bodily  movements are made by 
us (for example, the arm movements of a tennis player), while others are not (reflex movements 
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31  To dissolve the problems that stem from this view of action, McDowell proposes the same treatment given in his 
theory to perceptual experience, which can be captured in a variation of a kantian slogan: "Intentions without overt 
activity are idle, and movements of limbs without concepts are mere happenings, not expressions of agency" (1194a: 
89). His proposal consists in treating bodily actions as actualizations of spontaneity in which conceptual capacities are 
already involved: “Intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our active nature in which conceptual capacities are 
inextricably implicated” (1994a: 90). McDowell's positive view of actions is further developed in the debate held with 
Dreyfus in Inquiry (2007). In few words, McDowell holds that in performing basic actions we are actualizing practical 
concepts. Having such practical concepts just is having the bodily ability to perform an action (McDowell 2007b). I find 
two problems with this view. Firstly, it is not clear in which sense so-called practical concepts are concepts. Secondly, it 
not clear either what is the role that perceptual experience plays to determine the appropriate way of executing a 
practical concepts in each specific situation. McDowell's proposal deserves further discussion but it would distract us 
from the main target of these arguments: the dual visual streams hypothesis.
32 See McDowell 1994a; Brandom 1979
such as pupil dilation in response to changes in lighting). When we execute an intentional action, 
we suppose the movements of our body are things we are doing. As Matthew Nudds says:
In acting on an intention, we don't simply find ourselves having done something. If I know 
how to tie shoelaces then I can carry  out an intention to tie them without any further 
reasoning, but in carrying out my intention I don't just find myself with tied laces [...] In 
acting our bodies move, but our bodies don't just move: we move them (Nudds 2007: 5)
The same idea can be found in the following quote by Kent Bach:
An action isn't just done --it is done in some way or other, and the agent has something to 
do with that. Even when a person forms an intention to do something immediately  thereby 
initiating the action, the rest of the action doesn't  just happen by itself, riding on the crest 
of the momentum generated by the intention. The rest of the action has to be performed 
[...] After all, an action can be performed in different ways, with different degrees of skill, 
control, effort, and attention. (Bach 1978: 363-4)
The action as a whole is performed by the agent. The way in which it is performed is something 
attributed to the agent and not just  an alien process that happens in her body. Assuming that the 
subject is only the agent of the intention, leads to a disassociated understanding of action like the 
one criticized by McDowell. For this reason, the way that we move in order to execute an action 
requires an explanation, not only  of the physiological mechanisms that produce the movements, but 
also of such movements as made by the subject. In other words, we need an explanation of the 
totality of the action that makes it intelligible as a phenomenon of the space of reasons. The 
following argument seeks to develop this intuition further.
A. An intuitive argument
It is a common place in theories concerning the content of experience to use examples of activities 
exhibiting certain phenomenological features, which seem to provide evidence in favor of a thesis. 
Here I will present another example of that kind. However, the example I’ll bring forth is not meant 
to highlight phenomenological aspects, but characteristics of the activity that are crucial for our 
understanding of action. The activity of which I want to talk about is that of surgeons at the moment 
of operating a patient.
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The training of a surgeon consists, inter alia, in acquiring the millimetric control of her actions. The 
success or failure of a surgery greatly depends on the perfect control of her hands' movements up to 
a high level of precision. An inappropriate movement of the scalpel can lead to a failure of the 
surgery and, in dramatic cases, to the patient's death. Faced with this kind of failure the surgeon 
must answer in professional, moral, and legal terms. A patient's death can mean losing her license, 
lawsuits, economic and reputation costs, etc. 
We naturally  suppose that the surgeon's actions are visually guided. We think, also, that in a surgery 
the doctor takes full responsibility  over the execution of her actions, even the finer ones. The 
surgeon taking on this responsibility must assume, at least, that the the visual information guiding 
her actions is reliable and corresponds to reality, since the success of the operation greatly  depends 
on her visual perception. My contention is that the activity  of surgeons involves epistemic 
commitment with visual experience, inasmuch as their movements are visually guided and they are 
movements for which they must assume responsibility. An epistemic commitment consists in taking 
a stance toward the content of experience; embracing it  as correct. The commitment with 
experience is epistemic insofar as the subject takes her experience as a way of accessing the world, 
of knowing it, and allowing her to act in it. 
I want to defend the idea that motor activity involves a commitment with the content of experience 
that is similar to the commitment taken when making a perceptual judgment. I will try  to show that 
the responsibility  of a subject over an action entails an epistemic responsibility  over the content of 
the experience that guides the execution of the action. To characterize this kind of commitment I 
will make use of McDowell's portrayal of perceptual judgments, and I will then explain why it can 
be said that there is an epistemic commitment with experience in motor activity. 
B. Perceptual judgment
Perceptual judgments (and beliefs) are paradigmatic examples of epistemic responsibility taken by a 
subject by committing to a content of her perceptual experience. I want to initially  characterize 
perceptual judgments (or judgments of experience) using Martha Nussbaum's formulation: "I can 
accept or embrace the appearance, take it into me as the way things are: in this case it  has become 
my judgment, and that act of acceptance is what judging is” (2004: 191). McDowell (1994a) has a 
similar idea: a perceptual judgment consists in adopting a content of experience as part of a world-
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view. The subject passively  receives perceptual contents from the world and, in making a judgement 
based on experience, actively takes that content as a correct representation of the world. In 
judgement, the subject takes experience at face value; she accepts what experience presents as a 
feature of the world: “In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that 
things are thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be 
the content  of a judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face value” (McDowell 
1994a: 26).   
This characterization of the move from experience to perceptual judgment is very similar to the 
Fregean idea of the advance from entertaining a thought to a judgment.33  The same content 
presented in experience is the content of the judgment. The move does not  consist in a change of the 
content but in the subject's actively taking a stance towards the content (i.e. she takes it up  as 
correct or rejects it  as incorrect). In the activity  of judging, the subject is free of committing, or not, 
with her experience: “It must be possible to decide whether or not to judge that  things are as one’s 
experience represents them to be. How one’s experience represents things to be is not under one’s 
control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it” (McDowell 1994a: 11).
There is another aspect of the Fregean characterization of judgement that its important to note. 
According to Frege: “It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to 
the reference” (1948: 216). What drives us in the advance from grasping a thought to a judgment 
(that Frege describes as an advance from sense to reference) is the striving for truth. According to 
this, truth acts like a guide in the formation of a judgment. Judgment aims at  truth. It can be said, 
then, that in forming a judgment the subject takes a stance towards a content that  consists in taking 
it as correct (or incorrect) according to a norm: truth. By  adopting a content as true, the subject is 
thereby committed with it. In perceptual judgement there is an epistemic commitment with 
experience insofar as the subject takes its content as a presentation of the way the world is, and thus 
takes her experience as a way of access to know the world.     
Following McDowell, in experience the subject is passively saddled with content (1194a: 31). 
Experience, as a receptive and passive faculty, only  receives contents from the world, and the 
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33  Frege characterizes the advance from thought to judgment as a the recognition of the truth of a thought that is 
expressed by the assertoric force of an indicative sentence.  The activity of judging, for Frege, consists in an advance 
from the mere consideration or grasp of a thought to the admission of its truth. In this advance, the content of the 
thought remains intact, but the subject adopts a stance towards that content that consists in taking it as true. See: Frege 
1948; 1956.
subject has no control over what it is given. But in perceptual judgment the content of experience 
enters completely in the domain of spontaneity, for there is a an active intervention of the subject in 
taking the content to be correct. The active intervention consists only in taking the content as an 
aspect of the world; that is, taking it as an accurate representation of reality. 
The transition from the domain of receptivity  to the domain of spontaneity has an implication for 
the content taken in the judgment: in this transition, the content begins to make part of a web of 
contents organized by rational relations. The content of the judgment is, then, sensitive to rational 
relations with other contents. In this way, the epistemic commitment implicit in the perceptual 
judgment consists in the subject taking the content as her own, integrating it  in a web of normative 
relations and restrictions in virtue of which the content begins to be part of her world view.  It can 
be said, then, that the subject is made epistemically responsible for the content of her experience. 
The normative relations and restrictions, against which the content of experience that is taken in a 
judgment must answer, demand that it  accurately presents a feature of the world, for it  must play the 
role of being the warrant of the truth of a judgment. 
McDowell insists that normative restrictions go hand in hand with freedom and responsibility. 
Together with freedom, there must be some kind of constraint, so that there is  a norm against which 
to comply; i.e., there must be something to which the commitment is answerable. Adrian Cussins 
expresses a similar idea:
The idea of commitment seems to require both freedom and constraint: freedom because 
making an epistemic commitment entails taking epistemic responsibility, and taking 
epistemic responsibility  requires that subjects be free—that subjects are not compelled—in 
how they determine their judgements. And the idea of epistemic commitment requires 
constraint because it  requires that one could be wrong, have made a mistake, and so be 
compelled to withdraw the commitment. In making a commitment there is something to 
which one is answerable, and that to which one is answerable entails constraint because it 
may require that the commitment be held or withdrawn. (Cussins 2008: 36)
 In perceptual judgments the normative restriction is truth and the activity of judgment is oriented 
to, and guided by, truth. For this reason, judgments must answer normatively to the way the world is 
as given in experience and against the subject's belief network: they must readjust in order to 
preserve truth.  On the other hand, insofar as a judgment is something for which the subject is 
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responsible, there must be freedom in the activity  of judging, otherwise, if the subject is compelled 
by an external force, it is not clear how there could be any epistemic responsibility. 
Let us return to the main point: I want  to characterize, with McDowell, a perceptual judgment as 
commitment with the content of experience that consists in taking experience at face value, taking it 
as accurate, and allowing that it's content to be in rational relations with other contents like 
judgments and beliefs that, as a whole, make up the subject's worldview. Insofar as adopting a 
content is a normative exercise of spontaneity, it is an exercise of freedom by the subject and, thus, 
something over which she is  responsible. 
C. Commitment in motor action
What similarities are there between judgment and motor activity that justify  the claim that motor 
activity involves responsibility and epistemic commitment as much as judgment? There are some 
interesting similarities that, at the very least, deserve to be considered.
Following Frege's idea, the act of judging involves a strive for truth that will only  be satisfied --in 
perceptual judgments-- if the content of the experience is accurate. For this reason, in the perceptual 
judgment the subject is committed with experience, by assuming that it presents the world just as it 
is. Otherwise the judgment would probably be incorrect. This is what I mean by saying that a 
person takes epistemic responsibility for her experience.
In motor activity there is no strive for truth, evidently; but  there is an analog goal: obtaining the 
desired state of affairs, as specified by  the agent's intention. When we talk about visually  guided 
motor activity  we suppose that vision allows the execution of the action to be performed in a skillful 
way that is attuned to the environment. It  could be said, then, that just like truth is the general goal 
of the activity  of judging, the visuomotor control of bodily activity has a similar goal: the skillful 
obtention of the state of affairs specified by  the subject’s intention; that is, the satisfaction of the 
subject’s intention by means of skillful bodily movements.34
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34 The idea of an overarching goal that acts as a guide for motor activity, in the way that truth is a guide for judgment, is 
taken from Cussins 2003. Also the idea that there is a normativity that’s characteristic of motor activity.
One could intuitively  say that the satisfaction of this goal depends, partially, on the subject's correct 
perception of the environment. Perceptual experience provides the information about the 
environment needed to guide her movements, and thus obtain the desired goal. The subject can only 
act skillfully  if her experience presents the world in an accurate way. Insofar as the agent chooses a 
course of activity  it is natural to think that she considers that such course will be appropriate for the 
satisfaction of her intention. In this case, the agent must also take the experience upon which she 
bases her choice to be accurate. For this reason, in performing a particular action, the subject 
commits to the correctness of her experience; she acquires an epistemic responsibility, just like 
when she makes a judgment based on experience. 
My hypothesis is that responsibility for bodily  movements, like the one taken by the surgeon, 
entails the adoption of epistemic responsibility for the information guiding those movements. In the 
case of visually guided actions, being responsible for the movements is also being epistemically 
responsible for the visual information that guides them. It is the same as with the perceptual 
judgment. The subject acquires responsibility for the contents of her perceptual judgments and, in 
doing so, she is thereby committed to the contents of the experience they are based on. She assumes 
them as correct, for the judgement's truth depends on the correctness of experience. Likewise, the 
success of motor activity depends on the accuracy of the visual information that guides it. Thus, in 
performing an activity on the base of visual information, the subject commits to its correctness. But 
in order to do this, the information must be accessible to the subject. How is this access guaranteed? 
By perceptual experience: it is necessary that the visual information that guides the movements be 
in the experience of the subject so that she can take a stance towards it and assume responsibility 
for the movements based on it.  
It could be argued that it is not necessary that experience guides the movements to skillfully obtain 
the desired state of affairs. The evidence presented by Milner and Goodale shows that visuomotor 
control can work correctly independently  of the accuracy of the subject's experience. The 
experiments presented in the previous chapter show that success in visuomotor control does not 
depend on the accuracy of experience. If this is correct, it would follow that  there need not be an 
epistemic commitment with experience in motor activity, for it is not necessary that experience be 
accurate for the activity of the skillful and successful. In other words, if it  is not experience but 
subpersonal information what guides activity, then it  is not necessary that the subject takes 
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epistemic responsibility for her experience. Success in motor activity  can be guaranteed by dorsal 
processing alone. I will argue against this view in what follows. 
When a subject is responsible for her movements, they  are situated within a normative context in 
which some movements are correct or appropriate and others are not. A context defined by what the 
subject, as it were, ought to do, rather than by what she actually does. Take the case of the surgeon: 
In the performance of a surgery, there will be some movements that lead to its success, and others 
that lead to failure. This fact traces a normative framework for the movements. Those that lead to 
failure are incorrect, and those that lead to success are correct. Since the surgeon is responsible for 
the success or failure of the operation, one might say  that she ought to perform the surgery in a 
manner that leads to success. Hence the movements that lead to success are correct; those are the 
movements she ought to do. The surgeon is, then, responsible to perform those movements, and not 
the ones that lead to failure. The performance of the surgery is then framed by this normative 
context. But for there to be a normative context there need be relations such as one thing being 
correct in the light of another (following McDowell).
What determines what the agent ought to do is that to which motor activity responds to, in a 
normative sense. So, what determines the movements that a subject ought to do? Or, in other words, 
what is it that renders some movements correct and others incorrect? In the first place, the intention 
that the subject wants to satisfy  through her movements. Movements are correct if they  lead to the 
fulfillment of the intention, and incorrect otherwise. Secondly, the disposition of the environment. 
In different environments, different movements will be appropriate to skillfully  satisfy the intention. 
Hence, when a subject is responsible for her bodily movements, these should be responsive both to 
her intentions and to the disposition of the environment. 
In making a movement for which the subject takes responsibility, she takes (implicitly, perhaps) the 
movement as being correct against such frame. But how can the subject know which movement is 
correct in that  frame? First, she must know what are the conditions of satisfaction of her intention; 
that is, what must happen in the world in order that her intention is satisfied. Second, she must have 
access to the relevant features of her environment that render some movements as correct. For this it 
is necessary that she has access to the relevant  information about the disposition of the 
environment, and the way in which the environment's disposition is made available to her is through 
visual experience. Given these two conditions, the subject is now able to perform actions in a 
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responsible way. That  is, in a way that guarantees (or at least makes more probable) that there will 
be no failure.
She will, then, perform her movements on the base of these dual normative frame. By doing this, 
she is thereby committed to the correctness of the information on the basis of which she performs 
her movements. Therefore, in acting and taking responsibility over a movement, the subject is also 
taking epistemic responsibility  for the experience that guides the movement. If this is correct, the 
tele-assistance model cannot explain an agent's responsibility for her bodily movements, for it 
denies that the subject has access to the relevant  features of the environment in the light of which 
movements are rendered correct or incorrect. If there is no such access in experience, then there 
may be no commitment, hence no normative framework against  which the subject settles on a 
course of motor activity. Attributions of responsibility require such a normative frame.
This argument can be criticized by saying that bodily movements can respond to the disposition of 
the environment without being guided by experience: through visuomotor routines that  establish 
covariations between detected features of the environment and movements executed. However, if 
this were to be the case, the movements would not respond normatively to the environment’s 
disposition.  As I explained above, in the tele-assistance model the visuomotor control processes are 
carried out at the subpersonal level, in which there are no normative relations but only  algorithmic 
ones; visuomotor routines establish nomological covariations between detected features of the 
environment and the executing of movements. This covariation, that is subject to laws, impedes an 
understanding of the movement as normatively answering to the way the world is. Remember that 
the normative frame is needed for the ascription of responsibility;  it is needed for the ascription to 
the subject (and not merely a module in the brain).    
To clarify this point further, consider the difference between movements done by the subject  (those 
for which the subject is responsible) and reflex movements. The degree to which pupils dilate, for 
example, is a reflex that responds to the lighting conditions of the environment. There is a reliable 
nomological covariation between the lighting in the environment and the dilation of the pupils. But 
this is not a movement that is done by the subject; it is not a movement for which the subject is 
responsible. This movement is, nonetheless, executed by  means of a visuomotor routine that 
responds to the environment. This shows that both, movements made by  the agent, and movements 
she does not make, may be responsive to information about the environment.    
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It does not seem, then, that the kind of response to the environment provided by visuomotor 
routines guarantees that the agent is responsible for her movements. It is not possible to distinguish 
the agent's movements from mere happenings with this resource alone. The way to outline the 
distinction, I suggest, is that reflexes respond algorithmically to how the world is, while the agent's 
movements respond to the world normatively.35 This explanation, however, is out of the reach of the 
tele-assistance model. 
A possible answer from the tele-assistance model would be to draw the difference between reflexes 
and the agent's movements by  claiming that the latter are caused by intentions, whereas the former 
are not. This is a view proper of causal theories of action, and as such is subject to the well-known 
flaws pointed out in the literature, like those of deviate causal chains.36 Consider the following case: 
a man is at  a party and has the intention of talking to an attractive woman. This intention causes a 
state of arousal in the sympathetic nervous system, which in turn causes his pupils to dilate. Though 
in this case the pupil dilatation is caused by  an intention of the subject, we cannot  properly say that 
the dilatation is performed by him. An explanation of action in terms of intention has two problems: 
firstly, insofar as causal relations are transitive, there can always be cases like the one just 
described. Secondly, intentions only  give a distal specification of the state of affairs they look to 
obtain: they frame an action, but within this frame there can be several chains of events. These two 
points show that intentions underdetermine bodily movements and cannot make the difference 
between movements of the subject and reflexes. 
The tele-assistance model can only explain the responsiveness of bodily movements to features of 
the environment as an algorithmic, nomological, covariation. This explanation is not sufficient to 
account for a subject’s responsibility for her bodily movements, nor to distinguish between 
movements made by the subject from mere reflexes. To account for responsibility a normative 
frame is required; a frame against which some movements are correct, and some are incorrect. 
When a subject takes responsibility for her movements, she performs these movements on the base 
of this normative frame. But for this to be possible, she must have access to information about the 
relevant features of the environment in virtue of which some movements are correct and some 
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35 I will develop this point further in the next chapter.
36 
aren’t. To deny that this information is accessible in experience (as the tele-assistance model does) 
entails an impossibility to account for this sort of responsibility.
The second argument in favor of my view (that is not entirely independent of the first) runs as 
follows: the attribution of responsibility for movements supposes the subject's freedom in their 
control. If visual control of movements is a merely nomological process happening at a subpersonal 
level, and in which the agent cannot interfere, there is no space for freedom, and hence no space for 
responsibility either. 
Why does the characterization of visuomotor control as a nomological process entail that the 
subject is not free and, hence, not responsible? Suppose that the bodily movements of a subject 
nomologically respond to certain visual features detected in the environment. If, in the course of an 
action, the dorsal stream receives information about the position of a target-object with relation to 
the subject's hand, this will cause the hand to move in that direction. This process will be 
determined by an algorithm, in virtue of which whenever stimulus x is received,  there will be the 
corresponding motor response y. If this were the case, the subject would not have the possibility of 
making a different movement: she would not have the possibility of modifying, correcting, or 
changing the movement of her hand ---the movement would already be determined by the 
nomological process at the subpersonal level. Furthermore, the subject would not have access to the 
information needed for such correction.
The contrast I want to present here, between an action for which a subject can be held responsible 
and one caused by a subpersonal process, can be better understood through the contrast that 
McDowell presents between justifications and exculpations: “if someone is found in a place from 
which she has been banished, she is exculpated by  the fact that she was deposited there by a 
tornado. Her arriving there is completely removed from the domain of what she is responsible for; it 
is not that she is still responsible, but there is a basis for mitigating any  sanctions” (McDowell 
1994a: 8). According to McDowell, when we deal with exculpations, there cannot be ascription of 
responsibility; for to do so we require the normative frame of justifications. 
Consider the example of a surgeon that  causes the death of her patient  by cutting an important blood 
vessel by misdirecting the movements of her hand while using the scalpel. If we explain the mistake 
of the surgeon as a result of an automatic visuomotor routine, the surgeon would be as responsible 
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for this mistake as the person in McDowell's example. To put in McDowell's terms, when what 
happens is "the result of an alien force, the causal impact of the world, operating outside the control 
of our spontaneity." (1194a: 8), the subject cannot be held responsible for it. In these cases, the 
subject can only be exculpated, but this is exactly the opposite of what we are looking for.
While the information that guides the movements is relegated to the space of subpersonal processes, 
their success or failure can only be attributed to the visuomotor routines that control them. Freedom 
presupposes the possibility  of abstaining. In perceptual judgment, the subject has the possibility of 
accepting or rejecting what is presented to her in experience. In motor activity, the subject should 
also  have the possibility of acting on the base of what experience presents her, or abstaining from 
doing so; she must also have the possibility of correcting an erroneous movement. But in order for 
this possibility to be available, the information that determines the correctness conditions of the 
movements must be accessible to the subject. If it is only accessible to a subsystem of her brain that 
works through routines, the subject will never find herself in a position to follow a course of action 
that seems correct, or abstaining form doing so. Because the subject has no access to the 
information that determines the correctness of her movements, she cannot know when a movement 
being made is appropriate, or when it is not so and should be fixed; her body is nomologically 
compelled to perform the movements dictated by  her dorsal system. The subject is not free to 
choose, and so, is not responsible for her bodily movements. 
It is not part of my hypothesis that we are always fully responsible for each and every one of our 
movements, or that we explicitly commit with all the visual information that guides our motor 
activity. What I wish to stress from the surgeon's examples is that there are some cases in which we 
are fully  responsible. The ascription of responsibility  in the execution of actions requires that the 
subject has access to the perceptual contents that guide motor activity. Even if in our daily motor 
activity we do not explicitly commit with the contents of our experience, the ascription of 
responsibility over motor activity assumes that we are (at least potentially) able to take epistemic 
responsibility for the experience that guides it.  
In other words, for a situation like that of the surgeons to be possible, a case in which the agent 
must be responsible for any movement, it is necessary that the agent be epistemically responsible 
for the visual information that guides her movements. She must have the possibility  of intervening 
in the course of her movements ---either choosing or fixing them--- so that the movements can be 
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attributed to her and not to an automatic routine in her brain. But it would not be enough that the 
subject blindly intervened in the course of her movements (certainly  a surgeon would not like to 
operate blindfolded). The intervention has to involve epistemic responsibility  for the information 
that guides it. 
The tele-assistance model entails that such ascription of responsibility, like in the case of the 
surgeons, is not possible. According to this model, the control of bodily movements  (once framed 
and triggered by an intention) is entirely independent of the subject's visual experience. In this 
model, the movements performed in an action are completely determined by  automatic visuomotor 
routines --- by subpersonal algorithmic processes in which the subject is not involved and there is 
no sensitivity to reasons. Furthermore: the information relevant for movement guidance is 
inaccessible in principle to the subject's experience.37  Thus the subject cannot, in principle, take 
epistemic responsibility  for the visual information that guides her movements since she has no 
access to it. In other words, the tele-assistance model, combined with Milner and Goodale's bold 
proposal, lead to the impossibility of accounting for an agents responsibility over her bodily 
movements. In this model, movements will alway be (just like in bald naturalism, according to 
McDowell) alien to the subject.
2.3 The other side 
In the section above, I argued against the disassociated models of intentional action that, like tele-
assistance, are not capable of accounting for agents’ responsibility over the bodily  movements they 
perform in the course of an action, and are also incapable of distinguishing movements done by  the 
agent from those that aren’t. The reason for this explanatory  poorness is that movements are 
situated in what Sellars calls the space of law, where there are no normative relations or restrictions 
that allow talk about freedom and epistemic responsibility. In this section I will briefly  present an 
alternative version of action and I will argue shortly and shallowly against this view, hoping to 
explain why it is not a satisfactory alternative.
The explanation of action given exclusively  in terms of intentions leaves out an important part of 
the phenomenon: the way in which we move to execute an intention. As Nudds suggests, the 
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explanation of the particular movements we make is out of the reach of the explanation in terms of 
intentions:
In seeking to explain visually guided actions, we are seeking to explain how vision guides 
the way we move in carrying out our intentions [...] I don't have any intentions to move in a 
specific way. If vision guides my action --guides the way I move-- it  must do so in some 
direct way that is not mediated by intentions [...] Suppose for example that someone 
intentionally  ties their shoelaces. In carrying out their intention to tie them, they perform 
certain hand movements --they move their hands in just the right way  required for shoelace 
tying. In the same way that we can ask, of someone who performs the visually  guided 
action of picking up a coin, why they moved their hand to that place or in that way, so we 
can ask why someone moved their hands in that way in performing the action of tying their 
shoelaces (Nudds 2007: 3)
The passage suggests that an explanation of action requires an account of the bodily movements 
that we perform in the course of an action. The particular way in which we move is not determined 
by the intention: there can be several different movements that execute the intention of picking up 
the pen in front of me, all resulting in the obtention of the intention. As McDowell holds (1994a), an 
intention only  frames a course of action. An explanation in terms of my intention necessarily 
underdetermines the actual course of action performed. This entails problems like the impossibility 
of distinguishing the agent's movements from mere reflexes.38 
It is worth asking, then, if it  is possible to explain the subject's movements by ascribing her 
intentions to move in particular ways. Instead of an explanation of action appealing to a distal 
specification of the intention, there could be an explanation in terms of several intentions with 
particular bodily movements as their contents. This would avoid the underdetermination and the 
responsibility-ascription problems: the agent would be responsible for the body movements 
specified by her intentions, thus justifying the movements (insofar as there is a justification for the 
intentions). Justification for these intentions would situate bodily  movements in the space of 
reasons, which would render the ascription of responsibility less problematic.
I will call this kind of explanation intellectualist, following Merleau Ponty's slogan: "judgment is 
everywhere pure sensation is not, which is to say everywhere" (2002: 39). This view I am 
suggesting is intellectualist because it postulates doxastic states and propositional intentions for 
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each bodily movement performed by the agent. The slogan could, thus, be adapted as follows: 
"intention is everywhere pure movements are not, which is to say everywhere". I will not enter in 
the details of theories defending this kind of explanation, for they are not the main target of my 
critiques (unlike the tele-assistance model). I will only point out a theoretical orientation, which I 
will superficial criticize.39    
The explanation of action in terms of intentions has this general form: it appeals to beliefs and 
desires of the agent to justify an intention. These kind of explanations show the intention to act  as 
the product of an instrumental practical reasoning: "Given the desire P and the belief Q, I should act 
in an A manner", where A is the content of an intention (in the case of visually guided actions, the 
beliefs can be perceptual beliefs) If we wanted to explain the bodily movements performed by a 
subject in terms of intentions, we would have to ascribe her practical reasonings of the kind "Given 
the desire P and the belief Q, I must make the movement A" for each and every single one of the 
bodily  movements performed in the course of action; that is, the subject should be attributed 
doxastic states that entered in practical syllogisms to rationalize and justify each and every  one of 
the movements performed. 
This explanation model has several undesirable consequences: (1) It would need to postulate an 
individuation criterion for bodily movements so that it could formulate a practical syllogism for 
each and every one of them. There may be, however, several difficulties in formulating such a 
criterion. For example: the anticipatory adjustment of the hand for grasping an object would count 
as one single movement or as many? I do not want to suggest that it  is not possible to establish such 
criterion but it would probably result in a complicated, artificial taxonomy of bodily movements. 
(2) The model would also need to ascribe to the agent as many doxastic states (beliefs, judgments, 
etc) and practical reasonings as there are movements. In complex actions, involving several 
simultaneous movements, this would result in an cognitive overload for the agent (Pacherie 2011). 
This overload can be even more dramatic, if one considers other elements the subject has to include 
in her practical reasonings, such as constant environmental changes, the need of doing hasty 
movements in some circumstances,  etc.
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(3) The explanation would not do justice to the idea that there are basic actions in our action 
repertoire: actions whose performance does not  require the intervention of instrumental 
rationality.40 According to this model, basic actions would be bodily movements, and not object-
oriented actions, like "catching a frisbee" or "picking up a fork", which are basic actions par 
excellence. The notion of basic action explains important facts, like the acquisition of practical 
abilities, like playing tennis, skiing, knitting, etc. The difference between the performance of an 
novice and an expert is generally  explained by saying that for the expert a performed action, or a 
repertoire of them, is basic, while the novice requires the mediation of instrumental rationality. 
Skillful performance of actions seems to require the absence of instrumental rationality in its 
execution.
A dramatic example of this point is that of the baseball player Chuck Knoblauch. After being 
recognized as an extremely skillful player, he started thinking about the movements he had to 
perform to throw a ball to first base, after which he lost his ability:
As second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was so successful he was voted 
best infielder of the year, but one day, rather than simply fielding a hit and throwing the 
ball to first base, it  seems he stepped back and took up a ‘‘free, distanced orientation’’ 
towards the ball and how he was throwing it—to the mechanics of it, as he put it. After 
that, he couldn’t recover his former absorption and often—though not always—threw the 
ball to first base erratically—once into the face of a spectator [...] I’m told that in some 
replays of such easy  throws one could actually  see Knoblauch looking with puzzlement at 
his hand trying to figure out the mechanics of throwing the ball. (Dreyfus 2007a: 354)
Dreyfus presents this case to show that the mediation of rationality inhibits the skillful performance 
of an action. McDowell (2007b) interprets this case as an example in which instrumental rationality 
interferes with the bodily skills:
Knoblauch exemplifies a specific way  in which practical intelligence can lose its grip on 
activity. That can happen when someone with a skill whose exercises belong to a basic 
action type tries to bring the limb movements that contribute to doing the thing in question 
within the scope of intention otherwise than under specifications like ‘‘whatever is needed 
to throw efficiently  to first base’’. Before the loss of ability that takes that shape—the 
attempt to extend the scope of intentional control—the skill itself provided for the 
movements to be as they  needed to be (the skill itself gave specificity  to that ‘‘whatever is 
needed’’), without the agent’s means-end rationality being called on to intervene. This kind 
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of loss of skill comes about when the agent’s means-end rationality  tries, so to speak, to 
take over control of the details of her bodily movements, and it cannot do as good a job at 
that as the skill itself used to do (McDowell 2007b: 367-8)
(4) In an explanation of this kind,  the notion of "object-oriented actions" would be disfigured. The 
content of intentions is typically specified distally, as a state of affairs that the subject seeks to make 
the case through her action. This specification of the content is one of the reasons for which the 
action is characterized as intentional: it is directed towards the world, towards objects. In the 
performance of object oriented actions, one might say that the body is “transparent”, insofar as it is 
kept in the background, allowing the intentional object of the action to be the world, not a bodily 
movement. In the intellectualist view, this transparency is lost, for the contents of intentions are not 
distal but  rather bodily  movements. In such model there would not be object-oriented actions but a 
series of actions oriented to bodily movements (considering that an action is specified by an 
intention, each movement would be an intentional action in itself) that would finally cause a state of 
affairs in the world. The state of affairs, however, would stop being constitutive of the action.
What these four criticisms show is that the mediation of instrumental rationality  in the execution of 
bodily  action can hinder the action itself (its performance as much as its understanding). It seems 
that instrumental rationality  interferes with motor abilities, instead of being a tool for the selection 
of optimal courses of activity. This suggests that motor activity  does require some degree of 
automaticity. Habits, routines, and predetermined responses have a great value for motor activity 
(which can have effects in the survival of the individual or the species). This is well-known idea 
since Hume's Inquiry. In evolutionary and engineering terms, some degree of automaticity is a good 
a idea.  However, for the reasons presented in this chapter and others to come in the next one, it 
seems necessary that these routines be accessible to spontaneity. Spontaneity  must be able to take 
control of what is in most cases automatic and predetermined. 
2.4 Conclusions of the chapter
In this chapter I explored the tele-assistance model of intentional action, formulated within the dual 
visual streams theory. In the second section I showed that, because of the disassociation of 
intentional action, the model faces serious problems in accounting for the agent's responsibility over 
her bodily movements. 
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In the third section I explored an alternative model, that  looks to avoid the problems brought by  the 
models that disassociate action: the intellectualist explanation. This explanation is not satisfactory 
because it  puts too much cognitive burden on the agent, while also vanishing the notion of 
"intentional action" as an action oriented to the world. The problems of this explanation show that 
automaticity, at least to some degree, is valuable for the success and skill in bodily actions. In the 
following chapter, I will suggest an alternative model to explain the relation between motor activity 
and perceptual experience that  aims to bring together the importance of automaticity with an 
explanation of bodily  action that allows it to be situated in a normative frame, and thus account for 
the agent's responsibility for her bodily movements. 
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Chapter 3
Perception and Activity
In the previous chapter I argued against the model of intentional action presented as part of the dual 
visual streams theory. This model disassociates action in such a way that generates difficulties in 
accounting for the responsibility of a subject for her bodily movements. 
These problems are the consequence of a narrow understanding of experience. According to Milner 
and Goodale, the disassociation between perception and visuomotor control is due to the fact that 
the information processed by  the dorsal stream does not have the appropriate, as it  were, format to 
be part of the visual experience of the subject. It does not have the form of contents about objects 
and invariant  properties that are prone to be part of judgments. For this reason, the information in 
the dorsal stream, containing the relevant features of the environment that render some movements 
as correct or incorrect, is completely excluded from perceptual experience. This information, being 
relegated to a brain module, is not available to the subject. Hence it  cannot be used by the subject to 
guide her movements. This entails that the task of guiding movements can only be attributed to the 
automatic processes of sensorimotor routines, and not to the subject. This sheds doubt over the 
possibility of ascribing the subject responsibility for her bodily moments (for the way she performs 
an action) beyond the formation of the relevant intentions.   
I will suggest that the strategy to avoid the problems surrounding the conception of action is to 
reformulate the theory about the relation between perception and action. This reformulation must be 
such that it allows contents in perceptual experience with a non-propositional format. If the 
understanding of experience is improved in this way, experiential content can be thought of as 
including information about the conditions of correctness of bodily movements, and this 
information would be accessible to the subject. Once this access is guaranteed, it  will be possible to 
ascribe the guidance of movements to the subject, and responsibility  over them will no longer be 
problematic.  
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3.1. The glide-path model41
In the end of the previous chapter I suggested that, to avoid the diagnosed philosophical problems 
regarding action, an explanation of the relation between perception and motor activity is needed: an 
explanation that does not disassociate action and yet does not lead to an intellectualist  view. The 
reasons given in the previous chapter show the conceptual problems faced by  a theory that holds 
that bodily movements are entirely automatic. The objection to the tele-assistance model shows that 
in the case of responsible action, the possibility for spontaneity  to take control of bodily movements 
is required.  The objections to the intellectualist approach, on the other hand, show that instrumental 
rationality may interfere with skillful action and that automatic routines are valuable tools in the 
execution of actions: they prevent a cognitive overload on the subject, allow an appropriate time 
frame for the action, etc.  
 
There are, however, cases in which the automaticity principle has proven to be problematic, even 
for engineering. There are cases in which a free and intelligent human operator needs to take charge 
of the situation. One can be found in aeronautic design: The control systems of commercial jets are 
designed in a way that impedes the plane from flying at certain degrees of inclination. When the 
plane is inclined beyond a certain degree, its mechanisms are under too much pressure and there is a 
high risk of damage. For this reason, the plane's computer is programmed to prevent those 
inclinations in which the plane’s mechanisms are endangered. The plane is programmed so that, 
whatever the pilot does, it is not possible to fly at a slope beyond the range allowed by the 
computer. 
This engineering principle is clearly  beneficial, for it protects the plane from human error. In this 
way there is a guarantee that the flight follows the appropriate course and the plane is not at risk. 
Insofar as the pilot has no possibility of altering the maximum degree of inclination, there is a 
guarantee that everything goes as it  should.  But what happens if there is a situation unforeseen by 
the computer programmers? For example, if the radar is damaged by  a storm that also reduces the 
pilot's visibility, and she is suddenly  faced by a mountain that cannot be avoided unless she inclines 
the plane beyond the degree allowed by  the computer. Or if the pilot realizes too late she is going to 
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metaphor of a glide path to explain the relation between perception and action.
crash with another plane and the only  way  of avoiding the collision is by going outside the 
predetermined slope range. Such cases are not only possible; they have happened in real life. 
These cases show that what is normally a good engineering principle (that typically guarantees the 
correct functioning of a system or activity) can become disadvantageous in unforeseen conditions. 
If there is an error that  was not considered in the system's programming, the inability of the human 
operator to intervene can be catastrophic. When possible mistakes are foreseen and there are 
reliable algorithms to respond to them, automatic routines are a good strategy. The problem is that 
there cannot be a program with predetermined answers for every possible situation in a course of 
activity. In these cases of error, an intervention on the part of a free and intelligent agent is needed.
Returning to philosophy: a theory about the relation between perception and motor activity is 
needed, which includes both automatic routines and the possibility of spontaneity taking control of 
the movements. The alternative presented by the tele-assistance model is not satisfactory, because 
of the reasons presented in the second chapter. Spontaneity  needs to take part in motor activity  itself 
and not only in the formation of intentions to act. In what follows I will suggest a sketch of a theory 
that can fulfill the requirements presented throughout this work, to account for the relation between 
perception and action. This sketch is based on a fundamental notion that is absent in the tele-
assistance model; a notion that serves to distinguish between an agent's movements and mere 
happenings in her body.  
3.1.1 Frankfurt and the notion of "guidance"
In his essay "The problem of action" (1998), Harry Frankfurt discusses a central problem in the 
philosophy of action: "the contrast between what an agent does and what merely happens to him, or 
between the bodily  movements that he makes and those that occur without his making 
them." (Frankfurt 1998: 69). His discussion begins with a critique of causal theories of action, 
similar in some respects to the one presented in the second chapter.
Causal theories of action make this distinction based on the causal history of bodily  movements: 
what makes a series of movements an action is their being caused by a certain kind of event (an 
intention, a desire, etc). According to these theories, the movement's causal antecedents are 
sufficient to determine if they are to be considered actions or not. In this model, there is nothing 
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intrinsic to movements that  makes them actions; the distinctive feature is external to the 
movements. As I explained in the previous action, McDowell shows that this understanding of 
action entails an important problem for the notion of agency. Frankfurt has a similar objection: 
It is integral to the causal approach to regard actions and mere happenings as being 
differentiated by nothing that exists or that is going on at the time those events occur, but 
by something quite extrinsic to them [...] The result is that it is beyond their scope to 
stipulate that a person must be in some particular relation to the movements of his body 
during the period of time in which he is presumed to be performing an action. (Frankfurt 
1998: 70)
Frankfurt argues that  this feature of causal theories of action makes them particularly liable to 
counter examples, specially examples of deviate causal chains (1998: 71). More importantly, these 
theories are incapable of accounting for what, he claims, is one the most fundamental characteristics 
of action: a certain relation, or contact, that a subject has with her movements during the course of 
her actions. According to causal theories of action, the subject's relation to the movements of her 
hand to pick up the phone, during the course of the action, is the same relation she has with the 
dilatation of her pupils. The only difference between these events is the fact that the former is the 
effect of a certain kind of cause, while the latter is not.42 This is not only  counterintuitive but also 
entails conceptual problems related to the notion of responsibility, as shown in the previous chapter. 
Frankfurt proposes the following criterion for distinguishing between a subject's actions and events 
that merely happen to her: "What is not merely  pertinent but decisive, indeed, is to consider whether 
or not the movements as they occur are under the person's guidance. It is this that  determines 
whether he is performing an action" (Frankfurt 1998: 72).  Frankfurt claims that the particular 
relation between a subject and her bodily movements is that of guidance. In guiding her 
movements, the subject stands in a particular relation with them during their execution; that is, the 
subject guides her movements as they are being made. 
The concept of "action", according to this view, is defined as "an intentional movement guided by 
the agent". This differs from the concept of 'intentional action", which Frankfurt uses to refer to 
actions that are deliberate and self-conscious: actions that the subject has the intention of doing 
(Frankfurt 1998: 73). According to this, not every action is intentional:
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When a person intends to perform an action, what he intends is that certain intentional 
movements of his body should occur. When these movements do occur, the person is 
performing an intentional action. It might be said that he is then guiding the movements of 
his body  in a certain way (thus, he is acting), and that in doing so he is guided by and 
fulfilling his intention to do just that (thus, he is acting intentionally). There appears to be 
nothing in the notion of an intentional movement which implies that its occurrence must be 
intended by the agent, either by way of forethought or by  way of self-conscious assent. If 
this is correct, then actions (i.e., intentional movements) may  be performed either 
intentionally or not. (Frankfurt 1998: 73-74).
According to this, it is possible to separate the concepts of action and intention. Not everything that 
counts as an action is guided by an intention. Not everything that the agent does counts necessarily 
as an intentional action. The agent can move her body  in a guided way, so that the movement can be 
seen as an action (i.e., it is attributed to the agent and not  to an external process), independently of 
whether the movements are guided towards the obtention of an intention. 
The quote suggests that action can be analyzed in three components: bodily movements, guidance 
from the agent, and intention. The notion of action is to be understood as a movement guided by the 
agent. The notion of intentional action, on the other hand, is to be understood as a movement 
guided by  the agent, who is guided, in turn, by the purpose or intention of obtaining a determined 
state of affairs. 
The difference between a movement that is alien to the subject and an action can be expressed 
through the following quote: 
Consider the difference between what goes on when a spider moves its legs in making its 
way along the ground, and what goes on when its legs move in similar patterns and with 
similar effect because they are manipulated by a boy who has managed to tie strings to 
them. In the first case the movements are not simply purposive, as the spider's digestive 
processes doubtless are. They are also attributable to the spider, who makes them. In the 
second case the same movements occur but they are not made by the spider, to whom they 
merely happen. (Frankfurt 1998: 78).
It is suggestive that Frankfurt uses the example of a spider. Contrary to a human being, the spider 
cannot form intentions with propositional content but can nevertheless perform actions. 
A human being can perform actions; some of them intentional, some of them not. For a human 
being the difference between them would be the difference between directing the movements of the 
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hand to pick up a phone and the movements of the hand when idly tapping your fingers in a 
distracted way (Frankfurt 1998: 58) In the first case, there is a series of movements guided by the 
agent and oriented by  the deliberate intention of picking up the phone (that obeys the practical 
reasoning involving the desire to make a call, the belief that to make a call it is necessary to pick up 
the phone, etc). In the second case, there is a bodily movement that, certainly, is attributed to the 
subject (unlike the pupils' dilatation) but that not necessarily  obeys to an explicit and deliberate 
intention formed by the subject. 
Thus, the fundamental notion in the explanation of action is no longer the notion of 'intention' but 
that of 'guidance'. Intention is an additional notion that characterizes a particular kind of actions. 
According to Frankfurt's proposal, there is a relation between an agent and her bodily movements 
that is not  restricted to causing and framing them by means of an intention. Bodily movements, in 
this view, can be seen as an exercise of agency on the part  of the subject and not as events alien to 
her. 
The notion of guidance for conduct is defined as follows: "Behavior is purposive when its course is 
subject to adjustments which compensate for the effects of forces which would otherwise interfere 
with the course of the behavior "(Frankfurt  1998: 74). It  is important to distinguish “movements 
guided by the subject” from “movements guided by a purpose”. For example, pupil dilation is 
guided by a purpose, but not guided by the subject. We do not say that a person dilates her pupils; 
rather, we say  that they dilate in response to changes in the lighting conditions. In the case of the 
pupils' dilatation, there are mechanisms that adjust  the movements in a way  that  guarantees 
fulfilling the purpose. But the movements' guide is attributed to the sympathetic nervous system, 
and not to the person: “the activity of such a mechanism is normally  not, of course, guided by us. 
Rather it  is, when we are performing an action, our guidance of our behavior” (Frankfurt  1998: 75). 
According to this idea, a bodily movement is intentional (i.e., an action) when the subject is 
responsible for guiding the course of the movements. 
The notion of "behavior guidance" is defined as follows: if there were a movement that deviated the 
course of action from its purpose, the subject would intervene in such course to compensate the 
deviation. In other words, the subject guides the movements if and only if, in case of receiving 
negative feedback, she would intervene in the course of action to compensate the deviations that 
could affect the obtention of the purpose (Frankfurt 1998: 75-76). According to this understanding, 
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the subject has a regulatory role in the performance of his actions: "What counts is that he was 
prepared to intervene if necessary, and that he was in a position to do so more or less 
effectively" (Frankfurt 1998: 75)
This presents a great advantage in comparison to other theories we have encountered so far, for it 
avoids the conceptual problems of the tele-assistance model, while also avoiding the intellectualist 
view according to which the subject chooses her bodily movements (as a rational choice, the 
product of deliberation, etc). The alternative presented now allows many  of the movements in the 
course of an action to be caused and selected by automatic routines; however, it also distinguishes 
between movements made by  the subject and reflexes: the former are guided by the subject, while 
the latter are not. 
3.1.2 Some consequences of Frankfurt’s view
What does it  mean for a movement to be guided by the subject? How are we to characterize the sort 
of guidance that can be attributed to the person and not to some subpersonal mechanism? Since this 
notion is not further developed in Frankfurt’s essay, from now on I will present my own version of 
this model, based on Frankfurt’s view. As stated in the previous chapter43, what is legitimately 
attributed to the person (understood as a rational agent) is what stands in the personal level of 
explanation. The personal level of description has been characterized as one in which normative 
explanation makes sense. Thus, it the subject's guidance of her movements responds not (only) to 
nomological relations to visual stimulus, but also to normative restrictions like 'movement x is 
appropriate in the situation a, while movement y is not'. The movements guided by the subject are 
those that normatively answer to perceptual feedback: movements that adjust to a normative 
restriction determining how they should be. 
A consequence of Frankfurt's view is that if we ascribe a particular movement to a subject  (i.e., if 
we admit that a movement is part of the subject's action), we suppose that the subject must be in a 
position to receive normative feedback to determine if the movement is appropriate, or if it deviates 
from the behavior in course. If the subject does not receive this feedback, she would not be in a 
position to compensate for deviations, were there any. 
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To guide a series of movements, the subject must have an idea of which are the appropriate 
movements for the obtention of her intention. This knowledge must come from two sources: (1) An 
understanding of the action performed, perhaps given in terms of the satisfaction conditions of the 
intention: "What is it to pick up a phone?", "What are the conditions under which the intention of 
picking up the phone is satisfied?", etc.; and (2) the disposition of the environment: in a particular 
environment, a series of movements can be appropriate for performing an action, and in another 
they  may not be. Because the environment is presented to the subject in experience, we will say  that 
experience is the second source of access to the correctness conditions of the movements. Thus: the 
subject's guidance consists in monitoring the performed movements, in such a way  that they are 
appropriate for obtaining the desired intention in a particular environment.
In normal cases, these two informational sources are integrated in a common framework: 
experience. In experience the subject is presented with the disposition of her current environment, 
in virtue of which some movements are appropriate. But experience is also the base on which the 
subject forms her intentions. She forms the intention of picking up the phone based on her beliefs, 
desires, and her experience of the phone in the vicinity of her body. The movements leading to the 
fulfillment of the intention are, also, based in the experience of the phone (its location, size, etc). 
This allows an integration of the subject's intention and her guidance of bodily movements. To put it 
in Frankfurt's terms: this allows the subject to be guided by her intention when she is guiding her 
bodily  movements. When the subject performs non-intentional actions, there is no integration with 
intention because there is no intention to do the guiding. 
Frankfurt's criterion to distinguish actions from happenings leads to a claim about the role that 
perceptual experience plays in motor activity, even though Frankfurt does not express the point in 
this way. This theory of action requires a theory of the content of experience in which experience 
provides the subject with normative feedback on her bodily movements; a theory of experience that 
accounts for the possibility of movements being appropriate or inappropriate based on the 
disposition of the environment. 
3.1.3 "Glide-Path" 
To illustrate the model of the relation between perceptual experience and motor activity, I will use a 
concept of aeronautic engineering: the notion of glide path (in the following GP). When a plane is 
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going to land, a gliding path between it and its runway  is traced: this shows the pilot the trajectory 
she should follow to successfully  land and not run any  risks.  This path shows the plane's slope, the 
direction it should follow, etc. When the pilot goes out of the traced glide path, alarm systems 
activate in the cabin to alert the pilot of the error and ask for a correction of the course.
According to my proposal, when a subject performs an action, experience plays a dual role. On the 
one hand, it plays the role that the tele-assistance model ascribes to it: being the base for the 
formation of intentions. On the other hand it  has the role of being a glide path for the execution of 
the action. Experience presents the subject with the course that her movements should follow in a 
particular environment. Thus, experience constitutes a normative framework for the guidance of 
bodily movements. How is this normative framework constituted? 
The version of the model that I want to suggest holds that experience constitutes a normative 
framework for motor activity insofar as it provides the subject  with the normative feedback of the 
course of her movements. When the movements go out of course, experience provides negative 
feedback to the subject that allows her to correct their course and compensate for deviations. 
Experience presents movements as incorrect in the light of the agent’s intention and her current 
environment. This feedback is part of the content of experience, it shows the subject what are the 
appropriate movements to make in a particular environment. To make sense of this, it is necessary 
to reformulate the view of perceptual experience in the way that I will suggest in the next section. 
3.2 The wide view of perceptual experience
Milner and Goodale hold that there are some features of objects that  determine what movements 
must be done, for example, to pick up an object, lift  it, etc. Features like the position of the object in 
relation to the subject's hand, its size, its form, the texture of its surface, etc. All of these features are 
processed by the dorsal stream to guarantee the success of visuomotor control, and are not 
presented to the subject in perceptual experience. In the model I am suggesting, experience presents 
the subject with the relevant features of objects and the environment that render movements as 
correct or incorrect. On the base of this contents of experience, subjects are able to guide their 
bodily  movements when they  perform actions. Dorsal-processing is, accordingly, an enabling 
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condition44 for experience to have contents that are useful for the guidance of motor activity, in the 
same sense that the processing of perceptual constancies is the ventral stream is an enabling 
condition for the perception of particular objects. 
To adopt a model of action like the one suggested in the previous section, it is necessary to abandon 
some of the ideas that are central to the dual visual streams theory. It is important to clarify  which 
of them should be kept and which should be abandoned. Let us start with the ones to keep:
(1) Perceptual and visuomotor tasks have different computational requirements and are 
performed by different systems in the brain.45
(2) Success in any of these two tasks is independent from success in the other.
(3) The specialization of the ventral and dorsal systems obeys to the different requirements of 
each of these kinds of tasks. 
The reason for maintaining these theses is the strength of the evidence presented by the authors, so 
long it is understood in the moderate way that I have suggested. The claims that I want to reject are 
the following (including also several consequences that follow from them, and that I will not 
mention):
(4)  The contents of experience are only the conceptualizable contents, susceptible of being 
articulated in judgments. 
(5) Perceptual experience is exclusively the product of the ventral processing. 
(6) The information that guides visuomotor control is outside the subject's access. 
(7) The execution and programming of bodily actions are subpersonal processes in which the 
agent has no role. 
In the model I am sketching, from the rejection of thesis (4), the rejection of theses (5) -(7) naturally 
follows. In the following sections, I will present  an alternative view of experiential content that 
denies (4), and then explain how this view interacts with the GP Model, thereby denying (5)-(7)
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44 See: McDowell 1994b
45  It should not be forgotten that by 'perceptual tasks' I mean those tasks that involve the report or use of perceptual 
judgments.
3.2.1 Two kinds of experiential content
Let us go back to Milner and Goodale's argument from the computational requirements of 
perceptual and visuomotor tasks.46 One of the most relevant premises for holding their hypothesis is 
that  each task requires a particular kind of processing of visual information:
Visual processing in perception and action are very  different. They  differ in their time 
constants: very short for action, indefinitely  long for perception.The two systems differ 
also in their metrics: one is object-based and relational, the other is viewpoint-dependent 
and uses real-world metrics. And one system is knowledge based and top-down, while the 
other works from the optic array using first principles, in a bottom-up way. (Milner and 
Goodale 2004: 96)
Perceptual tasks involve abilities of recognition, discrimination, and categorization; for these the 
computation of the invariant properties of objects and perceptual constancies is required. This 
demands a link with short and long term memory, the processing of relative metric, and a spatial 
codification that is based on the scene. Visuomotor tasks require, on the contrary, a constant update 
of the position of the objects relative to the subjects body and a codification of the objects's real size 
in an absolute metric.
These computational requirements can be understood as the enabling conditions for the execution 
and success of each kind of task. It  is in virtue of the brain's ability  to perform these computations 
in an effective manner that it is possible to carry out each task successfully. To accomplish this, 
Milner and Goodale argue, it is necessary  that the computations be made by independent brain 
systems; otherwise they  would interfere with each other: “These two broad objectives [...] impose 
such conflicting requirements on the brain that to deal with them within a single unitary visual 
system would present a computational nightmare” (Milner and Goodale 2004: 73). This is one of 
their main reasons for stating the functional division between vision for perception and vision for 
action. 
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46 See: section 1.1
Accepting this argument amounts to accepting theses (1)-(3). The enabling conditions (at  the 
neurophysiological and computational level) of perceptual and visuomotor tasks are different and 
independent. This argument, presented by Milner and Goodale as a consideration about the 
engineering level of the processes, is also recognized in philosophical reflections about perceptual 
experience. Even though there are several formulations of this point, I will try to put it in the most 
general form: What is needed for experience to justify beliefs and judgments, is very  different from 
what is needed for experience to play a guiding role in motor activity. Some paradigmatic 
arguments defending this idea can be found in Dreyfus (2007a), Nudds (2007) and Cussins (2003; 
2008). Below, I will briefly present Nudds’ and Cussins’ proposals. 
Andy Clark (2001) equally recognizes this point, when he draws philosophical conclusions from 
Milner and Goodale’s theory.  He claims that “[t]he contents of conscious visual experience are, on 
this story, entirely and profoundly concept-ready. And what  this costs them is their ability  to play a 
direct role in the online support of fluent, object-engaged behavior” (Clark 2001: 514). So 
apparently  there is a dissociation between the contents that can enter in conceptual thought, justify 
judgments, etc., and the contents that have the appropriate format to guide motor activity. In light of 
these considerations, it is natural to think that if we are to give a role to experience in guiding the 
execution of actions and bodily  movements, we would need to postulate a kind of content, different 
from the propositional-conceptual content. This amounts to rejecting thesis (4).
Thus,  a possible reinterpretation of the dual visual stream hypothesis would be that the two streams 
compute two different kinds of contents for visual experience. The formulation would be the 
following: each of the streams contributes to the formation of a kind of content of visual experience. 
The ventral stream and its characteristic mode of processing enable the formation of contents that 
can be articulated propositionally  and form part judgements and reports. The dorsal stream and its 
characteristic mode of processing enable the formation of a kind of content directly  linked with 
motor activity: a kind of content that allows the subject to guide and regulate her movements during 
the execution of actions. 
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This reinterpretation is compatible with a minimal reading of the empirical evidence presented by 
Milner and Goodale, as I will show below.47  In this minimal reading,48  there is a double 
disassociation between the formation of perceptual judgments and the visuomotor control of action. 
This interpretation differs from Milner and Goodale's, because it does not deny that visuomotor 
control depends on the visual experience of the subject.
3.2.2 The wide view of experience and the GP model 
At this point, I want to clarify that the goal of this work is not to formulate and defend a particular 
theory  about the contents of perceptual experience. The goal would be better described as the 
formulation of the desiderata for a theory of the content of experience, in accordance with the 
considerations about the relation between perception and action, that have been presented 
throughout the thesis. What I have called the wide view of experience is no more than the sketch of 
the points that should be included in a theory of experience in order to account for the (equally 
sketchy) understanding of intentional action described above. 
The starting point of this proposal is Frankfurt’s criterion to distinguish a subject's actions and the 
bodily  movements that are alien to her. This criterion is that  the subject guides her movements as 
they  are being made. In section 3.1 I claimed that, in order to be able to guide her movements, the 
subject must have access to negative feedback: there must be something that presents the 
movements to the subject as incorrect in the light of the disposition of the environment. If the 
information that determines the correctness of a movement is not available in experience to the 
subject, but only to a module in the brain, it  cannot be said that the subject is the one guiding the 
movement. Rather, it would be the brain module doing the guidance. The narrow view of 
experience involved in the dual visual stream hypothesis is inappropriate for this model, because it 
denies that the features of objects relevant to guide movements are available in experience. The 
wide view of experience, suggested here, admits that experience has non-propositional, and non-
conceptual, contents that present the subject with the normative frame for her bodily movements. 
Among the theories of non-conceptual content, there are two candidates that could constitute a wide 
view of experience satisfying the desiderata established here.
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47 See Chapter 4
48 See Chapter 1
One alternative is Matthew Nudds’ (2007) theory, according to which experience has presentational 
contents, on the one hand, and directive contents, on the other. The first kind of contents present the 
world "as being a certain way", and can be the base for perceptual judgments (Nudds 2007: 11). The 
second kind of contents do not present properties of the world, but present the way in which the 
subject must perform her actions and movements. According to Nudds, the subject knows how to 
move in order to perform an action on an object, in virtue of her perceptual experience of the object. 
Visual experience guides movements, because it presents the subject with the way her movements 
should be made; it contributes to the constitution of a guide for motor activity. These visual contents 
are not presentational, for such contents are useless in the determination of the correct movements 
for the performance of an action: “Being aware of an object as being some way could only 
determine an action in the context of a piece of practical reasoning: you are aware of an object as 
being some way  and, given that, have to work out how to move in order to achieve your goal [...] 
there’s no direct move from being aware of an object as being some way to the way you ought to 
move in order to act on it” (Nudds 2007: 12-3). The visual content that is useful for guiding is the 
directive content that directly shows the subject how she should move (Nudds 2007: 11).
Another alternative is Adrian Cussins' (2003; 2008) theory, that postulates a similar dichotomy 
between the contents of experience. Cussins claims that mediational (non-conceptual) content 
differs from referential (conceptual) content in two features: its governing normativity  and its mode 
of presentation. Referential content is governed by the normativity of truth. This is cashed out as 
follows: referential contents, are the contents of thought, judgment, belief and other mental states 
whose content can be specified by  means of propositions. Adopting a Fregean framework, Cussins 
conceives propositions and thoughts as contents that can be evaluated in terms of their truth or 
falsehood. In other words, the standard for the correctness of these contents is truth, and so they  are 
governed by this norm; they aim at being true (Cussins 2003: 152). The governing normativity  of a 
type of content determines a mode of presentation of the world given in that content. Referential 
content is governed by truth, and so it presents the world as that which makes the content  true or 
false. Referential content presents the world as a field of referents: truth-makers (Cussins 2003: 
152).
Mediational content, on the other hand, answers to what Cussins calls mundane normativity: the 
normativity of fluent  and skillful motor action. Bodily  movements in an environment have 
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conditions of correctness: they can be done in way that is attuned to, and harmonious with, the 
environment; or they can be done clumsily and incompetently  (Cussins 2003: 154). These 
correctness conditions constitute the normativity  that governs mediational content. Consequently, 
mediational content is not truth-evaluable, but rather is answerable to this standard of fluent, skillful 
activity. In Cussins’ theory, it follows that mediational content has a characteristic mode of 
presentation of the world. It presents the world as a field of mediation for activity, a field of 
affordances, solicitations, obstacles, etc. (Cussins 2003: 155). 
Mediational content is not  only  non-conceptual, but also non-conceptualizable, insofar as it is not  a 
kind of content that can be specified in terms of truth-conditions, and its characteristic mode of 
presentation is not that of referents. In other words, mediational contents are not the type of 
contents that can be part of judgments and beliefs, because their normative conditions and mode of 
presentation differ from those of judgments and beliefs. This point is made clear by  Cussins’ 
example of the skilled motorcyclist. 
Many years ago I used to ride a motorcycle around London and I would often exceed the 
speed limit. One time a policeman stopped me and asked, “Do you know how fast you 
were traveling?” He didn’t mean it  to be a difficult question; really  just a preamble to his 
telling me how fast I was going. But, lost inside my full-face motorcycle helmet, it  dawned 
on me that this was in fact a difficult philosophical question. On the one hand, I did know, 
and know very well, how fast I was traveling. I was knowingly making micro-adjustments 
of my speed all the time in response to changing road conditions. [...] On the other hand, I 
did not know how fast I was traveling in the sense of the question intended by the 
policeman. I was unable to state my speed, in an epistemically  responsible way, as some 
number of miles per hour […] My knowledge of my speed wasn’t structured in that kind of 
way. (Cussins 2003: 150)
The speed at which he was traveling was presented to him as a guidance for his movements and 
adjustments of his body, but not as something which could be judged. That  is, not as a propositional 
knowledge about his speed, which he could judge as true. Still, “[t]hese micro-adjustments weren’t 
simply  behaviors, the outputs of some unknown causal process. They were, instead, epistemically 
sensitive adjustments made by  me, and for which I was as epistemically responsible as I was for my 
judgments” (Cussins 2003: 150). This epistemic responsibility over his movements implies that 
they  were not guided by subpersonal, unconscious processes (as EBS and tele-assistance would 
claim) but they were guided by personal-level conscious experience. 
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According to Cussins what makes mediational content apt for the guidance of motor activity  is the 
fact that it  shares its correctness conditions. In fact, the governing normativity  of mediational 
content is inherited from the governing normativity of skillful activity (Cussins 2003: 156). 
Mediational content  can guide motor activity because it  presents subjects with a field for action, in 
which some movements are presented as correct and some as incorrect. 
Cussins uses an example that is specially  useful in this discussion: In going across an unknown 
room, an agent is guided by the disposition of the objects in the room. Such disposition is presented 
to the subject as a guide for her activity of walking across the room; that is, it presents the room in a 
way that shows the subject which are the fluid, skillful courses of action. This form of guidance for 
movements has a normative character. There are some appropriate courses of activity and some 
inappropriate; some movements are skillful and some others are clumsy. Cussins holds that this 
form of guide is not given by  the intention of the subject to go across the room:  “The normativity 
that guides your activity  is not given by your intention because even if you have one—and you may 
not— there is also a structure to your activity which would be the same whatever was your 
intention” (Cussins 2008: 25). To repeat an idea that has been present in this and the previous 
chapter: the intention does not determine the totality  of motor activity, although it may provide an 
additional guide to the agent. It is meditational content, as such, what guides motor activity; the 
subject's experience of the environment, affording certain courses of action and inhibiting others. 
Although Cussins’ and Nudd’s theories have strong disagreements, they have some common 
ground. Firstly, they both claim that propositional content is not enough to guide motor activity. 
Such content, is (only) useful to form intentions. From intentions on, though, there is much to be 
done: the correct  movements in the environment must be determined, and the subject's movements 
must be guided to conform to such conditions, and thus successfully fulfill the subject's intention. 
Propositional content does not have the appropriate structure for this task. 
Secondly, both agree in the idea that non-conceptual content (be it directive or meditational) 
provides the agent with a sort  of knowledge of how she should move in her current environment. 
This knowledge is not propositionally articulated; rather the subject has direct access, in her 
experience, to the features of the environment that show her how to move. The subject sees how to 
move: she sees the environment and the object as affording certain courses of activity. This 
91
knowledge is a normative frame for the agent’s motor activity: it allows her to see when the course 
of action is in the right path and when there are deviations and errors.
The way  in which it  is possible for experience to constitute a normative frame for movements is that 
it presents the environment of the agent as a field of activity in which some movements are correct 
while others are not. If the subject's experience presents her some courses of action as correct, she 
can guide her movements on the basis of that experience, taking an attitude of commitment toward 
it. Letting herself be guided by the non-conceptual contents of her experience is taking epistemic 
responsibility for its contents.
In tracing normative frames for movements, non-conceptual content performs two roles 
simultaneously: it provides the subject with the negative feedback needed for guiding her 
movements, and, while the subject does not receive negative feedback, she will know that she is in 
the right course and there is no correction needed. She will know that her movements are 
appropriate in the light of the normative frame traced by experience and that, were her movements 
incorrect, experience would reveal them to be so. In this way there is a commitment with the 
experience that guides her movements. Insofar as such contents are accessible and the subject 
guides her movements by them, she takes epistemic responsibility for them. 
This leaves us with an outline of a theory of the content of perception. Sketching these aspects 
allows a further exploration of the alternatives available, with their problems and advantages. The 
hardest part of the investigation is still to be done. Firstly, we need a theory  that can account for the 
intimate relation between perception and motor activity, and explain how the two kinds of contents 
integrate. 
Secondly, we need a further explanation of the notion of normativity at the non-conceptual level of 
motor activity. I have adopted a formulation of normative relations found in McDowell: “relations 
such as one thing’s being warranted, or --for the general case-- correct in the light of 
another” (1994a: xv). At first sight, this is a wide enough description, according to which 
movements and non-conceptual contents could also stand in normative relations to each other. But 
McDowell himself denies that this kind of relations can be found outside the realm of concepts 
(1994a: 5). To support the view that I have here suggested, an explanation and development of the 
notion of normativity is needed. A possible path to take is to start  with the notion of motivation and 
92
normativity used in some branches of phenomenology, such as Merleau-Ponty’s and his followers. 
But this is the topic of further investigations. 
3.3.  Conclusions of the chapter
 
In the dual visual streams theory there are two intertwined theses: the narrow view of perceptual 
experience and the tele-assistance model of intentional action. In this chapter I have proposed a 
model of the perception-action relation that presents alternatives to both theses: the wide view of 
perceptual experience and the glide path model of action. The model of action that I propose has the 
advantage of explaining how a bodily movement can belong to a subject, in the sense of being 
made by her, and not merely something happening in her body. This accounts for the responsibility 
of the subject  over the bodily movements she makes in the course of her actions. Assuming the 
principle I presented in the second chapter, according to which the responsibility over a movement 
entails epistemic responsibility over the information that guides it, accepting the Glide Path model 
(GP) would require a broader understanding of experience in which there are experiential contents 
that present the subject  with useful and relevant feedback for guiding her movements in tune with 
the environment. For this reason, the GP model goes hand in hand with the wide view of experience 
in which there are two kinds of contents in perception: a propositional content, that provides the 
basis for the formulation of experiential judgments and intentions, and a sort  of non-conceptual 
content that presents to the subject the normative feedback for the guidance of bodily movements. 
I presented, shortly, two theories of the non-conceptual content of experience that could satisfy the 
desiderata established in this investigation: Matthew Nudds's theory of directive content and Adrian 
Cussins's theory of meditational content. I did not explore the differences between these theories, 
nor the possible advantages that each could have over the other one. That  task is left for another 
time. However, the common aspects of the theories help  as a starting point for the formulation of an 
outline of a theory  of experience that can explain the central role that perceptual experience plays in 
motor activity, and the way in which an agent is responsible for her movements (by being 
epistemically responsible for the information used to guide them).
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Chapter 4
Objections to the GP Model and the Wide View of Experience
In the previous chapter I presented a model of the relation between action and perception. In the 
first place, I presented a model of action that seeks to avoid conceptual difficulties within the tele-
assistance model: the glide-path model. This way of conceiving action goes hand in hand with a 
certain view of perceptual experience: the wide view of experience. I suggested these two elements 
could constitute a view of the relation between experience and action that avoids the conceptual 
problems entailed by Milner and Goodale’s model. In this chapter I will defend the model from two 
angles: first, I’ll defend it from two philosophical objections; second, I’ll show that it is consistent 
with the empirical evidence put forward by Milner and Goodale. 
4.1 The philosophical front
One of the conclusions obtained from arguments developed in previous chapters was the need to 
abandon the narrow view of experience, adopted by the dual visual stream hypothesis, which leads 
to severe conceptual difficulties. The points I’ve held in my discussion assume that this conception 
derives from slightly  arbitrary criteria used to ascribe perceptual experiences to a subject in 
experimental conditions. Nonetheless, there are strong philosophical reasons to adopt this view. In 
this section I’ll examine the argument put forward by Andy Clark (2001; 2007; 2009) in support of 
a narrow view of experience (defending his claims from some objections similar to the ones I have 
put forward), to evaluate more clearly its philosophical advantages and disadvantages.
4.1.1 Against non-conceptual content
In his 2001 article, Clark argues against theories that postulate a content of perceptual experience 
that is specified through its role in guiding motor activity. In other words, theories that  claim that 
there is a direct link between perception and motor activity, and that this link is given by the non-
conceptual content of experience. 
Clark describes his target-theories in the following way:
[I]n several influential treatments (Evans, Peacocke, Cussins), a notion of the 
nonconceptual content of conscious perceptual experience is, prima facie, being required to 
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play  a dual role: to reflect, on the one hand, the nature and grain of our conscious 
experience; and to make intimate contact, on the other hand, with the ongoing control of 
motor activity. What holds these two strands together is the perfectly commonsensical (but 
potentially false) Assumption of Experience-Based Control. This assumption thus plays a 
special role in attempts to legitimate a notion of nonconceptual content (Clark 2001: 499)
Clark claims that the notion of non-conceptual content has two roles: (1) account for the fineness of 
grain and richness of detail of our perceptual experience; and (2) provide a direct link with motor 
activity. According to this article, the main motivation to put forward some kind of non-conceptual 
content is the need to account for the fineness of grain of experience, which don’t seem to be 
captured by our conceptual repertoire. The link with motor activity is the result of the need to 
establish criteria for the fixation of non-conceptual contents (Clark 2001: 496-7). He claims that 
these two features of non-conceptual content are held together by EBC: 
Assumption of Experience-Based Control (EBC): Conscious visual experience presents the 
world to the subject in a richly textured way, a way that presents fine detail (detail that 
may, perhaps, exceed our conceptual or propositional grasp) and that is, in virtue of this 
richness, especially  apt for, and typically utilized in, the control and guidance of fine-
tuned, real-world activity. (Clark 2001: 496)
The formulation of EBC deserves some close attention. Clark claims that  EBC plays a central role 
in the legitimation of the notion of non-conceptual content, insofar as it creates a connection 
between the two roles for non-conceptual content, and thus keeps both strands together. According 
to his formulation of EBC, it is because the non-conceptual content of experience presents the 
world in fine detail that it is apt to play a role in the guidance of motor activity.  
Clark quotes empirical evidence from Milner and Goodale’s theory to argue against EBC. He 
maintains that this evidence proves that motor control isn’t guided by  the contents of conscious 
visual experience, but by unconscious information processed in the dorsal stream:  "The apparently 
fine detail […] of our conscious visual awareness is not, if this is correct, the ongoing driving force 
behind our successful object-oriented manipulations" (Clark 2001: 511). According to Clark, as 
long as empirical evidence refutes EBC, it also refutes the theories that try to establish a direct link 
between perceptual experience and the control of motor activity. In place of EBC, Clark proposes 
EBS49  as a hypothesis to explain the link between experience and action. EBS establishes an 
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indirect link between the contents of experience and the guidance motor activity  (a link that, as I 
explained in Chapter 2, can be understood through the tele-assistance model).
Although Clark doesn’t claim that Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis, and EBS imply  a conceptualist 
view of experience, he considers that they provide support for this kind of views (2001: 516-7): 
“Where the friends of nonconceptual content aligned visual experience and visuomotor action, and 
kept these distinct from conceptual reason, EBS thus invites us to align conscious visual experience 
and conceptual reason, and to keep these distinct from visuomotor action” (Clark 2001: 514). EBS 
doesn’t necessarily imply this conception, since it is consistent with some notions of non-
conceptual content, such as Peacocke’s and certain interpretations of Evans’; but since none of these 
notions establishes a guiding link between experience and motor activity, they can’t fulfill the role 
that, I’ve argued, non-conceptual content must play.
Hence it would seem Milner and Goodale’s theory  contradicts any effort to assign a type of content 
to experience that has a direct link with motor activity and can be used as a guide to execute 
actions. Nonetheless, several important points should be kept in mind. In the first place, Clark 
criticizes a particular notion of non-conceptual content. According to this notion, it is the fineness of 
grain and richness of detail of experience that guide activity. What the dual hypothesis shows is that 
the high degree of detail in visual experience is totally useless in guiding motor activity, since the 
kind of information required by visuomotor control is different in kind from the information 
contained in the subject’s perceptual contents. Evidence shows, especially  in cases of optical ataxia, 
that preserving details of visual experience is not enough to guarantee successful visuomotor 
control. The cases of visual form agnosia and blindsight  show that it is possible to have successful 
visuomotor control, even without possessing the typical richness of detail of experience. 
But this notion of non-conceptual content disfigures some of the proposals mentioned by  Andy 
Clark; specifically, Adrian Cussins’ (2003) proposal. Moreover, Clark’s portrayal of theories of non-
conceptual content is tendentious, insofar as it makes the theories liable to his objections. In what 
follows I’ll explain why. Clark criticizes theories of non-conceptual content based on the 
assumption that, according to these theories, it is the fineness of grain and the richness of detail of 
our experience that make it appropriate for the control and guidance of motor activity. There is, 
however, a known flaw in the arguments for non-conceptual content that appeal to the fineness of 
grain of perceptual experience. This flaw is well described by McDowell in the third lecture of 
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Mind and World (1994). McDowell objects to Evans’ argument, which can be stated as follows: our 
experience has a fineness of grain and richness of detail that exceeds by far the scope of our 
conceptual repertoire. We don’t have enough concepts to capture all the contents that we are able to 
discriminate in experience, since concepts are coarser grained than our perceptual discriminative 
capacities. This is evident with the case of shades of color. We have a limited stock of color 
concepts, although we are capable of perceiving and discriminating shades of color with a high 
determinacy of detail. Evans takes this as evidence for his claim that experiential content is non-
conceptual:
No account of what it is to be in a non-conceptual state can be given in terms of 
dispositions to exercise concepts unless those concepts are assumed to be endlessly fine-
grained; and does this make sense? Do we really understand the proposal that we have as 
many color concepts as there are shades of color that we can sensibly  discriminate? (Evans 
1982: 229)
McDowell responds to this claim by arguing that, even if the premise of the argument is granted, 
the conclusion does not follow. The reason is simple: although we may not have as many color-
concepts as shades of color in our experience, those contents can be captured by demonstrative 
concepts, such as “that shade”. 
It is possible to acquire the concept of a shade of color, and most of us have done so. Why 
not say  that one is thereby  equipped to embrace shades of color within one's conceptual 
thinking with the very same determinateness with which they are presented in one's visual 
experience, so that one's solar concepts can capture colors no less sharply  than one's 
experience presents them? In the throes of an experience of the kind that putatively 
transcends one's conceptual powers --an experience that ex hypotesi affords a suitable 
sample-- one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly  as fine-grained as 
the experience by uttering a phrase like "that shade", in which the demonstrative exploits 
the presence of the sample (McDowell 1994: 57).
Thus, even if the contents of experience are not already conceptualized, they are clearly 
conceptualizable, or concept-ready.50 If the fineness of grain and determinacy of detail of perceptual 
experience can be captured by  demonstrative concepts, and if they can be articulated in 
demonstrative thoughts, then they can also be articulated in perceptual judgments. Consequently, if 
all there is to the non-conceptual content of experience is its fineness of grain, then all the content 
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50  What, according to McDowell,  ensures that these demonstratives involve conceptual capacities is the fact that they 
persist into the future, and can be articulated in thoughts about past experience: "[W]hat ensures that it is a concept […] 
is that the associated capacity can persist into the future, if only for a short time, and that, having persisted, it can be 
used also in thoughts about what is by then the past, if only the recent past" (McDowell 1994: 57).
of experience can be a part of a perceptual judgment. This conception of non-conceptual content is, 
therefore, in agreement with Milner and Goodale’s narrow view of experience.
 
Hence, the flaw that McDowell diagnoses for “fineness of grain” arguments for non-conceptual 
content makes them equally  liable to fall under Clark’s objections. These arguments can only show 
that there are contents in experience that are not already  conceptualized. They do not show, 
however, that there are non-conceptualizable contents. This implies that the contents of experience 
can always be part of judgments, for they can always be subsumed by (demonstrative) concepts. 
 
Clark argues, based on Milner and Goodale’s evidence, that contents of experience are not used in 
the guidance of motor activity. He claims that the evidence shows a dissociation between what is 
part of subjects’ experience and the information that guides motor control. In the first chapter I 
argued that Milner and Goodale’s evidence only  shows a dissociation between motor guidance and 
the contents of experience that can be part of judgments. The claim that there is a dissociation 
between experience and motor control presupposes a view of experience according to which the 
contents of experience are only those that can be part of judgments.
Clark portrays all the theories of non-conceptual content as adopting the “fineness of grain view”; 
that is, as adopting a view in which the non-conceptual contents of experience are concept-ready 
and apt  to be part of judgments. For this reason the theories are vulnerable to his attacks. In other 
words, Clark characterizes those theories as agreeing with the narrow view of experience. If they 
agree with these view, then they grant the presupposition that is required to justify  the claim that 
there is a dissociation between experience and motor control. 
If richness of detail is all there is to non-conceptual content, then Milner and Goodale’s evidence 
clearly  shows that there is a dissociation between the contents of experience and the information 
that guides motor action. What this analysis should make clear is that Clark’s argument, not only 
presupposes a view of experience according to which experiential content is concept-ready, but also 
characterizes theories of non-conceptual content in a way that agrees with this view. For this reason, 
Clark’s argument is tendentious, insofar as it presents the theories in a way that makes his 
conclusion inevitable. 
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This portrayal of the theories of non-conceptual content  clearly misrepresents Cussins’ view. There 
is a fundamental difference between Cussins’ (2003) proposal and the fineness of grain theories of 
non-conceptual content. While the latter argue for a negative characterization of non-conceptual 
content, the former argues for a positive characterization. Fineness of grain arguments intend to 
show that there are contents in the visual experience of subjects for which they do not possess the 
relevant concepts. Cussins, however, not only adopts the idea that non-conceptual content is a type 
of perceptual content that exceeds subjects’ conceptual capacities (i.e. he adopts the negative view), 
but he also makes an attempt at a positive view, by characterizing non-conceptual content  as 
mediational content.51 According to Cussins, what links non-conceptual content to motor activity 
isn’t the degree of detail or the fineness of grain of perceptual experience, but the fact that the 
norms governing non-conceptual content are the same that govern activity. According to Cussins 
what makes mediational content apt for the guidance of motor activity is the fact that it shares its 
correctness conditions. In fact, the governing normativity of mediational content is inherited from 
the governing normativity of skillful activity (Cussins 2003: 156).
This is why EBC doesn’t capture Cussins’ proposal adequately, and why the arguments against EBC 
don’t seem to contradict Cussins’ proposal. In fact, Cussins’ theory, as I suggested in the third 
chapter, is coherent with some of the premises that motivate the dual stream hypothesis. It also 
maintains that the requisites for visual experience’s usefulness in guiding activity  are largely 
different from the requisites for experience’s justification of judgments. To put it in terms I’ve used 
so far, in Cussins’ theory non-conceptual content shows the subject the correctness conditions of 
motor activity. Later on I will return to the compatibility between this kind of proposal and 
empirical evidence52.    
Milner and Goodale’s theory  is evidence against the theories of non-conceptual content only if the 
narrow conception of experience is presupposed. In other words, what Clark presents as a 
theoretical consequence of the model and the evidence given by Milner and Goodale, is actually 
presupposed in the model’s formulation and in the interpretation of evidence. Furthermore, the 
validity  of Clark’s argument against theories of non-conceptual content depends on the portrayal of 
such theories in a manner that accords with the narrow view of experience. If this view of 
experience is abandoned, the evidence would not refute a theory according to which there are 
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51 See Section 3.2.2
52 See Section 4.2
contents in experience which guide motor activity, but which can’t be reported because they  don’t 
have the appropriate structure to be articulated into judgments.
The inclusion of a notion of non-conceptual content that directly links experience and motor 
activity depends on the rejection of the narrow view of experience. As I argued in previous chapters, 
there are strong philosophical reasons to abandon this conception. But there are also strong 
philosophical reasons to maintain it. In the following section I’ll present Clark’s arguments in favor 
of it  and explain why, in light of the ideas I’ve presented in this thesis, the argument isn’t 
satisfactory.  
4.1.2 Concepts, experience and agency
The pivotal element in the narrow view of experience that most strongly  influences Milner and 
Goodale’s interpretation of the evidence is the criterion for the attribution of experiential contents to 
a subject. As I said in the first chapter, experiments are explained and interpreted through the 
criterion of the reportability  of contents. According to that chapter’s analysis, such criterion implies 
that only the contents of experience that can be articulated into perceptual judgments, and which are 
expressible through various kinds of reports, are to be considered contents of experience.
In response to an argument presented by Walhagen (2007) (which differs, but follows the spirit of 
the argument here exposed), Clark explains that the criterion of reportability  isn’t arbitrary and has 
an important philosophical background:
My own view, that I shall try to defend as the discussion progresses, is that there is a 
perfectly  proper underlying demand here, but one has more to do with deep  ties between 
experience and deliberate response and agency than with any shallow conflation of 
experience and reportability. It is only when in some sense the agent has access to 
perceptually transduced information that that information can be counted as given to the 
agent in her experience. (Clark 2007: 580)
This quote suggests that  the reportability  of content  is a good indicator to know if the agent has 
access to information. The determinant factor to count certain content as an experience is its 
accessibility to the agent; so reportability isn’t an arbitrary  criterion to ascribe content to a subject’s 
experience. As the reader may have noticed, up to this point Clark’s vision of experience is similar 
to the one I suggested in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, he introduces a factor which causes his 
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criteria to reach very  different conclusions from the ones in my proposal: mainly, Clark agrees with 
Milner and Goodale’s interpretation of their experimental results, while I reject it. 
According to Clark, “visual experience should be the experience of an agent, where that is cashed in 
terms of the direct availability  of that information for use in the planning and selection of deliberate, 
stored knowledge-exploiting, goal-reflecting, and goal-responsive actions” (Clark 2007: 588). This 
characterization of experience intends to avoid a commitment to the existence of informationally 
isolated islets of experience, which don’t play any role in the cognitive economy of the agent. In 
other words, it  tries to avoid a gap between the agent and her perceptual experience. This is why a 
necessary  condition for content to count as experience is that it  may  serve as input for the agent’s 
decision system; that the content may give the agent reasons for her rational choices and actions.53
What lies behind this philosophical stance in regard to perceptual experience is the rejection of the 
idea that there can be contents in experience that don’t play any role in the cognitive economy of 
the agent and are informationally isolated from other intentional states in such economy. For some 
authors (such as Evans and McDowell) accepting this requisite implies that the contents of an 
experience must be prone to enter a conceptual reasoning system.54 For Clark, on the other hand, 
the conceptual abilities which the subject may engage in, based on her experiences, don’t play such 
an important role:
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53  This criterion comes from Evans’ proposal (1982), which holds that, for content to count as an experience, it must 
serve as:  “input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system: so that the subject’s thoughts, plans, and 
deliberations are also systematically dependent on the informational properties of the input. When there is such a link 
we can say that the person, rather than some part of his or her brain,  receives and processes the information” (Evans 
1982: 158). Several authors adopt similar views. Dretske (2006), for example, suggests that the criterion to ascribe 
contents of experience is that this content must be a reason for a subject: a necessary and sufficient condition for certain 
information to be considered a subject’s experience is that the information be available to the subject as a reason that 
justifies her actions, desires and choices (Dretske 2006: 174).  For McDowell (1994a), a key element for contents to be 
considered experiences is that they can establish rational links with other contents; otherwise, the subject’s experiences 
would be blind.  (This expression is taken from the Kantian slogan, adopted by McDowell, which says “intuitions 
without concepts are blind”. See: McDowell 1994a: Chapters 1 and 3) For an experience not to be blind, it is necessary 
that this experience be presented to the subject as a glimpse of the world: as presenting features of objective reality 
(1994a: 54). This can only happen if such content can establish rational links with the web of beliefs constituted by the 
subject’s world view (1994a: 55). That is why McDowell excludes non-conceptual content from the contents of 
experience: since it isn’t conceptual (i.e. it isn’t propositional), it’s not able to establish justificatory relations with the 
subject’s beliefs.7 An experience without conceptual content would be a blind experience.
54 McDowell’s thesis is even stronger, since it holds that because of this,  the contents of experience themselves must be 
conceptual, whereas Evans accepts that such concepts may have a non-conceptual nature. Bermúdez and Macpherson 
(1998) hold that Evans’ position is quite unstable, and oscillates between triviality and falseness. McDowell, on the 
other hand (1994a), suggests that Evans’ notion of non-conceptual content fails to avoid a fall into the myth of the 
given. In this debate, Dretske doesn’t take any clear side, but from his criterion one could infer he would at least agree 
with Evan’s position.
[T]he real point  here is (or should be) quite independent of Evan’s appeal to the subject as 
concept-using. What matters, rather, is that the information must be available to the agent 
qua ‘reasoning subject’, where this may be unpacked in many different ways, not all of 
them requiring full- blown concept-use on the part of the agent  [...]  As long as an animal 
can form (non-conceptualized) goals, and can become directly and non-inferentially  aware 
of specific environmental opportunities that  allow, or that block, the fulfillment of those 
(limited) goals and projects, then transduced information can be, or fail to be, input to this 
kind of minimal reasoning subject (Clark 2009: 1465)
Accordingly, it is possible to ascribe experiences to a creature even if it doesn’t possess concepts. 
Clark suggests that what matters is that  information be available for the selection and planning of 
deliberate actions. An Advanced Non-Conceptual Animal (ANA) can be seen as a “reasoning 
subject” or an “agent”, if in a minimal sense: that is, in the sense that  it is capable of formulating 
goals and projects, and perceive in the environment those elements which promote or obstruct the 
realization of such goals. It can choose courses of action based on perceptual information about its 
environment. When information is used in this processes, we’ll say such information is part of the 
creature’s experience. 
In cases of cortical blindness and apperceptive agnosia, the information that guides the patients’ 
behavior doesn’t count as an experience, since it  isn’t integrated with their deliberate actions, 
projected towards the fulfillment of goals. The responsiveness of the patients’ behavior to the visual 
features of their environment isn’t enough to ascribe them experiences because, says Clark, there 
isn’t a clear link with their personal agency. This is the reason why, Clark suggests, we shouldn’t 
ascribe these patients a visual experience, and not because they can’t be subsume visual information 
under concepts.55 But what  does it mean to say that a certain bit of information has or hasn’t a link 
with personal agency? When it comes to a human being, what does personal agency consist in? In 
other words, what is lacking in DF and blindsight patients, that justifies Clark in denying that they 
have experiences?
According to his criterion, for information to count as an agent’s experience, it must be available for 
the planning and selection of deliberate actions, which exploit stored knowledge and which reflect 
and respond to the agent’s goals (Clark 2007: 558). The most natural interpretation of this view is 
that information is available to the agent when it is liable to enter in practical reasonings that lead to 
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55   In the following section I will return upon some of the characteristics of DF’s conduct, which according to Clark 
show this lack of integration in the form of experience with the “personal agency” of DF.
the formation of intentions. Hence, information would only count as an experience when it is prone 
to be articulated in judgments that stand in rational relations to other (propositional) states, and 
contribute to the practical reasonings in virtue of which intentions are formed.
To clarify this point further, it’s worth mentioning that the criterion adopted by  Clark is entirely 
based on EBS. Furthermore, it could be considered a reformulation of EBS: “Conscious visual 
experience presents the world to a subject in a form appropriate for the reason-and-memory-based 
selection of actions.” (Clark 2001: 512). As I explained in Chapter 2,56 this reason based selection 
of actions amounts to the formation of intentions to act, which include an action type and a target-
object (“grasp the cup that’s on top of the desk”), and which is based on practical reasonings 
involving the agent’s memory, beliefs, desires, etc. Hence, if information must be available for 
action selection and planning to count as an experience at all, then it must be available for this sort 
of practical reasoning that concludes in the formation of intentions. This practical reasoning 
requires conceptual contents. So, it appears that when it comes to human beings, for information to 
count as an experience it must be available for conceptual thought.
What seems to be an implicit point  in Clark’s argument would make this interpretation consistent 
with the idea that a non-conceptual animal may have experiences; i.e. that there is a fundamental 
difference between a non-conceptual animal and human beings. In human beings the, so to speak, 
decision system, which is in charge of the planning and selection of actions, is constituted by 
concepts and inferences. In non-conceptual animals, the decision system is, precisely, non-
conceptual. Hence, non-conceptual contents can be part of the animal’s, but not of the human 
being’s, decision system. For humans, the possibility of executing conceptual abilities on the 
contents of experience seems to be necessary, since our decision system clearly  involves these 
abilities. In other words, what constitutes agency for an animal is different from what it constitutes 
agency for a human person.57
If this is the interpretation given by Clark to the notion of “personal agency”, then it  is in agreement 
with the view of agency that I criticized in previous chapters: the view stemming from EBS and the 
model of tele-assistance, according to which the central element of agency is the formation of 
intentions (which are isolated, in an important sense, from their bodily execution). This generates a 
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56 See Section 2.1
57 McDowell (2007a) defends a similar point regarding perceptual experience. 
very restrictive concept of agency which, furthermore, leads to the problems discussed in the 
second chapter: first, an underdetermination of bodily movements, which leads to the impossibility 
of distinguishing movements made by the subject from those that aren’t. And second, the 
impossibility  of explaining the epistemic responsibility  that an agent assumes for the contents of 
experience that guide her motor activity, in the cases of responsible action. 
4.1.3 An alternative criterion
In the previous chapter I suggested a view of action that follows the line drawn by Frankfurt (1998). 
A view according to which an agent’s actions are not only  her intentional actions (in the sense of 
deliberate, conscious actions, etc.), but any behavior that is guided by the agent. A consequence of 
this view is that the field of “personal agency” is widened, to welcome non-intentional actions, or 
actions which aren’t the outcome of an explicit intention motivated by practical reasoning. This 
suggests, furthermore, that the field of personal agency is wider than the field of propositional 
contents and conceptual reasoning. 
Throughout this thesis I have adopted a notion of “the personal” as everything within the logical 
space of normative relations; i.e. that  which can be explained in terms of reasons. In this my 
proposal agrees with those of Clark, Evans, McDowell, and Dretske. Nonetheless, I’ve also 
maintained that, to explain this wider view of action, it  is necessary to posit  contents in the 
perceptual experience of the agent that serve to guide the execution of actions: contents which show 
the agent if her movements are correct or not, in light of the disposition of her environment. This is 
why I have suggested that there must be contents in experience that hold normative relations with 
the subject’s motor activity. Moreover, I have suggested that, for perceptual contents to play this 
role, they must  be non-propositional, or non-conceptual. In this point, my  proposal departs from 
other authors’: I claim that there must be phenomena at the personal level of explanation, which are 
liable to a normative explanation, but are not propositional or conceptual in nature.
This seems consistent with a reinterpretation of Clark’s proposal, according to which all experience 
must constitute a reason, but not necessarily  a propositional reason.58 This is coherent with the idea 
that a non-conceptual animal may have experiences (as Clark maintains). If an animal may  have 
reasons even without the possession of concepts, it seems to follow that there can be such things as 
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58 For an exploration of the notion of “non-propositional reasons”, and a defense of this notion , see: Cussins 2008
non-propositional reasons. This would go against McDowell’s view (1994a: 8), according to which 
only rational links between propositional contents are possible. So far my  arguments have intended 
to show the need for this wider notion of normativity; but the possibility to develop  such a notion, 
against McDowell’s contention, is still my burden of proof. However, this is not a challenge that  I 
will undertake in this investigation.
According to this interpretation, what is relevant for a content to be considered a reason isn’t if the 
content is propositional and is able to enter inferences, nor that the subject is able to convey  such 
content as a reason for her beliefs and actions; but rather that the content be able to draw a 
normative frame that determines what the agent ought to do (where this may be cashed in terms of 
what the agent must believe, what intentions she ought to have, or what movements she ought to 
make in a certain situation). If a wide view of agency and action is adopted, as I have suggested, 
this is possible at  the non-intentional level of motor activity. This is, precisely, Cussins’ position 
(2003; 2008). For him, non-conceptual content serves as a guide for motor activity because it 
provides the agent, within her experience, with a normative frame for her bodily movements. 
A consequence of this view is that there can be contents in experience which aren’t propositional, 
but nonetheless play  a role in the cognitive economy of the agent. These contents may guide the 
subject’s actions (in the wide sense held by  Frankfurt), even if they  cannot be used in practical 
reasoning to formulate propositional intentions. Since these contents are not of a propositional 
nature, they can’t be articulated into judgments, and therefore can’t be reported by the subject. But 
this is no reason for them to be considered “isolated islets of experience”, since they have a very 
clear role in the cognitive economy of the agent: they  show her how to move in order to fulfill her 
goals and intentions, in the particular environments where she is situated. 
Following this train of thought, a wider criterion could be presented to ascribe contents of 
experience to a subject, which follows the line drawn by Clark’s criterion but widens it in the 
direction I have pointed: For information to be considered an experience, it must be mode of 
presentation of the world for a subject, that  serves as input for the initiation and guidance of action. 
59  But the role of experience in the initiation and guidance of action must be a normative role. 
Accordingly, in the words of this thesis: “x is a content of experience if and only  if it is a content for 
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59 This formulation of the criterion is taken from Bermúdez and Macpherson (1998). They criticize Evans’ criterion an 
propose this one in turn. However they do not adopt all the consequences and implications that I draw from it.
which the subject  is able to assume epistemic responsibility, be it through the formation of 
perceptual judgment, or through motor activity”. This widening of Clark’s criterion is consistent 
with some conceptions of the non-conceptual content of experience. In particular, with conceptions 
according to which there are contents that guide motor activity  because they draw a normative 
frame for it. The criterion doesn’t imply the postulation of islets of experience, because the non-
conceptual contents always play a role in guiding the subject’s actions, even if they aren’t inputs for 
her concept-using reasoning system. 
To summarize what has been said so far, Clark defends the narrow view of experience, claiming 
that this view avoids the postulation of isolated islets of experience, which have no link to the 
subject’s “personal agency”. This argument shows that the criterion of reportability  to ascribe 
contents to a subject’s experience isn’t an arbitrary criterion. It’s based on strong philosophical 
reasons. Clark’s view of experience and agency has two possible interpretations: the first consists in 
that all experience must count as a reason and therefore must have a propositional and conceptual 
nature. The second is that all experience must count as a reason, but admits the possibility of non-
propositional reasons. The first interpretation leads to a restricted view of agency, against which I 
argued in the second chapter. The second allows for a theory of non-conceptual content, in which it 
plays the role of creating a normative frame for an agent’s motor activity, and provides non-
propositional reasons for the agent to move in a certain way given her current environment. 
Adopting the second interpretation does not lead to postulating isolated islets of experience, which 
is precisely what Clark intends to avoid. If the second reading is accepted, the narrow view of 
perceptual experience is abandoned, which has been my recommendation throughout this thesis.
 
4.2 The empirical front: the evidence revisited
In the first  chapter I analyzed the dual visual streams hypothesis and the exposition and analysis of 
empirical evidence done by Milner and Goodale. The conclusion of this analysis was that beneath 
the hypothesis and the presentation of evidence there is a particular view of perceptual experience. I 
argued that only in virtue of this conception, do the experiments and cases described by Milner and 
Goodale manage to support the hypothesis that perceptual experience doesn’t play a role in the 
visual control of motor activity. 
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In this section I’ll argue that, contrary to Clark’s contention (2001), the empirical evidence by itself 
does not rule out a theory of experience that establishes a direct link to motor activity. If the narrow 
view of experience is abandoned, another interpretation of the same evidence is possible: one 
consistent with the idea that each stream of visual processing is responsible for a kind of content  in 
experience. The ventral stream would be responsible for the kind of content that fulfills the 
requisites to warrant and justify perceptual judgments; that is, the kind of content that can be 
articulated into a judgment. The dorsal stream would be responsible for a kind of content that 
fulfills the requisites to visually guide bodily movements.  
This interpretation of the evidence is (partially) supported by Matthew Nudds: “This distinction 
between different kinds of content provides a framework for explaining the dissociations between 
vision and action that  occur in the empirical cases. There were three different  kinds of case […] All 
three can be explained in terms of a dissociation between the two different kinds of content” (Nudds 
2007: 12-3).
 
4.2.1 Dissociation in pathological cases
A. Optic Ataxia
Milner and Goodale (1995; 2004) interpret the syndrome caused by lesions in the parietal lobe as a 
deficit in visuomotor control, which leaves intact the patients’ visual experience. In the exposition 
of these cases they  talk about a correct perceptual representation of an object’s shape, size and 
orientation, alongside an incapacity to use the same visual information for the control of bodily 
movements. As I said in the first  chapter, 60  the idea that these patients have an intact visual 
experience is supported by  the fact that they are able to successfully  carry out perceptual tasks, 
which involve the formation of judgments of experience. This interpretation of the results is 
inevitable insofar as the narrow view of experience is presupposed. 
Nonetheless, these results are equally consistent with an interpretation according to which lesions in 
structures of the dorsal stream impede the visual processing necessary for the formation of contents 
that have the appropriate, as it were, format to guide visuomotor control. According to my 
interpretation of these results, these patients do not possess experiential contents that present them 
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60 See: Section 1.3.1 A
with the correctness conditions of their movements; that  is, the necessary contents to guide activity. 
Hence, contrary to what Milner and Goodale suggest, these patients’ visual experience does not 
remain intact. What in fact remains intact are the conceptual contents that support perceptual 
judgments. This is why patients have a normal performance in perceptual tasks, and why their 
deficit is not reflected in their reports.
In Nudds’ terms, the situation of these patients can be described in the following way:
Her visual experience lacks [non-conceptual] content so, in performing an object-oriented 
action she doesn't  know how to move her body. It  may  be, of course, that she can work out 
how to move on the basis of how an object seems to her to be. That will require her to 
engage in practical reasoning and to form intentions to move in appropriate ways. The 
resultant movements will not be those of a visually guided action. It may not always be 
possible for her to work out how to move in the right way to carry out her intentions. 
There may be properties a bodily movement must have for successful action that the 
subject cannot easily intend them to have: objects may not be visually presented as having 
the properties necessary for the subject to work out how to move (Nudds 2007: 13)
What this quote suggests is that contents linked to judgments (conceptual contents, or presentational 
contents, in Nudd’s theory) aren’t enough for the subject to know how to move when performing an 
action. The properties of objects that these contents present aren’t the relevant ones to determine 
which movements are correct to, say, grasp it. The properties that the ventral stream processes 
enable the formation of appropriate visual contents to select actions and to support the formation of 
intentions (which these patients preserve). As Nudds suggests, and as I said in the previous 
chapter,61 intentions are not the best guides for bodily movements.
The contents that provide a normative frame for bodily movements are excluded from these 
patients’ experiences because of the lesions in the dorsal stream’s structures. Hence, these patients 
don’t have the capacity to visually  guide their movements. They  can formulate intentions based on 
their experience, but they don’t possess a frame that presents them with the correct way to carry 
them out, or which provides them with negative feedback when there are errors in their movements.
In AT’s particular case, one could say that the errors in grasping movements happen because her 
experience does not show her when her movements are inappropriate. In virtue of this absence of 
contents, AT is incapable of guiding her movements. She cannot see, for example, when the grip 
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61 See: Section 2.3
aperture of her hand is inadequate for the size of the object she wishes to grasp. RV, for her part, is 
incapable of positioning her fingers on the points of stable grasp  needed to grasp  the object firmly, 
because her experience doesn’t present the position of her fingers as inadequate for the shape of the 
object she is grabbing. The use of tactile information is necessary for her to receive the negative 
feedback which, in normal cases, would be presented to her by her visual experience. 
This interpretation of optic ataxics’ syndrome doesn’t have the counterintuitive consequence that a 
subject’s experience will remain intact, even if the subject is systematically incapable of acting on 
the base of it. According to my interpretation and Nudds’, there is a change in the visual experience 
of these subjects: it doesn’t present them with the necessary  normative feedback to correct their 
movements in the light of their environment’s disposition and the object upon which they act. 
Nonetheless, their experience still presents them with the necessary  contents to formulate true 
judgments about these same objects. 
B. Visual Form Agnosia and Cortical Blindness
In the first chapter,62 I argued that the interpretation of DF’s and other visual agnosics’ symptoms as 
a deficit in visual experience could only  be justified if one presupposes the narrow view of 
perceptual experience. The greatest evidence to deny that DF has contents of form in her visual 
experience is her inability  to produce true reports about the form and orientation of objects within 
her visual field. If one assumes that contents of perceptual experience are only those that  can be 
articulated into perceptual judgments, then her inability to produce true judgments clearly shows 
DF lacks experiences of form. Nonetheless, if one abandons this narrow view of experience and 
adopts the wide view that I’ve recommended, the evidence only  confirms the more moderate thesis, 
according to which DF has no contents of form which can be articulated into judgments. This leaves 
open the possibility of ascribing DF’s experience other kinds of contents of form. 
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According to the model I’ve proposed, lesions in the structures of the ventral stream impede the 
visual processing of information to constitute contents of form that are apt to be articulated into 
perceptual judgments. The lesion impedes a processing of visual contents that allow DF to 
recognize, discriminate, and categorize properties of shape and orientation; therefore she lacks a 
perceptual base to form true judgments about such properties. In other words, there aren’t 
conceptual contents in her experience that can be used as a normative frame for the formation and 
emission of judgments. 
Nonetheless, there appears to be a normative frame to guide motor activity. There is a kind of form 
content in DF’s experience, which presents the conditions of correctness for her movements, and 
which provides negative feedback, allowing her to guide her movements so they adapt to her 
environment. These contents alert her of incorrect movements so it is possible to correct their 
course and guarantee an adequate grasp  of objects, the correct orientation of her hand to insert it in 
a slot, etc. These contents, nonetheless, aren’t  displayed in DF’s reports because they  don’t have the 
appropriate format to be articulated into judgment. They lack conceptual format. 
Milner and Goodale’s theory presents additional evidence to infer that DF doesn’t have experiences 
of form. Clark (2007: 586-7) presents a list of DF’s symptoms in virtue of which, he claims, it 
wouldn’t be appropriate to ascribe DF any  kind of experiences. From now on I’ll present the list of 
symptoms and explain why  I don’t consider any  of them to be sufficient evidence to sustain what 
Clark, Milner and Goodale affirm:
(1) DF is unable to copy  line-drawings: "[S]he is totally  unable to draw or copy objects 
visually present in the here and now" (Clark 2007: 586)
(2) DF is incapable of spontaneously  using visual information of form to initiate actions: "DF 
is famously unable to self-prompt the appropriate use of her own form-accommodating 
visuomotor skills" (Clark 2007: 586)
(3) DF would be unable to judge when an object  could fit in a given space: "Suppose DF were 
to visually inspect a room. She would not (I claim) be able to see that, for example, the non-
conceptualized object over there would fit into the non-conceptualized space over here, yet 
such judgments are surely paradigms of the kinds of judgment meant to be available to an 
agent in virtue of the non-conceptual contents of her experience." (Clark 2007: 586)
(4) When DF grabs an object she doesn’t do so in a manner adapted to the object’s function: 
"DF, though perfectly  able (if asked) to grasp a screwdriver with a form-appropriate grip, will 
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not typically  choose the grip that is most apt given her needs and purposes (e.g., to use the 
screwdriver to tighten a screw)" (Clark 2007: 586)
(5) DF can’t evaluate when her activity is well suited to reach a goal or intention. When her 
visuomotor control is successful, DF is quite surprised: "[E]ven where DF manages to 
produce a behaviour that is indeed apt for the fulfillment of some goal, plan or project, she is 
not able to assess her own unfolding activity as well suited to success. Thus she cannot see 
that her own unfolding posting behaviour is apt to the target" (Clark 2007: 587)
The first  point has already been discussed in the first chapter. I claimed that  under at least one 
description the task requires that the subject be able to form true judgments about the sketch she is 
copying, besides forming a comparative judgment to determine if the drawing made is similar to the 
original. This shows that the incapacity to copy drawings can be explained by the incapacity  to 
make judgments about shape and orientation, which is precisely  the way in which my model 
interprets DF’s deficit. 
The second point is simply  false. In the first chapter I included several quotes where Milner and 
Goodale narrate occasions in which DF spontaneously initiated actions, such as grabbing a pencil to 
examine it more closely  or picking up a fork during a picnic. These situations present a sharp 
contrast with the behavior of patients with cortical blindness, who can only use visual information 
in forced choice situations. In his 2009 article, Clark nuances this point, and holds that the capacity 
to perceive colors and textures explains the fact that  DF can initiate actions spontaneously (2009: 
1464). Nonetheless, if you take into account DF’s phenomenology, in which objects of the same 
color fuse into each other,63 it  isn’t very  clear how color and texture information could be enough to 
explain the spontaneous onset of actions oriented towards particular objects.
An obvious example of this is when, according to Milner and Goodale, DF managed to walk 
through an irregular path in a pine forest  without tripping with the branches or the roots. In a forest 
there are no clear differences in the texture and color of objects which allow an easy discrimination 
between them. I don’t consider this can simply  be explained by routine execution, since the path 
through a forest requires planning several actions, not just one: avoiding the tree on the right, 
clearing the branch to the left, etc., and this requires information about the shape of objects (which 
allows her to discriminate one from the other) to be available to the action initiation system.
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63 See: Section 1.3.1 B and C
Regarding the third point, the adaptation of means to ends, in this case, requires a categorization of 
the object: a semantic processing about what its function is (Milner y Goodale 1995: 229). This 
requires the object’s shape be recognized; a task which DF is unable to accomplish. What Clark 
wants to display here as non-conceptual content (an object’s affordance), is actually  conceptual 
content, since it requires the object’s semantic categorization. The kind of non-conceptual content 
which, I suggest, can be found in DF’s experience, is more basic. It is content that indicates the best 
way to move her hands in order to grasp the object. For the grip to adapt to an object’s function an 
additional conceptual ability is needed, which is precisely what DF lacks.
The fourth point does not imply a problem for my model. What Clark says is precisely  that DF is 
unable to form judgments based of her experiences about the shape of objects. Clark himself 
characterizes this task as the forming of judgments. The point he wants to put forward is that, in 
case of having non-conceptual contents of form in her experience, DF would be able to form certain 
judgments about the possibility of placing an object in a certain space. In the first place, Clark talks 
about the ability to form judgments without involving concepts. Since, in the philosophical frame in 
which I am working, the ability to judge is the conceptual ability  par excellence, I won’t discuss the 
possibility to form judgments without  concepts. Nonetheless, it’s worth mentioning that it is, to say 
the least, counterintuitive and hard to imagine how a judgment could be formed without using 
concepts of any kind; not even demonstrative concepts. If Clark assumes this as a possibility  that 
should be taken seriously in the current debate, he would have to assume the burden of proof. In 
second place, to judge if an object fits in a space it’s necessary to perform a comparative judgment 
between the form and size ob the object, and those of the empty space. These kinds of judgments 
are the ones DF is unable to make. Because of this, the fourth point doesn’t constitute additional 
evidence to argue that DF doesn’t have shape experiences.   
The fifth point is, perhaps, the most problematic for my proposal. For starters, I’ll have to say that 
the tele-assistance model and the EBS hypothesis don’t have a conceptual apparatus that allows 
them to distinguish this pathological situation from the condition of normal human beings. The 
dorsal-dependent information which, according to Clark, is useful to guide movements but isn’t 
found in DF’s experience, can’t be found in the experience of any other human being. Thus, 
achieving success in any motor activity should be surprising to all human beings each time they 
carry  out an action, since the whole visuomotor process happens behind their backs, so to speak. 
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Apart from this, Clark’s point still stands: if DF has non-conceptual experiences which she uses to 
guide her movements, why would she be surprised when her actions are successful? 
Points (3) and (5) present a  serious challenge for the model I am proposing. What these points 
reveal is a lack of integration between DF’s goals and objectives, and the use of visual information 
to control her movements. In Clark’s words, they show this information is isolated from DF’s 
personal agency (2007: 587). How is it possible that a content in DF’s experience can guide her 
movements, but nonetheless be so isolated from her goals and objectives? According to the 
alternative criterion I suggested to ascribe experiences, form contents would count as part of DF’s 
experiences and they would play a role in her cognitive economy as an agent. (3) and (5) contradict 
this idea. However, within the model I am suggesting, an explanation of these two facts can be 
made, which doesn’t necessarily lead to a dissociation of the agent and her experiences. 
In the previous chapter64 I claimed that typical cases of intentional actions involve the use of both 
types of contents of experience. On the one hand, agents make use of conceptual contents to form 
intentions to act. On the other, they use non-conceptual contents to guide their movements. In these 
cases there is an integration of intention and the guidance of movements, which consists in the 
subject’s intention guiding the subject in the process of guiding her movements. The intention 
specifies the state of affairs that is sought with the action and to which bodily movements are, so to 
speak, oriented. In other words, intentional action is typically guided by two normative frames: one 
provided by the subject’s intention, and the other by the disposition of her environment.
This integration is possible partly because both kinds of contents are found in the agent’s 
experience. This allows for the formation of intentions and the guiding of movements to have a 
common ground in experience. The subject is guided by  an intention formed on the base of her 
experience. Hence, there is a clear relation between the content of the intention and the content of 
experience. This is cashed out as follows: an agent selects an action (forms an intention) based on 
the contents of her experience; that is, the contents of her experience enter in the reasoning process 
that leads to the selection of the action. Also, there is a content that is common to both experience 
and intention: the object upon which the agent intends to act is the same object that  she perceives. 
Intentions formed on the base of perception guide the execution of the action. This process of 
guidance consists in the subject knowing what she means to accomplish with her action and 
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compensating the errors in movements that would deviate her from accomplishing it. When 
intentions are formulated on the base of perceptual experience, they allow the subject to have an 
understanding of the conditions in which her intention may be satisfied in terms of what should 
happen in her visual field for the intention to be satisfied. This understanding of the conditions of 
satisfaction in relation with her visual perception allows her to know when certain movements are 
appropriate to satisfy intention and when they  aren’t. This is what it means, at least in part, that a 
subject is guided by an intention when guiding her movements. 
DF’s pathology has the consequence that  her intentions to act aren’t formed on the base of her 
experience, since she can’t form perceptual judgments to support her intentions (in the sense of 
justifying them by entering a practical reasoning, etc.). Nonetheless, she may guide her movements 
based on her experience, since she counts on the correctness conditions of movements that non-
conceptual contents present her with. But these contents can’t be integrated with intentions, since 
the latter aren’t based on experience. There is no common ground for intentions and movements. 
DF may guide her movements, but when she does she can’t be guided by an intention, since it isn’t 
based on the contents of her experience.  
The fact that DF’s intentions are not based on the contents of her experience implies that DF doesn’t 
have a clear notion of what it means to carry out her intention; at least she doesn’t have an 
understanding of its conditions of satisfaction given in terms of her visual experience. DF can 
understand what it means to grab a hammer, but  this understanding isn’t integrated with the 
contents of her visual experience, since she cannot see a hammer. She cannot distinguish its shape, 
recognize it, or categorize it as a hammer. DF’s intention of grasping the hammer hasn’t, for her, 
conditions of satisfaction that she may understand and specify, relative to her current visual 
experience. That a series of movements guided by her lead to her to grabbing a hammer in the 
appropriate way is surprising for her, since the movements’ visual guidance isn’t guided, in turn, 
towards achieving this intention.  
This lack of integration explains why, when DF grabs a hammer, she may  carry  out the appropriate 
movements to grasp it, but she can’t  integrate these movements into a propositionally-formulated 
project: “I will grab a hammer”. Since there is no common ground in experience, the process which 
guides the movements is cut off from DF’s propositional intentions. This explains the fact that DF is 
surprised when her movements are appropriate for fulfilling her intentions. She is unable to evaluate 
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if her movements are appropriate, or not, for a given purpose because the conditions of satisfaction 
of her intentions in terms of her visual experience are unavailable.
This does not mean, however, that  the information guiding those movements and the process of 
guidance itself are isolated from DF’s “personal agency”, as Clark would claim. As stated in the 
previous chapter, the guidance from an intention is an additional element for action. In the absence 
of an intention, the process of guidance by itself guarantees that movements are made by the agent 
and not by some automatic, alien process. What DF’s experience of form contents lacks is a link 
with her propositionally formulated, and rationally selected projects.
This point should be nuanced, of course, if we take into account the fact that DF can spontaneously 
initiate actions such as grasping objects, catching them in the air, or navigating. There does seem to 
be some degree of integration between the non-conceptual contents that guide DF’s movements and 
her intentions. This integration allows one to draw differences with cases of cortical blindness. As I 
said in the first chapter,65  Milner and Goodale claim that a global visual agnosia would be 
experientially undistinguishable from cortical blindness. In that chapter I suggested that we need an 
explanation of the striking dissimilarities in the behavior of these two types of patients; an 
explanation given at the personal level. The main difference is that patients with cortical blindness 
may only use visual information in situations of forced choice, whereas DF retains the capacity to 
initiate actions in a spontaneous way using visual information. 
In the case of cortical blindness, ascribing experiences to patients would amount to postulating the 
dreaded islets of experience that play no role in their cognitive economy. For these cases, the model 
I suggest could concede that visual information guiding movements isn’t found in the subject’s 
experience. In these cases, visuomotor control may happen without the subject’s awareness, and the 
guidance of movements may occur merely through subpersonal routines. My model allows for this 
to happen. The difference with DF and SB would be that for them visual information of shapes does 
play  a role in their cognitive economy, since it allows guiding movements to initiate and execute 
actions in a spontaneous way. Because of this difference, one may say that DF maintains non-
conceptual contents of form in her experience, while patients with cortical blindness do not. 
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DF’s capacity  to begin actions oriented towards objects in a spontaneous way  could probably be 
explained by  the presence of color and texture contents, as Clark suggests. As I mentioned above, 
this interpretation isn’t very  plausible, because of her difficulty  to distinguish objects from their 
background, in some situations. Which of these is the correct interpretation of DF’s abilities is a 
question that will remain open for the moment. The available evidence doesn’t seem sufficiently 
conclusive to choose any of the options, since it seems to be compatible with both. One could only 
answer this question by designing the proper experiment; one that tests DF’s ability to initiate 
spontaneous actions upon objects that she can’t discriminate by means of color or texture cues. On 
the other hand, a developed theory of perceptual content, and of the way in which both kinds of 
content are related, is necessary to explain precisely  how the integration of intentions with the 
guidance of movements is accomplished, in both normal and pathological cases. 
To recapitulate what has been said so far: in light  of the wide view of experience, what  patients with 
visual form agnosia lack is the processing of form contents that may be articulated into perceptual 
judgments. These patients’ visuomotor abilities are explained by  the presence of non-conceptual 
contents, which play a role in guiding movements, but can’t be articulated into judgments. This 
interpretation is consistent with evidence presented by Milner and Goodale, and has two additional 
advantages: (1) it allows for an explanation, on the personal level, of the differences in the behavior 
of DF and patients with blindsight; and (2), it allows an explanation of why normal subjects, as 
opposed to DF, may fully integrate their propositionally formulated projects with their movements’ 
guidance, so the success of their motor activity  in achieving their intentions isn’t surprising for 
them. 
4.2.2 Dissociations between perception and visuomotor control
In the first chapter 66  I presented two groups of experiments that show that in many non-
pathological cases there is a dissociation between subjects’ perceptual reports and visuomotor 
control. The first group includes experiments in which the subject doesn’t report being conscious of 
a change in her visual field, but still adjusts movements of her hand in response to such changes. 
The second group includes experiments in which the subject emits incorrect perceptual judgments 
about the relative size of two objects due to an optical illusion, but adjusts her grasping movements 
in an appropriate way, adapted to the real size of the object. 
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66 See: Section 1.3.2
In both cases, Milner and Goodale maintain that the information that guides visuomotor control 
isn’t part  of the subject’s perceptual experience. In the first group of experiments this is said for two 
reasons: (1) in the cases in which there are reports of a change in stimulus, the report happens 
300ms after the beginning of the visuomotor adjustments; (2) in the cases in which no change is 
reported, subjects were equally, or more, able to adjust their movements to the change. As I said in 
the first chapter, this interpretation is influenced by  the narrow view of perceptual experience. In 
strict sense, what this experiments show is that  the subjects’ perceptual judgments happen after, or 
are inconsistent with, visuomotor adjustments. This evidence can be interpreted in a different way, 
if one admits there can be contents in experience, which guide movements but aren’t part of the 
subject’s judgments. Since we’re talking of a different kind of contents it isn’t necessary, as I’ll 
explain, to say there is an inconsistency. This is why there wouldn’t be a problem in admitting these 
contents are processed in a swifter and more efficient way than propositional contents that are 
reported by the subject, because they don’t  require a process of conceptualization. 
In regard to the second group of experiments, the authors seem to infer that if the judgment 
expressed by the subject is false (when she points to the wrong circle) the subject’s experience is 
equally incorrect, which shows that it’s the outcome of an optical illusion. Since the adjustment 
movements are appropriate, one can infer the visual information that guides them must be correct. 
They  infer from these facts that the information guiding visuomotor adjustments can’t be in 
experience, since it would create an inconsistency with the false content expressed by the subject. 
So, assuming there can’t be inconsistent contents within experience, the authors claim that the 
information guiding visuomotor control is not part of subjects’ experience. 
In the first chapter I said inconsistency is a relation that can only hold between propositional 
contents, since it is a notion defined in terms of truth, and truth is predicated of propositions. This is 
why the idea that there would be an inconsistency presupposes the narrow view of experience. If a 
wide view is adopted, the content that guides movements wouldn’t be seen as propositional content 
and, thus, wouldn’t be inconsistent with the propositional content expressed by the subject’s report. 
Nudds explains yet another way in which both contents can be said to be part  of experience, without 
committing to the existence of an inconsistency. In Nudds’ words, the experiment’s result  can be 
explained, 
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without supposing there is any inconsistency  in the content of the subject's visual 
experience. The presentational content of the subject's experience represents the object as 
having certain (in fact illusory) size; the directive content of the subject's experience 
represents a property of the movement required to grasp  the object. Since the experience 
represents properties of different  things --an object on one hand, and a bodily movement, 
on the other-- there is no inconsistency. Furthermore, since the subject's visual experience 
doesn't represent anything as actually having the action-guiding property, the property is 
not represented in a way that could be inconsistent with the property any object is 
represented as actually having (Nudds 2007: 13-4)
What the quote suggests is that  the (presentational) 67 content  in virtue of which the subject emits a 
false judgment can’t be inconsistent with the (directive) content  that guides her hands’ movements. 
The reason is that, while the first represents a property of the disc (an illusory size), the other 
represents a property of the movement that the subject must carry out to grasp the disc. 
In other words, one can say the content that motivates the false judgment represents how the world 
is in a propositional manner (i.e. which is the largest disc). Meanwhile, the content that guides 
movements is only  useful to the subject as a source of feedback to regulate de path of her hand 
movements, which does not conform a content with propositional structure about a property  of the 
disc (its real size). That is why it  is possible to admit that both contents are found in experience, 
without admitting that experience presents inconsistent contents. In Clark’s words (paraphrasing 
Nudds): “there is no inconsistency  in the content of visual experience here, since these different 
kinds of content share no ‘common currency’ in which to frame a disagreement” (Clark 2009: 1465)
It’s important to note that in his 2001 article, Clark admits there can be inconsistent contents in 
experience and, hence, that the experiment’s results aren’t conclusive (2001: 506). He says that 
admitting this possibility implies the methodological challenge of determining the contents of 
experience, since different experimental designs could show different  contents, which are, 
potentially, inconsistent (2001: 508). Regarding this point, I’ll only say  that the model I am 
suggesting doesn’t have this problem and it doesn’t need to undertake the methodological 
challenge, since: (1) it doesn’t need to posit  inconsistent  contents; and (2) it  involves a criterion to 
attribute contents to the experience of a subject, which is useful for both conceptual contents (which 
are expressed through reports) and non-conceptual contents (for which the subject assumes 
epistemic responsibility by using them as a guide for her action). 
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Finally, I’ll make a short commentary about the experiment conducted by Johnson and Hagaard 
(2005): in the first  chapter I described this experiment, and said its results point to the existence of a 
kind of “motor awareness” that isn’t necessarily  linked with the subjects’ verbal reports. I want to 
suggest these results favor an interpretation in terms of two kinds of contents. This is because, in the 
second stage of the task, subjects accurately reproduce the hand-trajectory  made in the first  stage, 
even though (many  times) they don’t report the shift in the target that motivated the first  trajectory. 
It would seem, then, that the information used to guide the first movement is useful to guide the 
second, even without being available for a report. Thus, the information guiding the movement 
would not only consist of the input for an automatic routine for the online control of the 
movements; but it  would also be available to guide the subject’s movement at a later moment. In 
this sense, it would seem that this information does play a role in the subject’s cognitive economy, 
as I have suggested, and can be counted as content of her experience. Of course, these results could 
be explained by some kind of short term motor memory. Once again, it would be necessary to 
propose appropriate experimental designs, which we don’t possess, to decide between both 
interpretations. I leave this question open for further research.
For now, I am only interested in underlining a possible interpretation for the experiments that 
Milner and Goodale present to build their theory. As long as the narrow view of experience is 
abandoned, it is possible to propose a kind of content  in the subjects’ experience which is useful to 
guide their movements. Since this kind of contents aren’t propositional, they wouldn’t be 
inconsistent with the contents reported by the subjects. So it isn’t necessary to deny that the 
information guiding their movements is part of their experience, in order to avoid saying there are 
inconsistent contents within experience. 
4.3 Conclusions of the chapter
In this chapter I defended two complementary  hypotheses, which seek to make up for the problems 
stemming from the dual visual streams theory: a thesis about action and a thesis about the content of 
perceptual experience. In the philosophical front, the model must answer to the need of avoiding the 
postulation of islets of experience that don’t play any role in the cognitive economy of the agent 
(which has several formulations in the work of philosophers like Dretske, Evans, McDowell, and 
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Clark). In the empirical front, the model must face all the evidence presented by Milner and 
Goodale in favor of the narrow view of experience and the tele-assistance model of action. 
In the philosophical front I have argued that the model I suggest doesn’t commit to the existence of 
islets of experience, since the non-conceptual contents I described are always contents that fulfill a 
function in guiding the subject’s actions, even if they aren’t inputs for a system of propositional and 
conceptual thought. I have suggested that in light of the considerations presented in the second 
chapter, we must adopt a wider view of agency. If it is adopted, it is possible to adopt a wider view 
of experience without falling in the error of postulating isolated bits of experience that play no role 
in the subject’s personal agency. 
In the empirical front, I argued that a minimal reading of the evidence presented by Milner and 
Goodale is consistent with the model I propose. In other words, if the evidence is interpreted 
prescinding from the narrow view of experience, it would be consistent with the model I have 
suggested. In the previous section I underlined some points in which the evidence would seem to 
favor an interpretation in terms of two kinds of contents. Nonetheless, the purpose of the section 
was to show the evidence is, at least, consistent with both interpretations. I also underlined two 
points of debate in which a crucial experiment could lead us to decide between one of the 
interpretations. For now, the debate remains open, and in need for a concrete and fully developed 
theory  about the contents of experience, the link between them, and the way  in which they integrate 
in intentional action. 
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Conclusions
Throughout this thesis I have analyzed the dual visual streams hypothesis, as it is formulated by 
Milner and Goodale. I tried to show that the formulation of this empirical hypothesis is strongly 
influenced by a philosophical understanding of  perceptual experience. This understanding is at the 
basis of their interpretation and presentation of empirical evidence. This view of experience also 
leads to an understanding of intentional action, which I have named the tele-assistance model. The 
view of experience and their model of action are intertwined philosophical theses with important 
and problematic consequences for the current debate about perception and action. 
In the first chapter I discussed the formulation of the theory and the evidence presented by the 
authors and argued that both are influenced by the narrow view of experience, according to which 
the contents of experience are only  those that can be articulated in perceptual judgments; in other 
words, conceptual, or concept-ready, contents. In the light of this view of experience, the authors 
interpret the evidence as showing that the information guiding an agent's bodily  movements is 
outside her experience. I argued that if we put this view aside it is possible to interpret the evidence 
in a weaker way: as showing that the information guiding bodily movements is not available to be 
articulated in judgment or communicated in a report. Abandoning the narrow view of experience 
also entails accommodating the possibility that such information is part of the subject's experience, 
despite not being liable to be articulated in a judgment.
In the second chapter I argued that the tele-assistance model leads to conceptual problems because 
it commits to a disassociated view of action. This dissociation consists in postulating two 
components for action: the formation of an intention, situated at  the personal level  of explanation, 
and the execution of the action, a process guided by automatic routines, happening at a subpersonal 
level. This entails that the theory  cannot account for the subject's responsibility over the bodily 
movements made in the course of an action. There are two reasons for this: (1) the responsibility  for 
a movement implies freedom, and insofar as movements are produced by  automatic nomological 
routines, it  cannot properly be said that the subject is free in the execution of their actions; and (2) 
responsibility for an action or movement involves epistemic responsibility for the information that 
guides the movement, and to the extent that the information guiding the movement is outside the 
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scope of the subject’s reach (i.e. not available in her experience), the subject can not  take epistemic 
responsibility for such information, and therefore can not be take responsibility for her movements. 
A way  out of this problem would be to postulate motor intentions for each movement the agent 
executes. This, however, would lead to an intellectualist view of action, which is inconvenient for 
several reasons. First it implies a cognitive overload for the agent, who would have to carry  out 
practical syllogisms to select each of her movements. Second, this would have the consequence that 
the agents were unable to carry out actions in a skillful way, as evidenced by Knoblauch's case. 
Third, the notion of "intentional action" or "object-oriented action" is blurred, because the content 
of intentions is no longer a distally specified state of affairs, but a bodily movement.
In light of these considerations it is clear that we need a theory of action in which there is room for 
some degree of automaticity  in the execution but allows an account of the subject's responsibility 
over her bodily movements. In other words, a theory in which the agent has the ability to guide her 
movements based on her experience, but which does not involve instrumental reasoning. 
These requirements are met by the glide-path model of action. This model takes the notion of 
guidance, as proposed by Frankfurt, as a criterion to distinguish a subject's actions from movements 
simply  happening in her body. In this model, the subject plays a regulatory role with respect  to her 
movements. She guides them, in the sense that she is willing to compensate deviations and errors, 
where the movements take a wrong course. To meet  this regulatory  role, the subject needs 
normative feedback that  lets her know when her movements are inappropriate to achieve a purpose 
in a particular environment. This feedback must be received in experience. 
This requires that the subject has access, in experience, to the correctness conditions of her 
movements. Only if experience presents certain movements as appropriate and certain others as 
inappropriate, can she meet the regulatory role of guiding her movements. The narrow view of 
experience denies, precisely, that this type of information is available in experience. For this reason, 
the glide-path model requires adopting a wider understanding of perceptual experience in which 
there is a type of content in experience that presents the correctness conditions of her movements 
and is thus able to provide the required normative feedback. 
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The wide view of experience goes hand in hand with the glide-path model of action. In the third 
chapter I explored schematically, and not too deeply, the outlines of a theory experience that is 
consistent with this model of action. In general terms, the theory  would have to posit two types of 
content for experience. A propositionally structured content that fulfills the role of being a warrant 
for experiential judgments; and a content that presents the subject with the appropriate way to move 
in a given environment in order to fulfill her intentions. The postulation of these two types of 
content obeys Milner and Goodale’s (2004) considerations about the engineering of the visual 
system. This theory  allows for a notion of non-conceptual content that follows the line drawn by 
Cussins (2003, 2008) and Nudds (2007). In this view, non-conceptual content has the task of 
providing the subject with the normative feedback needed to guide her movements. In order to 
fulfill this role, it must not be  propositionally structured. 
In the fourth chapter, I defended the proposed model on two fronts. First, in the philosophical front, 
I argued against Clark’s (2007, 2009) view, showing that if one assumes a broad understanding of 
agency, the wide view of perceptual experience does not lead to the postulation of isolated islets of 
experience. This defense led to the formulation of a criterion for the ascription of content to a 
subject's experience. The criterion is the following: “x is a content of experience if and only  if it  is a 
content for which the subject is able to take epistemic responsibility, either through the formation of 
a perceptual judgment or through motor activity”. When a subject  guides her movements based on 
information about her environment, such movements are actions of the subject and the information 
guiding them counts as an experience, insofar as the subjects commits to such information by 
guiding her movements on the base of it. 
Afterwards, the model was confronted against the empirical evidence that, according to Milner and 
Goodale, supports their hypothesis. Taking the discussion in the first chapter as a starting point, I 
showed that the evidence is consistent  with the model I suggest, as long as the narrow view of 
perceptual experience is abandoned.  
Finally, I present a balance of the answers and the questions that remain after this research. Overall 
the thesis explored two models of the relation between visual perception and action. Each of the 
models integrates a view of action with a view of perceptual experience. Both models are equally 
compatible with the empirical evidence reviewed in the thesis.
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From a philosophical perspective, there seem to be good reasons to support either model. Milner 
and Goodale’s model, supported by Andy Clark's argument, has the great advantage of clearly 
avoiding the postulation of isolated islets of experience, since it  maintains as a criterion for 
ascribing content that the information be available to the agent's decision system. In this model 
experience is of an agent because it is available for the reason-based selection and initiation of 
actions. However, we can assume a weaker version of this point, in which  the notion of agency, and 
therefore of experience, is extended. This version has the advantage of accounting for the agent's 
responsibility for her bodily movements and for the visual information that guides them. 
A potential problem with the model I suggest is that it  expands (perhaps too much) the personal 
level of explanation. In the second and the third chapter I adopted an understanding of the personal 
level according to which it comprises everything that is susceptible of normative explanations; that 
is, all that is liable to be explained in terms of what an agent ought to do. Including the subject's 
movements and the contents that guide them in the personal level of explanation means accepting 
that there are normative relations among non-propositional relata. This view involves a wide 
conception of normative relations and explanations, which subsumes everything that can be 
described as correct or incorrect in the light of something else. This clearly  goes against what has 
been traditionally considered as susceptible of normative explanation and as belonging to the 
personal level of explanation.
 McDowell (1994a) is clearly  against this. He argues that we can only understand the rational and 
normative relations as traditionally  understood: in terms of  deductive validity and probabilification. 
The central question this work leaves open is how to respond to McDowell. How can we come to 
understand a normative relation between non-propositional relata? Moreover, can we legitimately 
speak of normativity when talking about bodily movements and non-conceptual content? What 
support can be given to the notion of a non-propositional reason? On the other hand, is saying that 
some information equips the agent with a normative framework for her movements sufficient to 
claim that the execution of actions belongs to the personal level of explanation? The arguments 
developed in this work seek to show, at least, that this is a road worthy of philosophical inquiry, and 
should not be dismissed from the start. 
An exploratory path for these topics can be found in phenomenology, particularly  in Merleau-
Ponty's  concept of motivation, which seeks to open an intermediate space between the notions of 
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causes and reasons (as traditionally understood), showing that there is a wide range of phenomena 
that require normative explanation, and which are not expressible in terms of judgements and 
propositions.68  The understanding of normativity and motivation in the phenomenological line 
followed by   Merleau-Ponty could provide a theoretical basis for my proposal that would go beyond 
the mere intuition that motor activity deserves an explanation in terms of what an agent ought to do 
(i.e., how she ought to move in a certain environment to fulfill her intentions) and not just in terms 
of how, in fact, she moves to perform an action. I am happy for the moment, to point in the 
direction of this path of research, with the intention of resuming at another time.
More specific questions about the interpretation of cases presented by  Milner and Goodale are left 
open. First, how much must should we take into account the behavioral differences between DF and 
patients with cortical blindness for an explanation of their clinical conditions in terms of the 
absence, or presence, of certain contents in their experience? Is it  possible to explain DF’s ability to 
spontaneously  initiate actions only by the presence of color and texture content  in her experience, or 
is it necessary  to postulate some kind of non-conceptual content to which she has access? There is 
not enough evidence to settle this point, but proper experimental design and the development of a 
concrete theory about the integration of the two contents of experience is required. 
Second, to what extent can we say that information about form is integrated into DF’s cognitive 
economy, taking into account her remaining skills, but also the fact that  she is surprised by the 
success of her motor activity? Can we legitimately say that DF's movements based on visual 
information are responsible actions? Third, how would we describe the change in the experience of 
optic ataxics, due to the loss of non-conceptual content? At this point, it would be appropriate to 
look towards the phenomenological tradition, which I unfairly left aside in this research. 
One advantage of Milner and Goodale’s model over the one I have proposed is its simplicity. 
Whereas the glide-path model needs to postulate two kinds of experiential content, and explain the 
relation between them and their integration in intentional action, Milner and Goodale’s model is 
able to explain the evidence with a much simpler conceptual apparatus. What I have tried to show, 
however, is that the model’s conceptual austerity leads to important failures in the explanation of 
action.
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68See: Wrathall 2006; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Kelly 2010; Dreyfus 2007a; 2007b.
In the realm of the strictly philosophical, there are also some specific questions left to answer. To 
begin with, the defenders of non-conceptual content must face the task of developing a theory of 
experience that explains in depth the two types of content and how these are integrated into the 
experience of an agent, to provide a subject with what McDowell (1994a) calls glimpses of the 
world as an independent, objective reality, at the same time that it allows her to act skillfully in a 
manner attuned to her environment. This theory should also explain how experience enables the 
integration of the agent's intentions with the guidance of her movements in performing intentional 
actions. 
This research leaves more open questions than answers. It shows that, both in the philosophical and 
the empirical field, there are open routes for exploration which are as interesting as they are 
challenging.
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